State ex rel. Illinois Greyhound Lines v. Public Service Com'n

• Citation: 108 S.W.2d 116,341 Mo. 190
• Parties: State of Missouri at the relation of Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. Public Service Commission
• Decision Date: 26 August 1937
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

108 S.W.2d 116

341 Mo. 190

State of Missouri at the relation of Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., Appellant, v. Public Service Commission

Supreme Court of Missouri

August 26, 1937

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1937.

Motion to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied August 26, 1937.

Appeal from Cole Circuit Court; Hon. Nike G. Sevier, Judge.

Affirmed.

Ivan Bowen, June R. Rose and Clarence M. Barksdale for appellant.

(1) The operations of the appellant in the State of Missouri are exempt from the applicability and provisions of the Missouri Bus and Truck Act by the express provisions of said act. Sec 5264, subsecs. (b), (e), Laws 1931, p. 304. (a) The Legislature intended that the Missouri Bus and Truck Act should not apply to the operations of appellant, as the Legislature is presumed not to intend to pass an invalid or unconstitutional law. State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v Baker, 316 Mo. 853; Wagner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 152 Mo.App. 369; Sage v. Baldwin, 55 F.2d 971. (b) In construing a state statute, the court should avoid an unreasonable construction where a reasonable construction can be adopted. A statute will not be construed so as to lead to evil, unjust, oppressive, absurd or obnoxious consequences, or to self-contradiction. Kansas City v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 276 Mo. 549; State ex rel. Ousley v. Turner, 141 Mo.App. 323; Wagner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 152 Mo.App. 369; State ex rel. Union Electric Co. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853; State ex rel. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 326 Mo. 1169; Strottman v. Ry. Co., 128 S.W. 187, 228 Mo. 154; Barbour Asphalt Co. v. Hayward, 248 Mo. 280; State ex rel. Pearson v. Ry. Co., 215 Mo. 479, 114 S.W. 956; Hawkins v. Smith, 242 Mo. 688, 147 S.W. 1042; Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641; State v. Irvine, 335 Mo. 261, 72 S.W.2d 96; Holt v. Rea, 330 Mo. 1237, 52 S.W.2d 877. (2) The Missouri Bus and Truck Act, if enforced against the operations of the appellant, would impose unreasonable and arbitrary burdens of taxation and regulation upon interstate commerce, which would bear no reasonable relation to the appellant's use of the highways, and such act would therefore be void and unenforceable against appellant as invading the power of Congress of the United States in violation of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States of America. Sage v. Baldwin, 55 F.2d 971; Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U.S. 80; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610; Frost v. Railroad Comm., 271 U.S. 583; Interstate Busses v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554; Prouty v. Coyne, 55 F.2d 289; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160; Interstate Transit Co. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183; Corley & Hamilton v. Snook, 261 U.S. 66; A. & Pac. Stages v. Stahl, 36 F.2d 260; Weimer Storage Co. v. Dill, 103 N.J.Eq. 307. (3) The Missouri Bus and Truck Act, if enforced against the operations of the appellant, would deny to appellant the equal protection of the law in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and in violation of Section 30, Article II of the Constitution of the State of Missouri. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 567; Airway Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 85; Connally v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 564; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 417; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 333; Louisville G. & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 37; Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Comm., 295 U.S. 285; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 315; Cobb v. Dept. of Public Works, 60 F.2d 640.

James P. Boyd, General Counsel, and Daniel C. Rogers , Assistant General Counsel, for Public Service Commission.

The first question of importance, in fact the only question of importance, is the construction of subsections (b) and (e) of Section 5264 of the Missouri Bus and Truck Act of 1931 which relate to suburban territory and which except motor vehicles under those two subsections. It is conceded in the statement of facts that appellant operates a bus line from the city of Chicago through the State of Illinois over the Municipal Free Bridge crossing the Mississippi River into the city of St. Louis and over the streets of the city of St. Louis. The question arises: Does the exception under subsection (b) apply to interstate movements which take their beginning in another state and terminate within a municipality along the border lines of this State, such as in the cities of St. Louis, Kansas City, Hannibal, Louisiana and other cities that might be named? Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 69 L.Ed. 623; Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 68 L.Ed. 607; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 76 L.Ed. 1167.

OPINION

Tipton, J.

This case comes to the writer on reassignment. On October 17, 1933, the respondent, the Public Service Commission of Missouri, issued an order to show cause why the busses, operated by the appellant, Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., in this State were lawful under the Bus and Truck Act of 1931 in the absence of an interstate permit, which permits are issued by the respondent. After holding a hearing, the respondent made an order requiring the appellant to cease its operations within this State until such time as it might obtain a permit from the respondent. On certiorari, the Circuit Court of Cole County entered a judgment affirming the order of the respondent on July 11, 1934. From that judgment the appellant has duly appealed to this court.

The cause was tried before the respondent upon an agreed statement of facts. These facts disclose that the appellant is a foreign corporation; that the appellant is engaged in the operation of passenger service by motor-propelled vehicles from Chicago, Illinois, through the State of Illinois and into the city of St. Louis; that its operations in this State are solely and exclusively in interstate commerce, and are solely and exclusively confined to the corporate limits of the city of St. Louis; that the entire route followed by the appellant is over the city streets of the downtown area of the city of St. Louis, and that its entire route over such streets comprises 3.18 miles; that two motorbus carriers, namely, People's Motor Bus Company and St. Louis Public Service Company, both corporations, have been operating for a number of years over the streets of the city of St. Louis and St. Louis County, adjacent thereto, as intracity and intracounty motorbus carriers doing exclusively an intrastate business in this State; and that Article VIII of Chapter 33 of the Laws of Missouri, enacted by the General Assembly on May 6, 1931, commonly known as the Missouri Bus and Truck Act, is the only State law applicable to this proceeding, and it is admitted that the People's Motor Bus Company and the St. Louis Public Service Company are exempt from the provisions of this act.

In appellant's return to the order to show cause, it is contended that appellant is not under the jurisdiction of the respondent on account of subsections (b) and (e) of Section 5264 of Article VIII, Chapter 33. Appellant also contends that if respondent does have jurisdiction of the bus operations of the appellant under this chapter, then under Section 5272 of this chapter "it will be required to pay a large tax to enter the State of Missouri and operate exclusively within the City of St. Louis, Missouri, whereas said other carriers operating within the City of St. Louis and its suburban territory would be and are now exempt from any such tax, by the provisions of said subsections (b) and (e) referred to herein; that such tax imposed upon this company would, therefore, be an unreasonable and discriminatory tax on this company and would constitute a burden upon and interference with interstate commerce in violation of Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America, and would deny to this company the equal protection of the laws in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in violation of Section 30 of Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, in that said tax would bear no reasonable relation to the use made of the highways in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, by this carrier, and for the further reason that the other carriers referred to herein, operating many more busses in the said City of St. Louis, and making continuous use of the streets of the City of St. Louis to a far greater extent than this company, are exempt from the payment of any tax under the provisions of such act, whereas this carrier, operating exclusively in interstate commerce over the city streets of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, in a negligible degree by comparison with said other carriers, would be compelled to pay a large tax on each of its busses so operated, if the provisions of the said act should be enforced against it."

It is the appellant's contention that the express provisions of the Bus and Truck Act exempt it, by Section 5264, in its operations of its busses in this State from the applicability of the act. The pertinent parts of that section are as follows:

"(a) The term 'motor vehicle,' when used in this act, means any automobile, automobile truck, motor bus, truck, bus, or any other self-propelled vehicle not operated or driven upon fixed rails or tracks.

"(b) The term 'motor carrier,' when used in this act means any person, firm, partnership, association, joint-stock company corporation, lessee, trustee, or receiver appointed by any court whatsoever, operating any motor vehicle with or without trailer or trailers attached, upon any public highway for the transportation of persons or property or both or of providing or furnishing such...