State ex rel. J.C. v. State

Decision Date22 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. 20140449–CA.,20140449–CA.
Citation366 P.3d 867
Parties STATE of Utah, in the INTEREST OF J.C., a person under eighteen years of age. J.C., Appellant, v. State of Utah, Appellee.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Margaret P. Lindsay and Douglas J. Thompson, for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes, Cherise M. Bacalski, and Ryan Tenney, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.

Judge STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which Senior Judge RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred.1 Judge J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred, with opinion.

Opinion

ROTH, Judge:

¶ 1 J.C. was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult, see Utah Code Ann. § 58–37a–5 (LexisNexis 2012), and possession or use of marijuana, also a class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult, see id. § 58–37–8(2)(a)(i), (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015).2 On appeal, J.C. argues that the juvenile court committed plain error by accepting hearsay testimony, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the adjudication. We affirm.

BACKGROUND3

¶ 2 J.C., his brother, and three other students from their high school left the school's campus during a school-wide assembly. A school resource officer (the SRO) "had received information" that students might be leaving campus during an assembly to smoke marijuana "in a grove of trees" located near the school. The SRO drove to a place where he could observe the area from his vehicle through binoculars. From this location, he "observed five ... students walking down the canal trail and enter[ing] the grove of trees." Upon seeing the students, he "was able to identify" each student by name, including J.C. Although the SRO radioed for an additional officer to respond to the location, he became concerned that because the students were smoking marijuana, any evidence "might be destroyed by the time [he] waited for [the additional officer to arrive]." The SRO exited his vehicle, approached the five students—who were now standing in a circle—and said "don't move." All the students ran. The SRO gave chase, stating, "I know your names," and yelling "stop, police" multiple times. At this point, an additional officer had arrived and also gave chase. Four of the five students were apprehended, with J.C. escaping. The four students were taken back to the high school where they were subsequently interviewed by the school principal.4

¶ 3 The State filed a delinquency petition against J.C. alleging failure to stop at the command of a law enforcement officer, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession or use of a controlled substance. J.C. and his brother, L.C., were tried together on all three allegations.5 Before testimony began, the juvenile court asked each party to "identify their witnesses." The State identified six witnesses in the order they would be called: the SRO, the other responding officer, the school principal, and the other three students who had been in the circle at the grove of trees—J.M., N.C., and J.R. The attorney for J.C. and his brother responded that his clients "would be testifying perhaps if they choose to" but he did not expect to call any other witnesses.

¶ 4 As anticipated, the State first called the SRO, then the other officer, followed by the school principal, and finally the three students. The SRO testified that he smelled "a strong odor of burnt marijuana" as he started running toward where the students had been standing in a circle; that he "found a small baggie of marijuana" just a few feet from where J.M. and L.C. were apprehended; and that he discovered "a fresh apple pipe" in the location where the students were standing that had "burnt marks around the top of the apple where it's consistent that people carved out the apple to smoke marijuana." The other officer testified that although he could "[not] recall smelling any marijuana[,] ... [he] did see the apple."

¶ 5 The school principal then testified about his conversation with the four students the police had apprehended, describing what J.R., N.C., J.M., and L.C. had said to him at the school following the incident. His testimony regarding the statements of J.R. and N.C. included information from both that implicated J.C. The principal testified that J.R. "indicated that ... all five [students] were there and present and that all ... four[,] excluding him [,] [had] taken a hit [of marijuana]."6 And the principal also recounted that N.C. "confirmed" J.R.'s statements and "indicated also that ... five [students] were present" in the grove of trees. But none of the information the school principal recounted from J.M.'s or L.C.'s statements included any specific reference to J.C.

¶ 6 Following the principal's testimony, the State called the other three students to testify.7 The testimony of each student about what had happened in the grove of trees diverged from the principal's description of his interviews with each of them after they were apprehended. In particular, all of them testified that J.C., though part of a group that left school for the grove of trees, had left before the circle formed and before the apple pipe was passed around.

¶ 7 J.M. testified that all five students had left the school's campus that day and upon arriving at the grove of trees, he left the group to use the bathroom. He recounted that when he returned, everyone was in a circle facing each other and the apple pipe "was all just set up." The apple pipe was passed to him and he "was going to take the hit" but did not because the SRO arrived. Finally, he testified that, contrary to what the principal reported he had said, J.C. was not present in the circle because "J.C. left ... when [they] got there," "[j]ust before" J.M. went to use the bathroom.

¶ 8 N.C. also testified that all five students left the school's campus during an assembly and "went over to a grove of trees" where, as he had told the school principal, he had "taken a couple hits" of marijuana from the apple pipe. He stated, however, that J.C. "was with [him] at the beginning, but then he left to the bus stop before everything happened," again contrary to what the principal said N.C. had told him earlier.

¶ 9 J.R. testified that all five students left the school's campus during an assembly but they walked in two separate groups to the grove of trees. By the time the two groups reunited near the canal, J.C. "was gone." When asked about the group's activities in the grove of trees, J.R. denied standing in a circle, denied seeing an apple or an apple pipe, denied passing an apple pipe to another person, and denied smelling any marijuana. This testimony was contrary to the principal's testimony about what J.R. had told him in the earlier interview.

¶ 10 At the end of the State's case, J.C.'s attorney moved for a directed verdict, "specifically to J.C. because beyond being seen there by the officer and the parties," according to "the boys who were there ..., he left before any of the alleged incidents occurred." The juvenile court dismissed the allegation of failure to stop at the command of a police officer but denied the motion as to the other two allegations. J.C.'s attorney called no witnesses, but he renewed his motion for a directed verdict during his closing argument. The juvenile court, however, found the evidence against J.C. to be sufficient to support a delinquency adjudication for possession of drug paraphernalia and possession or use of marijuana. In its ruling from the bench, the court indicated that it found the SRO, the other officer, and the school principal to be "credible witness[es]," but not "[t]he young men that ... testified." Rather, the juvenile court "believe[d] that ... they either had a lapse in memory or ... there was some loyalty to [J.C.]." The court stated that although "[t]hey may have had their ... [own] charges taken care of after the fact," it "sense[d] that there was some fudging a little bit on what they were saying."

¶ 11 J.C. appeals the juvenile court's delinquency adjudication as to both allegations.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 12 J.C. argues that the juvenile court erred by relying on the principal's testimony because it was inadmissible hearsay. Because J.C. did not preserve this issue below, he seeks review under the plain error doctrine. "In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined. If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not established." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208–09 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).

¶ 13 J.C. also argues that the juvenile court erred by concluding that there was sufficient evidence to find J.C. delinquent. When a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is raised, "[w]e review the juvenile court's factual findings based upon the clearly erroneous standard." In re S.O., 2005 UT App 393, ¶ 12, 122 P.3d 686 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And under the clearly erroneous standard, we will set aside the juvenile court's decision only when that decision is "against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[ ] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re S.L., 1999 UT App 390, ¶ 20, 995 P.2d 17 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]e defer to the juvenile court because of its advantaged position with respect to the parties and the witnesses in assessing credibility and personalities." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And we afford "wide latitude" to the juvenile court "based upon not only the court's opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, but also based on the juvenile court...

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