Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 08 July 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1524,80-1524
• Citation: 21 O.O.3d 81,67 Ohio St.2d 129,423 N.E.2d 177
• Parties: , 21 O.O.3d 81 CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. JACKSON, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 129

67 Ohio St.2d 129

423 N.E.2d 177, 21 O.O.3d 81

CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. JACKSON, Appellee.

No. 80-1524.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 8, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

Civ.R. 53(E) and 54(B) by their nature are clearly inapplicable to proceedings in forcible entry and detainer, on the authority of Civ.R. 1(C).

This matter arose as a proceeding in forcible entry and detainer and an action for money damages in Cleveland Municipal Court on October 12, 1979. The landlord, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, sought to evict Norman Jackson, a tenant at the Riverside Park Estates for non-payment of rent, and to collect that back-rent in the form of civil damages. The matter was referred to Walter J. Russell, referee, "for trial and decision of all the issues of law and fact in the action." ¹ On November 5, 1979, the referee heard the case, and concluded that the defendant was "guilty as charged." That same day, the trial judge approved the "report" and rendered final judgment for plaintiff. No final disposition was made of the claim for money damages. Defendant timely appealed, and, on September 2, 1980, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, finding the trial judge committed reversible error by failing to comply with the provisions of Civ.R. 53(E). ² Plaintiff then appealed this reversal, claiming the Court of Appeals violated Civ.R. 54(B) by ruling on the correctness of the forcible entry and detainer judgment absent final disposition by the trial court of the claim for money damages. ³

This cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Timothy A. Marcovy, Chardon, for appellant.

Jose A. Villanueva and Thomas W. Weeks, Cleveland, for appellee.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice.

At issue is the applicability of Civ.R. 53(E) and 54(B) to actions in forcible entry and detainer. While the Rules of Civil Procedure are generally applicable to all civil proceedings in Ohio, the drafters carved out certain exceptions to their use, as provided in Civ.R. 1(C):

"These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure (3) in forcible entry and detainer; * * * "

Therefore, we must determine whether Civ.R. 53(E) and 54(B) are "by their nature * * * clearly inapplicable" to forcible entry and detainer proceedings.

Forcible entry and detainer, as authorized in R.C. Chapter 1923, is a summary proceeding in which "any judge of a county court" may make inquiry into disputes between landlords and tenants, and, where appropriate, order restitution of the premises to the landlord. ⁴ This is a civil remedy provided by statute and intended to affect only the question of the present right to possess real property. "The purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statutes is to provide a summary, extraordinary, and speedy method for the recovery of possession of real estate in the cases especially enumerated by statute." 24 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 455, Forcible Entry and Detainer, Section 2. ⁵

The purpose of the forcible entry and detainer statutes is to provide immediate possession of real property. Haas v. Gerski (1963), 175 Ohio St. 327, 330, 194 N.E.2d 765. Given its summary nature, the drafters of the Rules of Civil Procedure were careful to avoid encrusting this special remedy with time consuming procedure tending to destroy its efficacy. In a recent case, this court refused to allow the pendency of a collateral action in common pleas court to stay proceedings in Municipal Court in forcible entry and detainer. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Court (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 208, 400 N.E.2d 391.

Given the summary nature of this proceeding, and recognizing that the crowded dockets common to Municipal Courts in Ohio require use of referees, we find no need to compel strict adherence to Civ.R. 53 governing referees. Rather, the trial court need only comply with the forcible entry and detainer statute provisions requiring a judge, and not the referee, to make the final judgment entry, as the trial court did in this case. Civ.R. 53(E), requiring a 14 day delay between the filing of the report by the referee and the final judgment entry by the judge, by its nature is clearly inapplicable since it would destroy the summary nature of forcible entry and detainer proceedings.

By similar reasoning, we conclude that Civ.R. 54(B), governing judgments upon multiple claims, is inapplicable to this special proceeding. Commonly, claims to recover possession of real property in forcible entry and detainer are joined with claims for damages for non-payment of rent. ⁶ Were we to apply Civ.R. 54(B), the judgment appealed from here would be provisional and non-enforceable, since the trial court, in failing to rule on the claim for money damages, did not specify that "no just reason for delay" of appeal existed. Such a situation would utterly destroy the summary nature of forcible entry and detainer proceedings. Therefore, we hold that a judgment entry giving or denying a present right to possession of property, under R.C. Chapter 1923, is appealable even though all the causes of action have not been adjudicated.

Finding that, under the authority of Civ.R. 1(C), neither Civ.R. 53(E) nor 54(B) are applicable to proceedings in forcible entry and detainer, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Judgment reversed.

CELEBREZZE, C. J., WILLIAM B. BROWN, PAUL W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER and HOLMES, JJ., concur.

1 The docket sheet judgment entry consisted of a stamped entry, as follows:

"Action referred to Walter J. Russell Referee, for trial and decision of all the issues of law and fact in the...