State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court In and For King County, 25131.

• Decision Date: 25 May 1934
• Docket Number: 25131.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GRIFFITHS v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

33 P.2d 94

177 Wash. 619

STATE ex rel. GRIFFITHS v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 25131.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 25, 1934

Department 2.

Certiorari by State of Washington, on the relation of Austin E Griffiths, against Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for the County of King and the Honorable John A Frater, as Judge thereof, to review certain proceedings of such court.

Affirmed.

John S. Robinson and Griffiths & Cluck, all of Seattle, for relator.

W. G McLaren, of Seattle, amicus curiae.

Nelson R. Anderson, of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

Relator is a director of school district No. 1. His term commenced in June, 1932, and expires in June, 1935. On March 13, 1934, he was elected councilman of the city of Seattle for a term of three years commencing June 4, 1934. After qualifying for the office of councilman, relator announced that he would hold both offices and perform the duties of each. An action was thereupon begun by a taxpayer to test the right of the relator to hold the office of councilman while serving as school director. Relator's demurrer to the complaint was overruled by the court. Upon the refusal of relator to plead further, the court entered a decree prohibiting relator from taking or holding the office of councilman unless he should resign or retire from the office of school director. Upon the application of relator, a writ of certiorari issued from this court to review the proceedings of the court below. The matter is now Before us upon the return to the writ.

Article XIX, § 13, of the Charter of the city of Seattle provides, in part, as follows: 'Officers Not to Hold Other Office; Exceptions; Not Interested in Contracts; Not to Accept Passes; Forfeiture of Office; Forfeiture of Salary; Recovery of Forfeited Salary:--No head of department or other elective or appointive officer, councilman or member of any board, commission or bureau, created by or under this charter, except policemen or firemen, shall hold any other office, federal, state, county or municipal, except in the National Guard or as a notary public * * *.' The remainder of the section contains provisions prohibiting elective or appointive officers of the city from being employed by the city in any other department, or from being interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with the city, or from accepting passes from any transportation company operating within the city.

It is apparent from a reading of this section that the framers of the city charter determined that the persons named in the section should not hold any other office except as therein expressly permitted. There can be no public office other than federal, state, county, or municipal. These descriptive words add nothing except emphasis to what is already compendiously expressed in the preceding word 'office.' Beyond that, their only effect is to evidence a meticulous endeavor to discriminate between public offices and offices of a private nature. Immediately following these attributive words occur the exceptions, with such particularity as to leave no room for doubt concerning what was included therein and what was to be excluded therefrom.

Relator contends that the word 'municipal,' as used in the charter, must be interpreted in the limited sense of the word 'city,' rather than in its broader signification. The ablative effect of such construction is at once apparent. The broad and comprehensive meaning of the term 'any other office,' emphasized by the equally comprehensive adjective phrase 'federal, state, county or municipal,' would, under relator's contention, mean something less than the words naturally imply. On the other hand, if the framers of the charter had intended the construction for which relator contends, it is most reasonable to assume that they would either have used the word 'city,' which is the word used elsewhere in the same section, or else they would have specifically excepted from 'municipal' office those particular offices which they did not intend to include, just as they did with respect to National Guardsmen and notaries public. The narrow range of the exceptions affords the strongest evidence of intent to include all other offices, of every kind and description.

A school district is a municipal corporation. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 4702; Bates v. School Dist. No. 10, 45 Wash. 498, 88 P. 944; Seattle High School Ch. No. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 P. 994, 72 A. L. R. 1215. Directors of school districts are unquestionably school district officers under Rem. Rev. Stat. §§ 4775, 4776, and 4786. It must logically follow that school directors are municipal officers. We have held that under a constitutional provision authorizing the investment of permanent school funds in national, state county, or municipal bonds, such funds could be...