State ex rel. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority v. Guzzo

• Decision Date: 24 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1465,82-1465
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 6 O.B.R. 335 The STATE, ex rel. GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. GUZZO, Judge, et al., Appellees.

Page 270

6 Ohio St.3d 270

452 N.E.2d 1314, 6 O.B.R. 335

The STATE, ex rel. GREATER CLEVELAND REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant, v. GUZZO, Judge, et al., Appellees.

No. 82-1465.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Aug. 24, 1983.

Charles E. Mosley, Jr., Johanna M. Sfiscko and Laverne A. Nichols, Cleveland, for appellant.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Patrick Carroll, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee.

Komito, Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobson, Heller & McCarthy Co., L.P.A., Thomas Mester, Harlan M. Gordon, Daniel J. White and Richard C. Alkire, Cleveland, for intervening appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Three requirements must be satisfied before a writ of prohibition will issue: (1) the court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Rose Hill Burial Park, v. Moser (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 437 N.E.2d 300. Appellant submits that the accident report, the subject of this appeal, is privileged; and that appellee's orders violate R.C. 2317.02(A) and Civ.R. 26 and were therefore unauthorized by law.

Civ.R. 26(B)(3) allows " * * * discovery of documents * * * prepared in anticipation of litigation * * * only upon a showing of good cause therefor." The existence of a Civ.R. 26(B)(1) "privilege" as well as Civ.R. 26(B)(3) "good cause" are discretionary determinations to be made by the trial court. Appellee argues that such determinations are reviewable only on appeal. State ex rel. Staton, v. Common Pleas Court (1965), 5 Ohio St.2d 17, 213 N.E.2d 164 .

Whether appellee made a correct or incorrect determination, however, is not the issue before this court. Prohibition is a preventive, not a corrective, remedy. State ex rel. Stefanick, v. Municipal Court (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 102, 104, 255 N.E.2d 634 . It may not be invoked to prohibit the trial court judge's exercise of discretion where that judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person. State ex rel. Staton, v. Common Pleas Court, supra, 5 Ohio St.2d at 22, 213 N.E.2d 164. It is undisputed that appellee had jurisdiction to hear the case and discretion to rule on matters concerning discovery. Appellant may seek review of appellee's discovery rulings on appeal.

Appellee's orders were not unauthorized by law. Appellant also has an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. Prohibition cannot be used as...