State ex rel. Duncan v. Am. Transmission Sys., Inc.
Decision Date | 09 February 2022 |
Docket Number | 2021-0770 |
Citation | 166 Ohio St.3d 416,186 N.E.3d 800 |
Parties | The STATE EX REL. DUNCAN, Appellant, v. AMERICAN TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Appellees. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Richard Duncan, pro se.
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Stephen D. Jones, and Jeremy S. Young, Columbus, for appellees.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Richard Duncan, appeals the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissing his complaint against appellees, American Transmission Systems, Inc., and FirstEnergy Corp. (collectively, "ATSI"), the city of Aurora, and Aurora Mayor Ann Womer Benjamin. The court of appeals determined that Duncan's claims asserting private and public nuisance and his requests for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief exceeded its original jurisdiction and that his mandamus claim seeking the commencement of an appropriation proceeding failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.
{¶ 2} Duncan alleges that in 1994, he purchased a landlocked, 0.10-acre parcel of land next to an abandoned right-of-way. He hoped that Aurora would acquire the right-of-way, convert it into a recreational use, and allow him to use it to access a public road from his parcel.
{¶ 3} In 2017, Aurora learned that ATSI was interested in acquiring the right-of-way for the purpose of installing transmission towers. Seeking to prevent the construction of power lines on the right-of-way, Aurora sued to acquire it in 2019. In 2020, Duncan learned that Aurora was planning to settle the lawsuit with ATSI, enabling the project to move forward. And Aurora apparently adopted an ordinance that facilitated the settlement. According to Duncan, ATSI is now the "purported * * * present owner of the abandoned right of way."
{¶ 4} In 2021, Duncan filed a complaint in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. He alleged that if ATSI's project had not been approved, he would likely have acquired an easement from Aurora allowing him to use the right-of-way to access the public road from his lot. And because of the "small size" of his lot and its proximity to ATSI's power lines, he claimed, "any personal or real property placed on his lot * * * will become a safety hazard due to arcing problems." In addition, he asserted, "any human beings or animals present on the lot will be [at] a safety risk and also a health risk due to cancer
concerns." Duncan further alleged that other, larger lots near the right-of-way will not be harmed in the same way. Duncan's complaint sought (1) a declaration that the power lines are a public and private nuisance resulting in a taking of his property, (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction halting the project's construction, (3) a writ of mandamus ordering appellees to commence appropriation proceedings, (4) compensatory damages, and (5) other relief deemed necessary and reasonable.
{¶ 5} ATSI filed a motion to dismiss, which the court of appeals granted. The court determined that its jurisdiction under Article IV, Section 3(B) of the Ohio Constitution did not extend to Duncan's nuisance claims or his requests for declaratory, injunctive, or compensatory relief. And it declined to issue a writ of mandamus ordering appropriation proceedings because Duncan had failed to allege an actionable taking. Duncan then filed this appeal.
{¶ 6} Our review of a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is de novo. State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State , 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12.
{¶ 7} The Ohio Constitution vests the courts of appeals with original jurisdiction in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition, or procedendo and "[i]n any cause on review as may be necessary to complete its determination."
Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3 (B)(1); see also State ex rel. Neer v. Indus. Comm. , 53 Ohio St.2d 22, 23-24, 371 N.E.2d 842 (1978). Because the Constitution does not grant the courts of appeals original jurisdiction to decide nuisance claims or empower them to grant declaratory, injunctive, or compensatory relief, the court of appeals correctly dismissed those aspects of Duncan's complaint. See Pratts v. Hurley , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 21. Although a writ of mandamus is in the nature of a mandatory injunction, the injunctive relief that Duncan seeks is a restraint on the construction of ATSI's project. See State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted , 153 Ohio St.3d 225, 2018-Ohio-1854, 103 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 9-10, 13. That type of relief is in the nature of a prohibitory injunction, which the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to grant. Id.
{¶ 8} Notwithstanding these jurisdictional limits, Duncan argues that it was proper for him to file an omnibus complaint to avoid the preclusive effects imposed by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. But Duncan cites no authority to justify relaxing the jurisdictional limits of the courts of appeals under these circumstances. And his fear that these preclusive doctrines will bar him from raising claims in a later action is unfounded because the doctrines do not apply when, as here, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Donaldson v. Athens City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 68 Ohio St.3d 145, 150, 624 N.E.2d 709 (1994) ().
{¶ 9} Duncan next makes a passing argument that because the court of appeals’ opinion does not discuss his allegations against Aurora, we must reverse. We reject this proposition of law given the lack of meaningful analysis in Duncan's brief. See Mason City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision , 138 Ohio St.3d 153, 2014-Ohio-104, 4 N.E.3d 1027, ¶ 38 ( ).
{¶ 10} In determining whether the court of appeals correctly dismissed Duncan's mandamus claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we must presume the truth of the complaint's factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in Duncan's favor. State ex rel. Martre v. Reed , 161 Ohio St.3d 281, 2020-Ohio-4777, 162 N.E.3d 773, ¶ 8. "However, unsupported legal conclusions, even when cast as factual assertions, are not presumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss."
Id. at ¶ 12. Our review of a decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is de novo. Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 11} "The United States and Ohio Constitutions guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. , 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 765 N.E.2d 345 (2002), judgment modified in part on other grounds , 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-4905, 775 N.E.2d 493 ; see Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 19. A property owner alleging a taking of private property may institute a mandamus action to compel the state to commence appropriation proceedings.1 State ex rel. New Wen, Inc. v. Marchbanks , 159 Ohio St.3d 15, 2020-Ohio-63, 146 N.E.3d 545, ¶ 15. To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, the relator must establish by clear and convincing evidence (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Id. (Citations omitted.)
State ex rel. OTR v. Columbus , 76 Ohio St.3d 203, 206, 667 N.E.2d 8 (1996).
{¶ 12} Duncan argues that he adequately pled a compensable taking by alleging that his property "will become a safety hazard due to arcing problems" and that "any human beings or animals present on the lot will be [at] a safety risk and also a health risk due to cancer
concerns." Arcing is a phenomenon described as a "sustained luminous discharge of electricity across a gap in a circuit or between electrodes." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 64 (11th Ed.2020).
{¶ 13} The court of appeals rejected Duncan's arcing argument based on Smith v. Cent. Power Co. , 103 Ohio St. 681, 137 N.E. 159 (1921), quoting the following sentence: "The mere fact of the danger attendant upon the maintenance of high voltage wires in front of the property is not a valid ground of objection, unless it is also an interference with access, light, air, or view," id. at 699, 137 N.E. 159 (Marshall, C.J., concurring). In doing so, however, the court of appeals failed to specify that it was quoting a concurring opinion.
{¶ 14} But even if the court of appeals improperly relied on the Smith concurrence, we will not reverse a correct judgment supported by flawed reasoning. See State ex rel. McGrath v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. , 100 Ohio St.3d 72, 2003-Ohio-5062, 796 N.E.2d 526, ¶ 8. And "[w]e review a judgment of the court of appeals in a mandamus action filed in that court ‘as if the action had been filed originally in [this court].’ " State ex rel. Dynamic Industries, Inc. v. Cincinnati , 147 Ohio St.3d 422, 2016-Ohio-7663, 66 N.E.3d 734, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. , 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 164, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967).
{¶ 15} Here, the gravamen of Duncan's allegation is that ATSI's power lines pose a risk of harm.2 But Duncan cites no...
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