State ex rel. Dept. Economic Sec. v. Hayden

Decision Date01 July 2005
Docket NumberNo. CV-04-0303-PR.,CV-04-0303-PR.
Citation210 Ariz. 522,115 P.3d 116
PartiesIn re the Matter of STATE of Arizona, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY (Linda Dann), Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jack HAYDEN, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Terry Goddard, Attorney General by Kathryn Harris Kupiszewski, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for the State of Arizona.

Law Offices of Jeff C. Jackson by Jeff C. Jackson and Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A., by Daryl Manhart, Phoenix, Attorneys for Jack Hayden.

Law Offices of Paul G. Ulrich, P.C. by Paul G. Ulrich, Phoenix and Law Offices of Melinda K. Cekander by Melinda K. Cekander, Flagstaff, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Michael Pacheco.

Law Offices of Bill Spence, Ltd. by Brian K. Stanley, Chandler, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Kevin Le Clair and Tony Russell.

OPINION

HURWITZ, Justice.

¶ 1 Arizona law provides that each installment under a child support order becomes "enforceable as a final judgment by operation of law" when it comes due. Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 25-503(H) (Supp.2004). Either the party entitled to receive the installment or the Arizona Department of Economic Security ("ADES") may file a request for a formal written judgment for support arrearages no later than three years after the emancipation of all of the children who were the subject of a child support order. A.R.S. § 25-503(I). Once obtained, such a written judgment is "exempt from renewal and . . . enforceable until paid in full." Id. If no written judgment for support arrearages is timely requested, however, "an unpaid child support judgment that became a judgment by operation of law expires" at the end of that three-year period. A.R.S. § 25-503(H).

¶ 2 Arizona law also assigns to the State the right to the support of a child and spouse who receive assistance under certain federal welfare programs. A.R.S. § 46-407 (2005). The legislature has provided ADES with a variety of administrative remedies to collect child support arrearages. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-505.01(B) (Supp.2004) (income withholding order); A.R.S. § 25-516 (2000) (lien on property of obligor); A.R.S. § 25-521 (2000) (levy on obligor's rights to property).

¶ 3 The question in this case is whether ADES may pursue administrative measures to collect unpaid child support despite having failed timely to request a formal written judgment of arrearages.

I.

¶ 4 In 1977, Linda Dann gave birth to a baby girl. In 1980, Dann filed a petition in superior court to establish paternity and to require the child's father, petitioner Jack Hayden, to pay child support. Hayden admitted paternity and the superior court ultimately ordered him to pay $150 per month in child support. Hayden's child support obligations were assigned to the State after Dann and the child received Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and ADES subsequently initiated administrative measures to collect arrearages.

¶ 5 The child reached the age of majority in 1995. Neither Dann nor ADES requested a formal written judgment for the outstanding support obligations within three years of the child's emancipation. In 2002, Hayden filed a petition seeking to terminate ADES's administrative collection efforts, alleging that his obligation to pay child support had expired under A.R.S. § 25-503(H).1

¶ 6 The superior court rejected Hayden's claim and entered judgment in favor of ADES. The court of appeals affirmed. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 208 Ariz. 164, 168 ¶ 17, 91 P.3d 1007, 1011 (App.2004). We granted Hayden's petition for review because the issue is one of first impression and statewide importance. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120 .24 (2003) and Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

II.

¶ 7 The issue in this case is one of statutory construction: whether A.R.S. § 25-503(H) prohibits ADES from collecting the child support arrearages through administrative measures. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 547 ¶ 8, 105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005). When interpreting a statute, our aim is "to fulfill the intent of the legislature that wrote it." Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003). To determine that intent, we look first to the language of the statute. Id. We interpret statutory language to give effect to each word of the statute, such that "no clause, sentence or word is rendered superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant." Id. Statutes that are in pari materia — relating to the same matter — are construed together as though they constituted one law. Pima County by City of Tucson v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 Ariz. 151, 155, 761 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1988). In seeking to discern legislative intent, "we construe the statute as a whole, and consider its context, language, subject matter, historical background, effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose." People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 401, 403 ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 412, 414 (2002).

A.

¶ 8 In relevant part, A.R.S. § 25-503(H) provides:

The right of a parent entitled to receive support or the department to receive child support payments as provided in the court order vests as each installment falls due. Each vested child support installment is enforceable as a final judgment by operation of law. Unless it is reduced to a written money judgment, an unpaid child support judgment that became a judgment by operation of law expires three years after the emancipation of the last remaining unemancipated child who was included in the court order.

¶ 9 The question is whether the expiration of judgments under subsection (H) functions to cancel outstanding child support arrearages. Hayden argues that because each child support installment becomes a final judgment by operation of law as it falls due, the expiration of the judgment therefore eliminates the debt itself. The State counters that the vested right to receive payment does not become a final judgment but instead merely "is enforceable as a final judgment by operation of law." Therefore, the State contends, the expiration of a judgment that arises by operation of law does not cause the underlying debt to expire. Because the debt survives, the State argues, it may be collected through statutory non-judicial remedies even after the expiration of the judgment.

¶ 10 A commonsense reading of A.R.S. § 25-503(H) and related statutory provisions supports Hayden's interpretation. The statutes provide a comprehensive scheme facilitating the collection of child support installments over the life span of a child support court order. By regulating the effect of the support order, the statutes also necessarily regulate the underlying obligation. See Lamb v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 400, 402, 621 P.2d 906, 908 (1980) ("Since the duty to pay support does not exist unless a judgment, decree or order creates it, it follows that no duty exists if a valid order terminates the obligation."). To be sure, § 25-503(H) does not state in so many words that child support installments "become" judgments when they fall due. But the intent of the statute is clear: each unpaid child support installment is enforceable as if it were a final judgment and, unless timely reduced to a written money judgment, this temporary "operation of law" judgment "expires." Because the child support obligation is statutorily transformed into a temporary judgment, it logically follows that when the judgment expires, so does the obligation. And, once the obligation has expired, it necessarily follows that administrative collection efforts by ADES, as assignee of the obligee's rights, must also be unavailing.2

B.

¶ 11 The argument that the legislature intended for ADES to be cut off from both judicial and administrative remedies when it fails timely to request a written judgment for child support arrearages finds additional support in the broader statutory scheme. Section 25-503(I) provides:

The department (ADES) or its agent or a party entitled to receive support may file a request for judgment for support arrearages not later than three years after the emancipation of all of the children who were the subject of the court order. . . . Notwithstanding any other law, formal written judgments for support and for associated costs and attorney fees are exempt from renewal and are enforceable until paid in full.

The legislature thus provided that ADES would be bound by the same time limits as a private party seeking a written money judgment for child support arrearages. Once a written judgment for arrearages is timely obtained, it remains effective "until paid in full." It would have been a largely meaningless gesture for the legislature to enact this strict time limit on ADES's ability to obtain a written money judgment if lawmakers had intended that the agency retain its administrative collection remedies in perpetuity, with or without a written judgment.3

¶ 12 In addition, § 25-503(H) describes two narrow exceptions to the requirement that a party or ADES must timely request a written judgment of arrearages to prevent support judgments that arise by operation of law from expiring.

A request does not need to be filed within three years if: (1) The court later determines that the actions or conduct of an obligor impeded the establishment of a written money judgment . . . [or] (2) The court later finds that the obligor threatened, defrauded or wrongfully coerced the obligee into not filing a request to reduce any support arrearages to a written money judgment.

A.R.S. § 25-503(H). Neither exception applies here. Yet, ADES, in effect, argues for a third broad exception in all cases in which it seeks to collect upon the arrearage by means of administrative remedies. When the legislature has expressly defined the narrow exceptions to the requirement to timely request a written judgment for support arrearages, we cannot...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • State v. Mangum
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • January 12, 2007
    ...word, clause or sentence superfluous." State v. Story, 206 Ariz. 47, ¶ 13, 75 P.3d 137, 141 (App.2003); see also State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 210 Ariz. 522, ¶ 7, 115 P.3d 116, 117 (2005); State v. Rodriguez, 153 Ariz. 182, 186, 735 P.2d 792, 796 (1987). Reading § 13-3101(A)(......
  • Mackinney v. City of Tucson
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • March 13, 2013
    ...each word, “such that ‘no clause, sentence or word is rendered superfluous, void, contradictory or insignificant’ ” State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 210 Ariz. 522, ¶ 7, 115 P.3d 116, 117 (2005), quoting Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003); accord City of......
  • State v. Dominguez
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 2014
    ...Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, ¶ 9, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006), but rather give operation and effect to each one. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 210 Ariz. 522, ¶ 7, 115 P.3d 116, 117 (2005). Thus, the endangerment statute requires proof of a “substantial risk” of a particula......
  • State v. Dominguez
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 2014
    ...Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, ¶ 9, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006), but rather give operation and effect to each one. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 210 Ariz. 522, ¶ 7, 115 P.3d 116, 117 (2005). Thus, the endangerment statute requires proof of a “substantial risk” of a particula......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT