State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 94-2995

• Decision Date: 28 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94-2995,94-2995
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin ex rel. Alexander L. JACOBUS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 900

559 N.W.2d 900

208 Wis.2d 39

STATE of Wisconsin ex rel. Alexander L. JACOBUS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.

No. 94-2995.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Dec. 5, 1997.

Decided Feb. 28, 1997.

For the respondent-respondent-petitioner there were briefs by William C. Wolford, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

For the petitioner-appellant there were briefs by Alexander L. Jacobus.

Amicus curiae was filed by John Allen Pray, Debra Kvalheim and Legal Assistance Program, University of Wisconsin Law School, in support of Alexander L. Jacobus.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, Justice.

¶1 The State of Wisconsin (State) seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, ¹ which reversed and remanded a judgment of conviction of the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Michael J. McAlpine, Judge. The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 51.45(1) (1991-92) ² prohibits the State from criminally prosecuting an individual underWis. Stat. § 946.49 ³ for bail jumping due to consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond. We conclude that § 51.45(1) does not prohibit the criminal prosecution of an individual for bail jumping under these circumstances, and therefore we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

¶2 The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Over a three month period in 1992, the State charged Alexander L. Jacobus (Jacobus) with one count of disorderly conduct, two counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OMVWI), and five counts of misdemeanor bail jumping. Three of these five counts of bail jumping were based upon Jacobus' consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of his release bond. ⁴ Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Jacobus entered Alford pleas ⁵ to three counts of bail jumping, only one of which was based solely upon his consumption of alcohol. Jacobus also entered Alford pleas to the count of disorderly conduct and two counts of OMVWI. The State dismissed the remaining two counts of bail jumping as part of this negotiated plea.

¶3 On August 18, 1992, the circuit court entered judgments of conviction for the three counts of bail jumping, one count of disorderly conduct, and two counts of OMVWI. The circuit court placed Jacobus on three years of probation, and ordered him to a ninety day alcohol commitment. The circuit court also imposed and stayed multiple jail sentences, on the condition that Jacobus successfully complete his probation.

¶4 On October 3, 1994, pursuant to a request from the Department of Corrections, the Monroe County Police took Jacobus into custody on a probation hold, based on several reported violations of his probation. Subsequently, the Department of Corrections served Jacobus with a formal notice of revocation. After Jacobus waived his right to a hearing, the Department of Corrections revoked his probation, and his stayed jail sentences went into effect.

¶5 On October 7, 1994, while in the Monroe County jail, Jacobus filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court. Jacobus then filed a motion on October 11, 1994, in which he contended that he should be released from incarceration because Wis.Stat. § 51.45(1) prohibited the State from criminally prosecuting him in 1992 for bail jumping based upon his consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of his release bond. At a habeas corpus hearing on November 4, 1994, the circuit court determined thats 51.45(1) did not prohibit the State from criminally prosecuting Jacobus for bail jumping, and therefore denied Jacobus' petition.

¶6 The court of appeals reversed, because it concluded that Wis.Stat. § 51.45(1) clearly prohibited the State from criminally prosecuting Jacobus for bail jumping based upon his consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of his release bond. ⁶ Jacobus, 198 Wis.2d at 789, 544 N.W.2d 234. The court of appeals further determined that although the State may prohibit alcohol consumption as a condition of bail, parole, or probation, the only available penalty is revocation of the applicable status. Id. at 790, 544 N.W.2d 234. ⁷

II.

¶7 The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions. ⁸ State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha County, 184 Wis.2d 724, 728, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994). "Habeas corpus is confined to situations in which there is a pressing need for relief or where the process or judgment upon which a prisoner is held is void." Id. at 728-29, 516 N.W.2d 714; accord J.V. v. Barron, 112 Wis.2d 256, 261, 332 N.W.2d 796 (1983). Therefore, a court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus when other adequate remedies at law exist. Dowe, 184 Wis.2d at 728-29, 516 N.W.2d 714.

¶8 In the present case, Jacobus essentially is contending that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him of bail jumping in 1992, because Wis.Stat. § 51.45(1) prohibits the State from criminally prosecuting an individual for bail jumping due to consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond. Therefore, if Jacobus' interpretation of § 51.45(1) is correct, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.

¶9 Accordingly, this case requires us to interpret Wis.Stat. § 51.45(1). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which this court reviews de novo, without deference to the decisions of the lower courts. E.g., State v. Petty, 201 Wis.2d 337, 354-55, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996); State v. Williams, 198 Wis.2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. E.g., State v. Sostre, 198 Wis.2d 409, 414, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996); Williams, 198 Wis.2d at 527, 544 N.W.2d 406. To accomplish this goal, a court first resorts to the plain language of a statute. E.g., Sostre, 198 Wis.2d at 414, 542 N.W.2d 774; State v. Speer, 176 Wis.2d 1101, 1121, 501 N.W.2d 429 (1993). If the intent of the legislature is clear from a statute's language, a court must give effect to this intent and look no further. E.g., Williams, 198 Wis.2d at 525, 544 N.W.2d 406; Speer, 176 Wis.2d at 1121, 501 N.W.2d 429.

¶10 However, if a statute is ambiguous, ⁹ a court must examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute in order to determine the legislature's intent. E.g., Williams, 198 Wis.2d at 525, 544 N.W.2d 406; Speer, 176 Wis.2d at 1121, 501 N.W.2d 429. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way. E.g., Williams, 198 Wis.2d at 526, 544 N.W.2d 406; Speer, 176 Wis.2d at 1121, 501 N.W.2d 429. In addition, "[t]he interaction of two statutes can create an ambiguity, as can the interaction of words in the statute." Village of Shorewood v. Steinberg, 174 Wis.2d 191, 201, 496 N.W.2d 57 (1993); accord State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Showers, 135 Wis.2d 77, 87, 398 N.W.2d 154 (1987); State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis.2d 36, 49, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978).

¶11 We therefore must initially determine whether the legislature's intent is clear from the plain language of Wis.Stat. § 51.45(1). Section 51.45(1) provides: "It is the policy of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcohol beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum of treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society." It is arguable that this language, on its face, prohibits the State from criminally prosecuting an individual for bail jumping due to consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond. However, § 51.45(17)(a) provides: "Nothing in this section affects any law, ordinance or rule the violation of which is punishable by fine, forfeiture or imprisonment." It is arguable that the plain language of this section allows for the prosecution of bail jumping due to the consumption of alcohol in violation of a condition of a bond, since this offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment under Wis. Stat. § 946.49. Accordingly, reasonably well-informed persons could interpret § 51.45(1), as it relates to § 946.49, differently due to the interaction of § 51.45(1) with § 51.45(17)(a). Since an ambiguity exists, we must consider the scope, history, context, and object of these statutes to ascertain the legislature's intent.

¶12 Wis.Stat. § 51.45 was created by Chapter 198, Laws of 1973 (Ch.198). Ch. 198 originated as 1973 Assembly Bill 589. According to an analysis of 1973 Assembly Bill 589 by the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB): ¹⁰

This bill adapts the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act to Wisconsin law. Administered by the department of health and social services, the proposal changes the present policy of making public drunkenness a criminal offense and attempts to coordinate a comprehensive treatment program. (Emphasis added).

....

The bill does not affect present laws against drunken driving and other offenses committed under the influence of alcohol. (Emphasis added).

This analysis indicates that the legislature intended to establish treatment programs for alcoholics and intoxicated persons rather than to allow prosecution of them for public drunkenness. ¹¹ However, it also indicates that the legislature did not intend to change any additional criminal statutes other than those making public drunkenness a criminal offense.

¶13 The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act (Uniform Act) provides additional insight into the legislature's intent, since Wis.Stat. § 51.45 was substantially based on this act. See LRB analysis to 1973 Assembly Bill 589. In fact, § 51.45(1) was taken directly from § 1 of the Uniform Act. The comment to § 1 of the Uniform Act states:

This section is intended to preclude the handling of drunkenness under any wide variety of petty criminal...