State ex rel. GMS Management Co., Inc. v. Callahan

Decision Date16 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-385,88-385
Citation543 N.E.2d 483,45 Ohio St.3d 51
PartiesThe STATE ex rel. GMS MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., v. CALLAHAN, Judge, et al.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Civ.R. 52 is inapplicable to forcible entry and detainer proceedings on the authority of Civ.R. 1(C). (Cuyahoga Metro. Housing Auth. v. Jackson [1981], 67 Ohio St.2d 129, 21 O.O.3d 81, 423 N.E.2d 177, followed.)

2. In forcible entry and detainer proceedings a trial judge may, however, prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte within a reasonable time after a hearing on the merits. In such a proceeding, a reasonable time would be seven working days after such a hearing.

The relator, GMS Management Company, Inc. ("GMS"), is a corporation engaged in the business of real estate management. On January 21, 1988, GMS filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint in the Willoughby Municipal Court against a tenant seeking restitution and money damages. A hearing date was set and GMS deposed the tenant. A hearing was held on February 10, 1988, at which time one of the respondents, Judge Dennis M. Callahan, took the matter under consideration.

On February 26, 1988, GMS filed the instant action in this court requesting writs of mandamus and prohibition. Specifically, GMS has requested this court to issue a writ ordering Judge Callahan and any acting, assigned or sitting judge of the Willoughby Municipal Court to proceed in forcible entry and detainer cases in a timely fashion. Finally, on February 29, 1988, Judge Callahan rendered judgment in favor of the tenant in the underlying action and, also, sua sponte, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On March 18, 1988, this court granted an alternative writ in mandamus and allowed Judge Callahan (as well as the unnamed respondents) until March 25, 1988 to show cause why a peremptory writ should not be issued. Subsequently, on March 25, 1988, respondents filed an answer stating, inter alia, that GMS was not entitled to relief because mandamus was an inappropriate remedy, that the action was moot, since a judgment had been rendered in the underlying case on February 29, 1988, and that the same issues were pending in an original action for mandamus and prohibition in the Lake County Court of Appeals. In addition, in their brief, filed May 31, 1988, respondents contended that relator had an adequate remedy by way of appeal.

On February 28, 1989, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss restating, in part, their answer to the complaint noting that the case was moot and that neither mandamus nor prohibition was the appropriate relief to control future actions by the Willoughby Municipal Court.

Paul M. Greenberger, Beachwood, for relator.

B. Lawrence Allen, Willoughby, Director of Law, for respondents.

HOLMES, Justice.

The key issue presented in this case concerns whether GMS is entitled to have a writ in mandamus issue from this court to compel the Willoughby Municipal Court to proceed with future forcible entry and detainer actions in a summary fashion by entering a "general judgment" pursuant to R.C. 1923.09 1 rather than Civ.R. 52, 2 which provides that upon request the trial court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as part of the record. Also, we will address whether it was proper for Judge Callahan to have delayed the entry of judgment while preparing findings of fact and conclusions of law sua sponte in the underlying forcible entry and detainer proceeding.

As a threshold matter, however, we address respondents' motion to dismiss. Although respondents' motion to dismiss does not state specifically, it appears that the motion to dismiss is styled as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In essence, respondents assert that a duplicate lawsuit involving the same issues as this case has been filed by GMS in State, ex rel. GMS Management Co., v. Callahan, Lake App. No. 13-017, filed November 17, 1987, and is currently pending. Additionally, the respondents claim this case is moot since the trial court entered a final judgment in the underlying forcible entry and detainer action in GMS Management Co. v. MacChesney (Feb. 29, 1988), Willoughby No. 88 CVG 00123, unreported.

In O'Brien v. Univ. Community

Tenants Union (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus, this court held:

"In order for a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. ( Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 [78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80], followed.)"

After reviewing the complaint submitted by GMS we cannot reasonably conclude beyond doubt that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The case which respondents contend has the same issues as the one at bar is still pending before the Lake County Court of Appeals. We note that the underlying case before us is against a party other than the ones present in the underlying case before the court of appeals. Specifically, the underlying forcible entry and detainer actions in both cases are against different tenants. 3 Also, this court has held "[t]he sole fact that an action is pending in an inferior court of this state does not, ipso facto, deprive this court of jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint in mandamus." State, ex rel. Tulley v. Brown (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 235, 237, 58 O.O.2d 489, 490, 281 N.E.2d 187, 189 (where an action is pending in a common pleas court, the Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction); cf. State, ex rel. First Natl. Bank v. Botkins (1943), 141 Ohio St. 437, 25 O.O. 576, 48 N.E.2d 865. Therefore, the fact that a similar action is pending in the court of appeals does not preclude this court from exercising jurisdiction.

The respondents urge this court to dismiss this case for mootness since the underlying action has already been decided on the merits. However, we held in State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., v. Barnes (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 165, 527 N.E.2d 807, paragraph one of the syllabus, that even though a case may be moot, a court may still "hear the [case] where the issues raised are 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " See, also, State, ex rel. The Repository v. Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 28 OBR 472, 474, 504 N.E.2d 37, 39; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 602-603, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2617-2618, 73 L.Ed.2d 248; Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC (1911), 219 U.S. 498, 514-516, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283-284, 55 L.Ed. 310 State, ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., v. Kainrad (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 349, 351, 75 O.O.2d 435, 436, 348 N.E.2d 695, 696. In State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., the relator's reporter was barred from attending a meeting of the city council and mayor. The meeting had concluded before the case could be decided on the merits by any court. Therefore, the council could meet and bar individuals from attending meetings periodically without having to change its practice. Consequently, the issue before the court in State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." We conclude that the issue presented here is one that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." We realize that allowing cases to reach this court in this manner is unusual however, we feel that these types of issues should be addressed, to more fully accomplish the aims of justice. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and under the rationale of State, ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., we must overrule respondents' motion to dismiss.

It is contended by GMS that a writ of mandamus should be issued due to certain evidence of delay between hearings and the rendering of general judgments by the Willoughby Municipal Court in forcible entry and detainer proceedings. Additionally, GMS claims, in essence, that the Willoughby Municipal Court judges should not delay the proceedings by preparing unsolicited findings of fact and conclusions of law. GMS asserts that the Willoughby Municipal Court trial judges should follow R.C. 1923.09, rather than Civ.R. 52, in rendering general judgments in forcible entry and detainer proceedings. Lastly, GMS contends that forcible entry and detainer actions in the Willoughby Municipal Court should not be delayed or continued beyond eight days unless there is compliance with the bond requirement of R.C. 1923.08. 4

In addressing the issue of when mandamus is an appropriate remedy, this court has held that, "[i]n order for the extraordinary writ of mandamus to issue, a court must find that the relator has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, that the respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and that relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law." Freshour v. Radcliff (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 181, 182, 519 N.E.2d 395, 396, citing State, ex rel. Westchester v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus; see, generally, The Chapel v. Solon (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 3, 530 N.E.2d 1321; State, ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 6 OBR 50, 51, 451 N.E.2d 225, 226; State, ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 8 O.O.3d 36, 374 N.E.2d 641. In the present case GMS has made sufficient allegations that, if found to be true, entitle it to relief. Also, the respondents are under a clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, namely, render judgments in forcible entry and detainer proceedings. And finally, GMS and others similarly situated lack an adequate remedy at law if the respondents unreasonably delay their submission of judgment entries in order to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the writ of mandamus is the appropriate...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • T&R Props., Inc. v. Wimberly
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 2020
    ...would "utterly destroy the summary nature of forcible entry and detainer proceedings." Id. See also State ex rel. GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Callahan , 45 Ohio St.3d 51, 55, 543 N.E.2d 483 (1989) ("In light of the summary nature of forcible entry and detainer proceedings pursuant to R.C. Chapter......
  • Deborah Lewis v. James Powers
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1997
    ... ... with a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon ... which relief could be ... Murray (Feb. 26, ... 1996), Mont. Co. App. No. CA 15030, unreported. The frivolous ... Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc ... (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 291, 610 ... State ex rel Fant v. Sykes (1987) 29 Ohio St.3d 65, ... See State ... ex rel. GMS Management Co. v. Callahan (1989), 45 Ohio ... St.3d ... ...
  • Danielle Haney v. Kenneth and Tammy Roberts
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • February 10, 1998
    ... ... A pleading shall state as a ... counterclaim to any claim which at ... Ltd. Partnership v. H.O.T., Inc ... (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 475, 645 N.E.2d ... For the ... same reason, in State ex rel. GMS Management Co., Inc. v ... Callahan ... ...
  • State ex rel. Eliza Jennings, Inc. v. Noble
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1990
    ...(1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 15 O.O.3d 53, 399 N.E.2d 81, paragraph one of the syllabus; accord State, ex rel. GMS Management Co., v. Callahan (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 51, 54, 543 N.E.2d 483, 486; The Chapel v. Solon (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 3, 530 N.E.2d 1321; State, ex rel. Berger, v. McMonagle (1......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT