State ex rel. Harris v. Capizzi
| Decision Date | 04 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 29278 |
| Citation | 199 N.E.3d 31 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio, EX REL. Andrea M. HARRIS, Relator v. Hon. Anthony CAPIZZI, Judge, et al., Respondents |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶ 1} Relator Andrea M. Harris filed a complaint seeking a writ of prohibition against Judge Anthony Capizzi and Magistrate John Kolberg of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. She claims that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the custody of A.Y.S., her minor child, and that a Nevada court, which entered a prior custody order, has exclusive jurisdiction over the child. Harris asks that we vacate the juvenile court's orders in Montgomery J.C. No. G-2017-007314, and return custody of A.Y.S. to her. This matter is now ripe for a determination on the merits.
{¶ 2} According to the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, Harris and Father, who have never been married, are the biological parents of A.Y.S., who was born in Nevada in 2012. In January 2014, a Nevada family court established custody and visitation rights regarding A.Y.S. through a shared parenting order. (Compl. Ex. A.) Four months later, Harris and A.Y.S. moved to Ohio; Father remained in Nevada.
{¶ 3} In 2016, the parents filed a joint stipulation regarding the custody order, which was adopted by the Nevada court. (Compl. Ex. B.) The parties’ stipulation modified the holiday and visitation schedule and further provided that the parties would share joint legal custody of A.Y.S., but Harris would have full physical custody of the child. The parties expressly agreed that Harris would permanently reside in Ohio.
{¶ 4} On December 21, 2017, Maternal Grandfather filed a "motion for ex parte emergency order" in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court, seeking custody of A.Y.S. The parties agree that, at a hearing on the emergency custody motion, Harris informed the juvenile court about the Nevada custody order. (See Compl.; Answer ¶ 11.) Harris alleged that the magistrate responded that Nevada had lost jurisdiction because A.Y.S. was living in Ohio. Respondents deny that Magistrate Kolberg told Harris that Nevada had lost jurisdiction. (Answer ¶ 11.) The magistrate subsequently granted interim temporary emergency custody of A.Y.S. to Maternal Grandfather. (Compl. Ex. C.) On March 8, 2018, the juvenile court granted legal custody of A.Y.S. to Maternal Grandfather, terminated Father's out-of-state child support obligation, and granted parenting time to Harris. (Compl. Ex. D.)
{¶ 5} In June 2019, the Nevada family court terminated Father's child support obligation, retroactive to January 2018. (Compl. Ex. E.) Among the Nevada's court's findings were:
{¶ 6} Harris filed her complaint for a writ of prohibition on October 18, 2021. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), citing four bases for dismissal: (1) prohibition is a preventative writ, which cannot be used to seek review of actions that have already been performed; (2) the Montgomery County Juvenile Court was authorized under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to exercise jurisdiction over custody matters involving A.Y.S.; (3) Harris has an adequate remedy at law; and (4) Harris's requested relief is overly broad. Respondents attached several documents to their Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, including Maternal Grandfather's motion for ex parte emergency order and the magistrate's December 21, 2017 order granting interim temporary custody to Maternal Grandfather following an ex parte hearing (Exhibit A), and an order by the magistrate, dated January 5, 2018, ordering Harris to submit to a drug screen (Exhibit B).
{¶ 7} We denied the motion to dismiss on February 11, 2022. We first concluded that Harris's complaint adequately alleged the exercise of judicial power by Judge Capizzi and Magistrate Kolberg, and that prohibition can be appropriately applied to vacate or undo prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions. Next, we found that, upon construing Harris's complaint in the light most favorable to her, the facts alleged in her complaint supported her contention that Judge Capizzi and Magistrate Kolberg patently and unambiguously lacked authority to exercise judicial power regarding A.Y.S. Third, we concluded that Harris had alleged facts to support a conclusion that the juvenile court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to enter its legal custody order, and even if she were required to demonstrate the absence of an adequate remedy at law, the unique circumstances of this case raise a question of whether an adequate remedy existed. We ordered Respondents to file an answer to the complaint within 14 days, which they did.
{¶ 8} On March 15, 2022, we issued a scheduling order for how the case would proceed. Pursuant to that order, "[a]ll evidence to be considered by the court in determining the merits of this prohibition action" was to be filed by April 26, 2022. We noted that evidence in an original action "shall be submitted to the court by means of an agreed statement of facts, stipulations, depositions, interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admission." Loc. App.R. 8(E). At the parties’ joint request, we extended the deadline to file the evidence to May 10, 2022.
{¶ 9} On May 20, 2022, the parties filed a joint stipulation, which stated that "discovery has been completed in the above captioned matter." No evidence accompanied that filing, nor have the parties otherwise filed any evidence in compliance with Loc. App.R. 8(E). The parties subsequently filed merit briefs, which cite to the exhibits attached to Harris's complaint and Respondents’ motion to dismiss.
{¶ 10} A writ of prohibition is "an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions." State ex rel. Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), citing State ex rel. Burtzlaff v. Vickery , 121 Ohio St. 49, 50, 166 N.E. 894 (1929). To warrant a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that (1) the trial judge has exercised judicial power or is about to do so; (2) the trial judge lacks authority to exercise that power; and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein , 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 23. If the trial judge's lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous, the relator does not need to establish that there is a lack of an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman , 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 62. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a relator's ability to appeal generally bars relief in prohibition. Johnson v. Sloan , 154 Ohio St.3d 476, 2018-Ohio-2120, 116 N.E.3d 91, ¶ 24.
{¶ 11} In her merit brief, Harris asserts that the Montgomery County Juvenile Court patently and unambiguously lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the custody of A.Y.S., because Nevada is the child's home state, the juvenile court does not have the statutory authority under R.C. 3127.17 to modify the Nevada custody order, no grounds existed for the juvenile court to exercise emergency jurisdiction under R.C. 3217.18, and the juvenile court failed to make a determination about her unsuitability. She contends that a writ of prohibition is the appropriate remedy.
{¶ 12} Respondents reply that they had jurisdiction over the custody of A.Y.S. pursuant to R.C. 3127.18, the emergency jurisdiction provisions. They note that Father never responded or appeared for the proceedings and Harris, who did appear at all hearings, agreed to the juvenile court's March 8, 2018 order. They further state that "there is no reason to believe that the Washoe County Family Division Court of Nevada was not aware or declined the change in custody" from Harris to Maternal Grandfather. Respondents assert that, "[u]ltimately, Respondents were authorized to modify the prior court order * * *." They conclude that Harris cannot establish any of the elements for prohibition.
{¶ 13} We begin with the record before us. As stated above, Harris attached several exhibits to her complaint for a writ of prohibition, including:
Respondents also filed two exhibits in support their motion to dismiss: (1) the magistrate's December 21, 2017 interim order, with the motion for ex parte emergency order (Resp. Ex. A); and (2) the magistrate's January 5, 2018 interim order (Resp. Ex. B).
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated on May 20, 2022 that discovery was complete, but they did not present us with any evidence in accordance with Loc. App.R. 8(E) and (F). Harris's complaint was not verified and, therefore, does not constitute evidentiary material. Compare, e.g. , Johnson v. Clark Cty. Aud. , 2020-Ohio-3201, 155 N.E.3d 199, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.) (...
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