State ex rel. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Chamberlain

• Decision Date: 29 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. WD 74826.,WD 74826.
• Citation: 372 S.W.3d 24
• Parties: STATE of Missouri ex rel. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006–WF2, Relator, v. The Honorable David P. CHAMBERLAIN, Judge of the Circuit Court of Clay County, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

372 S.W.3d 24

STATE of Missouri ex rel. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY as Trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006–WF2, Relator,

v.The Honorable David P. CHAMBERLAIN, Judge of the Circuit Court of Clay County, Respondent.

No. WD 74826.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

April 10, 2012.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied May 29, 2012.

Application for Transfer

Denied Aug. 14, 2012.

Jennifer A. Donnelli, Kansas City, MO, for relator.

Gregory A. Leyh, Gladstone, MO, for respondent.

Before Writ Division: JAMES M. SMART, JR., Presiding Judge, MARK D. PFEIFFER, Judge and CYNTHIA L. MARTIN Judge.

CYNTHIA L. MARTIN, Judge.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank” and/or “Relator”) seeks a permanent writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of an order compelling discovery in an unlawful detainer action on the subject of its standing. We issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. Our preliminary writ of prohibition is made absolute.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

On March 28, 2011, Deutsche Bank filed a verified petition in unlawful detainer (“Petition”) against Robert L. Lisenbee, Jr. and Sara D. Lisenbee (hereinafter, collectively, “Lisenbees”) in the Circuit Court of Clay County, Missouri, Associate Circuit Court Division. The Petition alleges that a trustee's sale was conducted on February 28, 2011, on property located at 212 Northeast 88th Terrace in Kansas City, Missouri (“Property”), and that Deutsche Bank was and still is “lawfully entitled to peaceable possession” of the Property, having purchased the Property at the trustee's sale. The Petition alleges that the Lisenbees remain unlawful occupants of the Property, notwithstanding having received written notice of Deutsche Bank's purchase of the Property and of the Lisenbees' obligation to vacate the Property.

On July 14, 2011, the Honorable Janet Sutton entered a judgment finding that Deutsche Bank was entitled to possession of the Property and that the Lisenbees were unlawfully detaining the Property. The July 14, 2011, judgment awarded Deutsche Bank possession of the Property.

On July 22, 2011, the Lisenbees filed an application for trial de novo pursuant to sections 512.180.1 and 512.190.¹ The trial de novo was assigned to the Honorable David P. Chamberlain (“Respondent”).

On July 29, 2011, the Lisenbees served discovery requests (interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production) on Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank objected to nearly all of the requests.

At some point, the Lisenbees initiated a separate lawsuit against Deutsche Bank for wrongful foreclosure and to quiet title (“Federal Lawsuit”). In the Federal Lawsuit, the Lisenbees assert that Deutsche Bank did not have standing to enforce a promissory note signed by the Lisenbees and secured by the deed of trust against the Property. The Federal Lawsuit remains pending and is styled Lisenbee v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., Case No. 4:2011–CV–00597 (W.D.Mo.).

In mid-August 2011, Deutsche Bank filed a motion for summary judgment in the unlawful detainer action. Deutsche Bank alleged as an uncontroverted fact that it had purchased the Property on February 28, 2011, at a foreclosure sale and attached in support of this contention a certified copy of the recorded trustee's deed conveying title of the Property to Deutsche Bank.

A few days later, the Lisenbees served additional discovery requests on Deutsche Bank, including a Rule 57.03(b)(4) deposition notice.²

The Lisenbees then filed a Rule 74.04(f) ³ motion requesting that they be permitted to complete discovery before responding to Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment. In an attached Affidavit, the Lisenbees' counsel advised that the discovery was necessary “to consider a primary issue in this lawsuit: the discovery of facts relating to plaintiff's standing and the right to enforce [the Lisenbees' promissory note].” The Affidavit itemized the discovery requests that had been propounded and the subject matters on which a designated corporate representative for Deutsche Bank had been requested to testify. And the Affidavit asserted all discovery requests were related to this “primary issue.” The Affidavit advised that a motion to compel responses to the outstanding discovery propounded on Deutsche Bank would be forthcoming.

In mid-November 2011, the Lisenbees filed a motion to compel discovery alleging that the “principal issue in this [unlawful detainer] lawsuit is [Deutsche Bank's] standing and alleged status as a real party in interest pursuant to Rule 52.01.” ⁴ At several points in the motion, the Lisenbees confirm that the discovery they seek from Deutsche Bank is “designed to elicit discoverable information relating specifically to [Deutsche Bank's] standing and status as a real party in interest.”

Over Deutsche Bank's objection, the Respondent entered his order on December 13, 2011, granting the motion to compel discovery (“Order”). The Order directed Deutsche Bank to respond to specific discovery requests (certain of the propounded interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission) within thirty days. Within the thirty-day deadline, Deutsche Bank filed a motion to enlarge the discovery deadline, which the Lisenbees opposed, ⁵ and filed responses to the requests for admissions identified in the Order.⁶

On or about January 20, 2012, the Lisenbees filed a motion for sanctions based on Deutsche Bank's failure to respond to the discovery identified in the Order. ⁷ On January 31, 2012, Deutsche Bank filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition (“Writ Petition”) in this court alleging that the Respondent's Order was an abuse of discretion.

We entered a Preliminary Writ of Prohibition on February 7, 2012, prohibiting Respondent from enforcing the Order so long as the preliminary writ remained in effect, or should it be made permanent. At our direction, the Lisenbees filed an answer to the Writ Petition, and both parties have filed the briefs permitted by Rule 84.24(i) on an expedited schedule.

Analysis

Deutsche Bank argues that the Respondent's Order is an abuse of discretion because the Order compels discovery on issues that, by statute, may not be adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action and that have no connection to Deutsche Bank's standing to sue for unlawful detainer. We agree.

“[W]hen a trial court makes an order in discovery proceedings that is an abuse of discretion, prohibition is the appropriate remedy.” State ex rel. Plank v. Koehr, 831 S.W.2d 926, 927–28 (Mo. banc 1992). An abuse of discretion exists when a discovery order “ ‘is clearly against the logic of the circumstances, is arbitrary and unreasonable, and indicates a lack of careful consideration.’ ” State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Nixon, 160 S.W.3d 379, 380 (Mo. banc 2005) (quoting State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Messina, 71 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Mo. banc 2002)).

The unlawful detainer remedy is a creature of statute described in Chapter 534 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. “Unlawful detainer proceedings are summary in nature and the ordinary rules and proceedings of other civil actions do not apply.” Fannie Mae v. Truong, 361 S.W.3d 400, 405 (Mo. banc 2012). As such, Missouri courts construe the unlawful detainer statute consistent with its intended “special summary nature.” Lake in the Woods Apartment v. Carson, 651 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Mo.App. E.D.1983).

Section 534.030.1 defines “unlawful detainer” in pertinent part as follows:

When any person willfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other possessions, ... after a mortgage or deed of trust has been foreclosed and the person has received written notice of a foreclosure; ... and after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession of the premises by the person having the legal right to such possession, or the person's agent or attorney, shall refuse or neglect to vacate such possession, such person is guilty of an “unlawful detainer.”

(Emphasis added.) Thus, by legislative mandate, “ ‘the principle issue in an unlawful detainer action is the immediate right of possession.’ ” Walker v. Anderson, 182 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Mo.App. W.D.2006) (quoting S.L. Motel Enters., Inc. v. E. Ocean, Inc., 751 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Mo.App. E.D.1988)).

Consistent with the limited focus of the remedy, the legislature has narrowly defined the proof required of a plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action. Section 534.200 provides in pertinent part that:

The complainant shall not be compelled to make further proof of the ... detainer than that he was lawfully possessed of the premises, and that the defendant ... unlawfully detained the same.

(Emphasis added.) A specific example of “further proof” a complainant shall not be compelled to make is set forth in section 534.210 which provides that:

The merits of title shall in nowise be inquired into, on any complaint which shall be exhibited by virtue of the provisions of this chapter.

(Emphasis added.)

In keeping with the clear and unambiguous provisions of these statutes, our courts have uniformly held that “ ‘[i]ssues relating to title or matters of equity ... cannot be interposed as a defense in unlawful detainer actions.’ ” Walker, 182 S.W.3d at 269 (quoting S.L. Motel Enters., Inc., 751 S.W.2d at 117);see also Central Bank of Kansas City v. Mika, 36 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (holding a trial court has no authority to entertain matters of equity, whether raised as claims or defenses, in an unlawful detainer action); Lake in the Woods Apartment, 651 S.W.2d at 558 (holding that because the sole issue in an unlawful detainer action is possession, equitable issues cannot be interposed as a defense).

The Lisenbees are obviously mindful of these constraints. They have asserted equitable claims relating to the merits of Deutsche Bank's title in the Federal Lawsuit. There is no doubt that the Lisenbees' wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims could not have been...