I-70 Mobile City, Inc. v. Cartwright
Citation | 595 S.W.3d 161 |
Decision Date | 03 March 2020 |
Docket Number | WD 82790 |
Parties | I-70 MOBILE CITY, INC., Respondent, v. Deidre CARTWRIGHT, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Deidre Cartwright ("Cartwright") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lafayette County dismissing her affirmative defense and counterclaim alleging that I-70 Mobile City ("I-70") breached the warranty of habitability in an unlawful detainer action brought by I-70. Cartwright requests that the Court reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. We affirm.
On or about January 1, 2017, Cartwright and Mark O'Brien ("O'Brien") entered into a lease agreement with I-70 for the rental of real property to which I-70 has record title. On October 29, 2018, I-70 filed a petition for rent and possession against Cartwright and O'Brien. On December 6, 2018, an interlocutory default judgment was entered against O'Brien for possession of the property and damages.2 On December 12, 2018, Cartwright filed an answer and counterclaim, and on December 13, 2018, based on an oral motion in open court, the court granted I-70 leave to file an amended petition. On December 20, 2018, I-70 filed its amended petition amending the claim to solely request relief in unlawful detainer. In the amended petition, I-70 alleged that they had provided Cartwright with a written sixty-day notice of its intent to terminate the lease agreement on the same day that the amended petition was filed. I-70 further alleged that since the termination of the tenancy, despite numerous requests, Cartwright refused to relinquish possession of the property. Cartwright filed an answer to the amended petition that admitted all but one of the allegations in the petition. She only denied the allegation in the petition that despite numerous requests she had refused to relinquish possession of the property.3 She also raised an affirmative defense alleging that I-70 breached the implied warranty of habitability by shutting off water services on October 25, 2018 and refusing to provide running water to the property since that date. Cartwright also asserted a counterclaim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability alleging the same facts regarding the lack of running water, as well as a counterclaim for forcible entry and detainer on the ground that I-70 willfully diminished water services to her, its tenant, in violation of section 441.233.4
On April 1, 2019, I-70 filed a motion to strike Cartwright's affirmative defense and counterclaims, arguing that Missouri law does not permit affirmative defenses or counterclaims in unlawful detainer actions. On April 17, 2019, the circuit court dismissed Cartwright's affirmative defense and counterclaims and entered judgment in favor of I-70 for possession of the property and court costs.
This appeal followed.
"[T]he judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." McNabb v. Barrett , 257 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) "We review de novo questions of law decided in court-tried cases." Rhea v. Sapp , 463 S.W.3d 370, 375 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015).
Cartwright argues in her sole point on appeal that her affirmative defense and counterclaim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability were improperly struck because the claims were not equitable challenges to the title to the property or attacks upon title as prohibited by sections 534.200 and 534.210.5 She argues that as a result, she is entitled to assert these claims in this unlawful detainer action as permitted by Missouri Supreme Court Rules 41.01(d), 55.01, and 55.32(b) and sections 517.031 and 534.060.
I-70 contends that sections 534.200 and 534.210 preclude Cartwright from raising these affirmative defenses and counterclaims because they do not concern the right of possession, which is the only issue to be decided in unlawful detainer proceedings.
Unlawful detainer proceedings are governed by section 534.030. In pertinent part, section 534.030.1 states:
Walker v. Anderson , 182 S.W.3d 266, 268-69 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In a 2013 decision, upon which Cartwright principally relies, the Missouri Supreme Court addressed the seemingly categorical bar to counterclaims that had all but cemented itself in Missouri case law. Wells Fargo , 392 S.W.3d at 455. In that case, the Court explained that "though cases came to refer to a prohibition on counterclaims or affirmative defenses, such references simply were a shorthand statement on the effect of the substantive limitations imposed by sections 534.200 and 534.210." Id. In other words, counterclaims and affirmative defenses are not procedurally barred per se but rather barred only if they exceed the limitations of 534.200 and 534.210. Id. These statutes thereby create a substantive "prohibition against a defendant raising equitable defenses and/or challenges to the validity of the plaintiff's title in an unlawful detainer action." Id. at 455 n.7.
Section 534.210 specifically prohibits any inquiry into the "merits of the title" in an unlawful detainer action. As such, "Missouri law recognized that claims for unlawful detainer do not—and cannot—determine ownership of, or validity of title to, real property[,]" instead requiring that claims resting on any issue of title be brought in a separate action. Wells Fargo , 392 S.W.3d at 454.
While section 534.210 makes clear that title may not be questioned in unlawful detainer proceedings, Missouri courts have often interpreted chapter 534 as providing a categorical bar to affirmative defenses and counterclaims, regardless of their subject matter. Id. (). As such, even counterclaims unrelated to title are substantively barred in an unlawful detainer action. Broken Heart Venture, L.P. v. A & F Rest. Corp. , 859 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993) (citations omitted).
Neither Cartwright’s affirmative defense nor her counterclaims—directly or indirectly—require an inquiry into title. Cartwright states, and I-70 does not dispute, that her claims
As such, the case is distinguishable from many unlawful detainer cases in which courts dismissed counterclaims and affirmative defenses wherein the responsive pleadings directly or indirectly questioned title. See Wells Fargo , 392 S.W.3d at 461 (); Walker v. Anderson , 182 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) () ; State ex rel. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co. v. Chamberlain , 372 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) ( ); Cent. Bank of Kansas City v. Mika , 36 S.W.3d 772 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) ( ); Cmty. Bank of Raymore v. Patterson Oil...
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