State ex rel. Gardner v. Holm

• Citation: 62 N.W.2d 52,241 Minn. 125
• Decision Date: 29 January 1954
• Docket Number: No. 36177,36177
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GARDNER et al. v. HOLM, Secretary of State et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 52

62 N.W.2d 52

241 Minn. 125

STATE ex rel. GARDNER et al. v. HOLM, Secretary of State et al.

No. 36177.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 29, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

Under Minn.Const. art. 6, § 6, M.S.A., which provides that judges of the district courts of this state 'shall receive such compensation at stated times as may be prescribed by the legislature,' the signature of the governor is not a necessary prerequisite to the validity of an act of the legislature prescribing such salaries.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Geo. B. Sjoselius, Deputy Atty. Gen., Victor J. Michaelson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

E. Luther Melin, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.

Clifford W. Gardner, St. Paul, William W. Gibson, Minneapolis, Edward L. Gruber, Duluth, for respondents.

Gerald T. Mullin, Minneapolis, Joseph N. Moonan, Waseca, amici curiae.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

At the 1953 session, both houses of our legislature by majority vote passed an act prescribing the salaries of judges of the district court. The legislature thereafter adjourned sine die without any action having been taken on the act by the governor. Contending that under Minn.Const. art. 6, § 6, M.S.A., the governor's signature was not necessary to validate such act, relators, as taxpayers and as members and officers of the Minnesota State Bar Association, commenced this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state, revisor of statutes, and commissioner of administration to recognize said act as a valid act of the legislature prescribing such salaries. After a trial, a peremptory writ of mandamus was issued by the district court of Ramsey county. Judgment was entered thereon, and this appeal is from such judgment.

First we should dispose of a question which has not been directly raised but is nevertheless involved and has been given much publicity; that is, whether we are competent to hear and determine the case at all. While the members of this court are not directly interested in the case now before us, we must frankly admit that there is such an indirect interest that were it possible to do so we should all be happy to declare ourselves disqualified. Nothing is better established than the principle that no judge or tribunal should sit in any case in which he is directly or indirectly interested. See, Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259. However this principle must yield to the stern necessities of a case; and when there is no other tribunal that can determine the matter, it is the duty of the court, which would ordinarily be disqualified, to hear and determine the case, however disagreeable it may be to do so. The judicial function of courts may not be abdicated even on the grounds of interest when there is no other court that can act. Whatever may be the law in other states, it is clear that under our constitution there is no provision whereby we can escape the duty imposed upon us to determine this case. Minn.Const. art. 6, § 3, contains the only provision for the substitution of others for members of this court who are disqualified. As far as here pertinent it reads:

'District judges may act where supreme judges are disqualified. Whenever all or a majority of the judges of the supreme court shall, from any cause, be disqualified from sitting in any case in said court, the governor, or, if he shall be interested in the result of such case, then the lieutenant governor, shall assign judges of the district court of the State, who shall sit in such case in place of such disqualified judges, with all the powers and duties of judges of the supreme court.'

Unfortunately, here the judges of the district court are more directly interested in the case than we are, so obviously we could not abdicate in their favor.

This proposition is, however, nothing new. See, Payne v. Lee, supra. The general principle is stated in 30 Am.Jur., Judges, § 55, as follows:

'By the great weight of authority, the rule of disqualification must yield to the demands of necessity, and a judge or an officer exercising judicial functions may act in a proceeding wherein he is disqualified by interest, relationship, or the like, if his jurisdiction is exclusive and there is no legal provision for calling in a substitute, so that his refusal to act would destroy the only tribunal in which relief could be had and thus prevent a determination of the proceeding.'

In Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247, 40 S.Ct. 550, 551, 64 L.Ed. 887, 890, 11 A.L.R. 519, the Supreme Court of the United States had before it a case involving the question whether the salaries of federal judges were subject to federal income taxes. With respect to the court's right and duty to determine the matter, the court said:

'* * * Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, * * * we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us; and this although each member has been paying the tax in respect of his salary voluntarily and in regular course. But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation, in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go. He brought the case here in due course, the government joined him in asking an early determination of the question involved, and both have been heard at the bar and through printed briefs. In this situation, the only course open to us is to consider and decide the cause--a conclusion supported by precedents reaching back many years.'

In State ex rel. Null v. Polley, 34 S.D. 565, 570, 138 N.W. 300, 302, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 788, the South Dakota court said:

'* * * Had we declined to act in such case, plaintiff would have been without a remedy, and defendant, whether his proposed acts were legal or illegal, would be out of reach of the law and would be a law unto himself. In such cases the rule of disqualification of judges is deemed of less importance than the denial of the constitutional right to a forum in which rights may be adjudicated. And, however embarrassing the situation may be to us, we are unanimously of opinion that this court should not abdicate its functions and duties in any case, where such action would, in effect, deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights.'

See, also, Federal Const. Co. v. Curd, 179 Cal. 489, 177 P. 469, 2 A.L.R. 1202; State ex rel. Wickham v. Nygaard, 159 Wis. 396, 150 N.W. 513, Ann.Cas.1917A, 1065; Annotation, 39 A.L.R. 1476.

It must follow that, there being no other tribunal to which the case can be submitted, the duty rests on us to determine the issues presented, even though to all of us it is embarrassing to have to do so.

In the final analysis the decision in this case must rest upon the interpretation of the following language used in Minn.Const. art. 6, § 6:

'The judges of the * * * district courts * * * shall receive such compensation at stated times as may be prescribed by the legislature; * * *.'

Art. 4, § 1, defines 'legislature' as follows:

'The legislature shall consist of the Senate and House of Representatives, * * *.'

If we were at liberty to consider only these two provisions of our constitution there could be no doubt as to the true meaning of the language used. Clearly, the governor is not part of the legislature. In construing a provision of our constitution, however, we are governed by certain well-established rules. Foremost among these is the rule that, where the language used is clear, explicit, and unambiguous, the language of the provision itself is the best evidence of the intention of the framers of the constitution. If the language is free from obscurity, the courts must give it the ordinary meaning of the words used. This rule was clearly stated in one of the very first cases before our supreme court after the adoption of our constitution. In Minnesota & Pacific R. Co. v. Sibley, 2 Minn. 13, at page 20, Gil. 1, at page 9, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Emmett, said:

'In construing a statute or constitutional provision, the great object is to ascertain and interpret so as to carry out the intention of the lawgiver; and as a primary rule, the language used is to be first considered, as being the best evidence of what that intention is; and when the words are clear, explicit, unambiguous, and free from obscurity, courts are bound to expound the language according to the common sense and ordinary meaning of the words.'

With respect to the provision then under consideration, the court said, 2 Minn. 20, Gil. 9:

'* * * It is only by interpolating words in the constitution which the framers thereof expressly rejected, that any well founded doubt can be entertained as to the meaning of the language used.'

In State ex rel. Childs v. Sutton, 63 minn. 147, 149, 65 N.W. 262, 263, 30 L.R.A. 630, we said:

'* * * Where the language of the constitution is plain, we are not permitted to indulge in speculation concerning its meaning, nor whether it is the embodiment of great wisdom. A constitution is intended to be framed in brief and precise language, and represents the will and wisdom of the constitutional convention, and that of the people who adopt it. It stands, not only as the will of the sovereign power, but as security for private rights, and as a barrier against legislative invasion. It has been well said that 'the constitution, which underlies and sustains the social structure of the state, must be beyond being shaken or affected by unnecessary construction, or by the refinements of legal reasoning."

In that case we quote with approval the following statement of the rule from Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps, 7 N.Y. 9, 97 (63 Minn. 150, 65 N.W. 263):

"If * * * the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then...