State ex rel. Hofstetter v. Kronk

• Decision Date: 17 December 1969
• Docket Number: No. 69-145,69-145
• Citation: 49 O.O.2d 440,20 Ohio St.2d 117,254 N.E.2d 15
• Parties: , 49 O.O.2d 440 The STATE ex rel. HOFSTETTER, Appellant, v. KRONK, Auditor, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 117

20 Ohio St.2d 117

254 N.E.2d 15, 49 O.O.2d 440

The STATE ex rel. HOFSTETTER, Appellant, v. KRONK, Auditor, et al., Appellees.

No. 69-145.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 17, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under the principle of estoppel, the actual and necessary litigation of an issue binds the parties and their privies in any subsequent litigation between or among them, irrespective of the forms or causes of action. (Paragraph two of the syllabus of Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10, approved and followed.)

2. The court will look behind the nominal parties to the substance of the cause to determine the real parties in interest.

3. In an action brought by or against an agency of a county, or the head thereof, in the course of the performance of a governmental duty or to compel the performance of such a duty, the county is a real party in interest.

Relator, Carl Hofstetter, was elected and served as a Geauga County Court Judge from 1959 through 1962. On November 6, 1962, he was re-elected for the term 1963 through 1966.

In 1963, the General Assembly enacted Section 1901.02, Revised Code, creating the Chrdon Municipal Court and giving it jurisdiction within Geauga County, effective July 11, 1963. Section 1901.04, Revised Code, provides that 'upon the institution of a municipal court, the jurisdiction of county courts * * * in all civil and criminal causes terminates in any township or municipal corporation which is entirely within the territory.'

After relator served through the year 1963, the respondent auditor refused to issue payroll vouchers or to establish funds for paying relator as judge.

In January 1964, the Chardon Municipal Court began operation. Relator alleges that the prosecuting attorney filed a mandamus action in the Court of Common Pleas seeking an order compelling him to turn over his court records and other property as required by Section 1901.04, Revised Code. A writ of mandamus was issued ordering relator to surrender this property. Relator complied with the writ and did not prosecute an appeal.

In December 1967, relator filed a mandamus action in the Court of Appeals requesting the issuance of various writs of mandamus which would, in essence, require respondents to pay relator his salary as county court judge for the years 1964 through 1966, plus interest. Relator claims that Section 15, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, prohibits any change, addition or diminution which will result in the vacation of the office of any judge during term, notwithstanding the fact that the office of county judge was created by statute, and that the legislation which established Chardon Municipal Court with county-wide jurisdiction unconstitutionally deprived him of his office. The Court of Appeals, holding that the General Assembly having created relator's office could abolish it, sustained a demurrer to the writ and overruled motions to strike the demurrer and for reconsideration.

The cause is before this court pursuant to an appeal as of right.

Albert Ohralik, Huntsburg, for appellant.

Gene Henry, Pros. Atty., for appellees.

DUNCAN, Judge.

Relator contends that the Ohio Constitution prevents his removal from office in any way during the term for which he was elected, and therefore that a writ of mandamus directing the payment of his salary for the balance of the full term should issue. Although the Court of Appeals held against relator on a constitutional issue, we find that another issue is dispositive of the controversy. We therefore adhere to the rule not to decide constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary. State ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson, 142 Ohio St. 496, 52 N.E.2d 980; Belden v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629; Euclid v. Heaton, 15 Ohio St.2d 65, 238 N.E.2d 790.

We hold that the principle of collateral estoppel bars relator from litigating an issue which has already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Collateral estoppel bars a party or his privies from relitigating a point or fact actually in issue in a prior suit, even though the cause of action is different. Paragraph two of the syllabus of Whitehead v. General Tel. Co., 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 254 N.E.2d 10; Conold v. Stern, 138 Ohio St. 352, 35 N.E.2d 133, 137 A.L.R. 1003; Schimke v. Earley, 173 Ohio St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209. In applying collateral estoppel, a court looks beyond the nominal parties to discover the real party in interest. Mr. Justice Douglas stated this clearly when he said that "identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance." Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402, 60 S.Ct. 907, 917, 84 L.Ed. 1263.

In a case somewhat analogous to the instant case, this court held that the Director of Highways, defending a mandamus...