State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2022-G-0037 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 1536 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO ex rel. JEREMY J. JONES, Relator, v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE CAROLYN J. PASCHKE, Respondent. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition
Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A. Cruz, and Kelley R. Tauring, Stafford Law Co., (For Relator).
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Linda M. Applebaum Assistant Prosecutor, (For Respondent).
{¶1} Relator, Jeremy J. Jones ("Mr. Jones"), filed a verified petition for writ of prohibition against respondent the Honorable Judge Carolyn J. Paschke ("Judge Paschke"), to prevent Judge Paschke from exceeding her jurisdiction in the matter of Heidi O'Neill v. Jeremy J. Jones in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas by proceeding upon the complaint for grandparent companionship rights pursuant to R.C. 3109.11 that was filed by plaintiff Heidi O'Neill ("Mrs. O'Neill).
{¶2} This matter is currently before the court for resolution of the parties' competing motions for summary judgment.
{¶3} Since Mr. Jones can prove no set of facts establishing that Judge Paschke "patently and unambiguously" lacks jurisdiction or that he lacks an adequate remedy at law, we grant Judge Paschke's motion for summary judgment, overrule Mr. Jones' motion for summary judgment, and deny Mr. Jones' petition.
{¶4} In his petition, Mr. Jones alleges that on July 12, 2022, Mrs. O'Neill filed a complaint in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas against Mr. Jones seeking reasonable grandparent companionship/visitation with Mr. Jones' minor son. The minor was born on December 26, 2015, to Mr. Jones and Mrs. O'Neill's deceased daughter, Molly A. Jones, as issue of their marriage. Molly A. Jones died on July 2, 2022.
{¶5} In response, Mr. Jones filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine grandparent visitation pursuant to R.C. 3109.11.
{¶6} In September 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying Mr. Jones' motion to dismiss, finding that the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas has subject matter jurisdiction to proceed on Mrs. O'Neill's complaint. More specifically, the trial court found that R.C. 3109.11, applicable in the underlying case, authorizes a common pleas court to grant reasonable companionship or visitation rights to the parents of a deceased father or mother if the court determines that such visitation is in the best interest of the minor child. Further, juvenile courts do not have original subject matter jurisdiction over visitation motions brought under R.C. 3109.11. Lastly, since the same magistrate presided over the divorce proceedings of Mr. Jones and Molly Jones, and since he is already familiar with the history and circumstances related to the care of the minor child, the interests of justice are better served by the Court of Common Pleas as opposed to the Juvenile Court.
{¶7} In his petition, Mr. Jones contends that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to determine claims for grandparent visitation. This is especially so because prior to his divorce proceedings with Molly Jones, he had filed a complaint for neglect and dependency and an ex parte motion for temporary custody against Molly Jones in the Juvenile Court. Ultimately, the Juvenile Court vacated the ex parte temporary custody order after reviewing drug test results of Mr. Jones and Molly Jones and relinquished jurisdiction to the Domestic Relations Division because the parties were married.
{¶8} Mr. Jones also contends the trial court lacks jurisdiction to appoint a guardian ad litem ("GAL") in the underlying matter because it "failed to set forth any statutory grounds for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in a grandparent companionship case." He further asserts that a GAL may only be appointed upon the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to R.C. 3109.04.
{¶9} Both parties have moved for summary judgment. To be entitled to summary judgment, they must show that: "(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C).
{¶10} A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. Id. As such, it is an extraordinary remedy which is customarily granted with caution and restraint and is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies. Id.
{¶11} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that (1) the respondent is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18.
{¶12} The last two elements can be met by a showing that the trial court "patently and unambiguously" lacked jurisdiction. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC. v. Oil & Gas Comm., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 11. "Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions." State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298-299, 691 N.E.2d 253 (1998).
{¶13} A review of Mr. Jones's petition demonstrates he cannot establish that Judge Paschke "patently and unambiguously" lacks jurisdiction or that he lacks an adequate remedy at law.
{¶14} Mr. Jones incorrectly asserts that the juvenile court should have jurisdiction over Ms. O'Neill's claims for grandparent visitation.
{¶15} The General Assembly authorizes nonparent visitation with a child in three situations: (1) in a divorce, dissolution legal separation, annulment, or child support proceeding, the court may grant reasonable companionship or visitation rights to any grandparent, any person related to the child by consanguinity or affinity, or any other person other than the parent (R.C. 3109.051(B)(1)); (2) the court may grant the parents and other relatives of the deceased parent reasonable companionship or visitation rights (R.C. 3109.11); and (3) the court may grant grandparents and other relatives reasonable companionship or visitation rights to grandparents and other relatives when the child's mother is unmarried (R.C. 3109.12).
{¶16} Mrs. O'Neill filed her complaint for grandparent visitation pursuant to R.C. 3109.11, which states:
{¶17} (Emphasis added.)
{¶18} Jurisdiction is the trial court's "statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998); Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as a court's power to hear and decide cases. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. Wells Fargo Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Elliott, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAE 03 0012, 2013-Ohio-3690, ¶ 9.
{¶19} "A juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction only if expressly granted the authority to do so by statute." Rowell v. Smith, 133 Ohio St.3d 288, 2012-Ohio-4313, 978 N.E.2d 146, ¶ 13, citing Article IV, Section 4(B), Ohio Constitution ().
{¶20} R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) confers exclusive, original jurisdiction on juvenile courts "to determine the custody of any child not a ward of another court of this state[.]" It has been...
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