State ex rel. Csank v. Jaffe

• Decision Date: 13 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 68856,68856
• Citation: 668 N.E.2d 996,107 Ohio App.3d 387
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. CSANK et al. v. JAFFE, Judge.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 387

107 Ohio App.3d 387

668 N.E.2d 996

The STATE ex rel. CSANK et al. v. JAFFE, Judge.

No. 68856.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided Nov. 13, 1995.

Csank & Csank Co., L.P.A., and James F. Csank, Brecksville, for relators Epeus Invest. Co. and Paul L. Csank.

Thompson, Hine & Flory and Harry A. Hanna, Cleveland, for relators John Rupert and William Heideloff.

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Marilyn Cassidy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

George R. Penfield, urging denial of writ, Fairview Park, for amicus curiae, Donna M. Rozic.

PORTER, Presiding Judge.

The relators, Paul Csank, Epeus Investment Company, John E. Rupert and William R. Heideloff, commenced this prohibition action against the respondent, Judge Harry Jaffe, to prevent the judge from either reconvening the original jury or convening a new jury to determine the issue of punitive damages in the underlying case, Rozic v. Epeus Invest. Co., Cuyahoga C.P. No. 240298. The respondent, through the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, moved to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, and the relators have fully briefed their position. For the following reasons, this court grants the respondent's dispositive motion, denies the application for the alternative writ and dismisses this action.

In the underlying case, the plaintiff raised claims against the relators, inter alia, for breach of contract, fraud and punitive damages. On December 19, 1994, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages and found her entitled to punitive damages. R.C. 2315.21 prohibited the jury from awarding a sum for punitive damages. Thus, the respondent discharged the jury and scheduled a hearing on the issue of punitive damages for January 17, 1995.

On December 30, 1994, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled R.C. 2315.21 unconstitutional as violating the right to trial by jury under Section 5, Article I of the Ohio Constitution in Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397. The relators moved the respondent for a new trial. On January 17, 1995, the respondent determined that he would not hold a hearing on punitive damages and that he would deny the motion for a new trial, subject to reconsideration on the issue of whether he could reconvene the original jury to determine the amount of punitive damages. Respondent scheduled the next hearing for February 6, 1995, by which time trial counsel were to brief this issue.

On February 6, 1995, the respondent directed that the original jury be reconvened on April 24, 1995, to determine the amount of punitive damages. If reconvening the original jury would be impossible, then a new jury would be impaneled to make the determination. The relators then commenced this prohibition action to stop the respondent from proceeding.

The requisites for prohibition are well established: (1) the court against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law; and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 160, 540 N.E.2d 239. Prohibition will not lie unless it clearly appears that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause which it is attempting to adjudicate or is about to exceed its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe (1941), 138 Ohio St. 417, 20 O.O. 544, 35 N.E.2d 571 paragraph three of the syllabus. "The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its jurisdiction." State ex rel. Sparto v. Darke Cty. Juv. Court (1950), 153 Ohio St. 64, 65, 41 O.O. 133, 133, 90 N.E.2d 598, 599. Furthermore, it should be used with great caution and not issue in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1940), 137 Ohio St. 273, 18 O.O. 40, 28 N.E.2d 641; Reiss v. Columbus Mun. Court (App.1956), 76 Ohio Law Abs. 141, 145 N.E.2d 447. Nevertheless, when a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over a matter, prohibition will lie even if there is an adequate remedy. State ex rel. Tilford v. Crush (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 174, 529 N.E.2d 1245.

In the present case, there is no doubt that the trial court may convene a new jury to decide the amount of punitive damages. R.C. 2311.04 specifically grants the respondent the power "to order any issue to be tried by a jury." Civ.R. 39 in subsections (B) and (C) further provides the trial court with the discretion to submit matters to a jury in those cases in which a jury was either not requested or in which a jury would otherwise not be available. Thus, given these broad grants of power, it cannot be argued that the respondent would be acting beyond his authority to submit the issue of punitive damages to a new jury.

Furthermore, both Ohio and federal courts have recognized the propriety and necessity of submitting the issue of punitive damages to a new jury, when only that issue remains to be resolved. In Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 638, 635 N.E.2d 331, the jury awarded punitive damages against a doctor in an amount probably exceeding his net worth. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed that award as excessive and ordered a remittitur. The court then explicitly recognized that, if the plaintiff refused the remittitur, a jury could be impanelled to determine just the amount of punitive damages. Similarly in Eckmann v. Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17 Bd. of Edn. (N.D.Ill.1986), 636 F.Supp. 1214, the court granted a motion for new trial limited to determining the amount of punitive damages. Recently, in Sprosty v. Pearlview, Inc. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 679, 666 N.E.2d 1180, this court followed Zoppo, reaffirming that R.C. 2315.21 violates the right to trial by jury. Thus, this court remanded the case for further proceedings, e.g., a jury trial, on Sprosty's claim for punitive damages.

Moreover, a new trial may be properly limited to damages only. Indeed, "[a]s a general rule, error with respect to damages should require a new trial on damages only." Channel 20, Inc. v. World...