State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Com'n
| Decision Date | 07 May 1935 |
| Docket Number | 23,593 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MISSOURI, at the Relation of Kansas City Bridge Company, a Corporation, Relator, v. MISSOURI WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; EDGAR C. NELSON, Chairman, ORIN H. SHAW and JAY J. JAMES, Members of Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, Respondents |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
OPINION
Walter E. Bennick, COMMISSIONER.
MANDAMUS.
This is a proceeding by mandamus to compel the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission to assume and retain jurisdiction over a claim for compensation which the commission has heretofore refused to entertain on the merits upon the ground that the claim was one exclusively covered by federal law and therefore outside of and beyond the jurisdiction of the commission under Sec. 3310 (a), R. S. 1929 (Mo. St. Ann., sec. 3310 (a), p. 8245).
The claim is by the alleged dependents of Edwin Favier, deceased, to recover the death benefit provided by the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act (Secs. 3299-3376, R. S. 1929; Mo. St. Ann., secs. 3299-3376, pp. 8229-8294) for the death of the deceased allegedly occurring by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by Kansas City Bridge Company, the relator herein, which, along with the deceased, is to be taken as having theretofore elected to accept the provisions of the local act.
The deceased was a farmer, twenty-two years of age, residing with his parents on a farm located a few miles from the scene of his work, which was in the Mississippi River, off Pointrest, a place on the west bank of the river near Belgique, in Perry County, Missouri. For a period of about sixty days prior to his death on December 11, 1933, he had been employed as a mat weaver in the service of relator, which was then engaged, under contracts with the United States Government, in weaving mats, and in submerging and resting them upon the bed of the river so as to control the channel and divert the current of the river away from the bank.
The mats were made of lumber and other floating material woven together; and under the plan of the work were attached to the Missouri shore, and then made to extend from the bank out into the river towards midstream. The work of weaving the mats was carried on from a floating barge which was kept tied to anchor pilings driven into the bed of the stream for that purpose, so as to hold the barge stationary in the river at the end of the mat under construction and submerged in the water between the barge and the bank of the river. Beyond and towards midstream from the work barge, and attached to it, was a second barge, known as the lumber barge, on which were kept the lumber and other materials used in weaving the mat. Neither of the barges had motive power of its own, but both were towed from place to place on the river as necessity demanded.
All of the work in connection with the weaving of the mats was performed on the barges, and no part of it was done on the bank of the river. In the performance of the project the mat was kept afloat until the weaving was completed, when the part of the mat extending farthest out into the river was loaded with stone or other heavy material, and caused to sink. When thus completed and permanently placed, pilings were driven through it as the mat lay on the bed of the river, and it was then left to serve the purpose of preventing the pilings from washing out.
The barges were not equipped with living quarters, and so there is no question in the case of the deceased living on the barge or even at his place of work. Instead, he stayed at his home on the farm of his parents, as we have already pointed out, and drove to and from his place of work each day.
On the day of his death he reported for work in the morning as usual, and was employed at his job of mat weaving until the noon hour, when the men stopped work for lunch. After he had finished his lunch, he walked from the work barge over upon the lumber barge for the announced purpose of obeying a call of nature, and while so engaged fell off of the lumber barge into the river and was drowned at a point approximately two hundred feet out from the bank of the river.
Claim for compensation was filed within time by the alleged dependents of the deceased; and thereafter the employer and self-insurer answered, denying liability and the status of the claimants as dependents within contemplation of the act, but not in anywise questioning the jurisdiction of the commission to entertain the claim. An agreed statement of facts, conforming in all essential respects to the statement of the case as it has heretofore appeared, was filed by the parties with the commission; and thereafter the full commission found and determined therefrom that it was without jurisdiction. An alternative writ of mandamus was thereupon sued out of this court to compel the commission to assume jurisdiction of the controversy; and the case has been submitted upon relator's motion for judgment on the pleadings, following respondents' return, demurring to the petition upon the ground that from the face thereof it appears that the case is one falling within the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal government, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the commission to determine.
Now the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal government arise under Art. 3 Sec. 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that the judicial power shall extend, among other things, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. By the blanket provision of Art. 1, sec. 8, of the Constitution, the Congress is given the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; and by the Judicial Code it is provided (28 U.S.C.A., sec. 41(3), 371) that the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the several states, of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common-law remedy when the common law is competent to give it.
What was intended by the saving clause was to preserve rights sanctioned by the maritime law which might be enforced through any appropriate remedy or means of redress which is recognized at common law and in courts which proceed according to its course, and not to permit the determination of a defendant's liability by the standards of common law rather than by those of the maritime law (Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.S. 372, 38 S.Ct. 501, 62 L.Ed. 1171; 1 C. J. 1253); and Incidentally it is enough merely to say that such saving clause does not of itself in anywise contemplate state compensation legislation for the enforcement of purely maritime rights and obligations, the remedy provided by such legislation, at least of the type of our own, being wholly unknown to the common law, and incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of court. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086; Knickerbocker Ice Co, v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834.
In fact so jealously has the Supreme Court set itself to safeguard the inherent exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government in respect to admiralty and maritime matters that it has held unconstitutional each attempt of the Congress to save to Claimants for compensation for injuries or death in the course of maritime work and activities their rights and remedies otherwise existing under the compensation laws of any state or possession of the United States, and to make such rights and remedies, when conferred, exclusive upon the question of the adjudication of the respective rights and liabilities of the parties. The underlying theory has been that Congress may not in effect discriminate, and deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain admiralty and maritime cases, while vesting them with jurisdiction over others; that the constitutional grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal government looks to harmony and uniformity, so that Congress may not delegate to the states its own exclusive power to legislate upon such subject; that Congress may not divide its jurisdiction, leaving open a portion of the field to be occupied by the states; and that in that class of claims which fall within the maritime field, Congress may not provide that in some instances the federal courts shall have jurisdiction and In other instances not, depending upon whether the state in which the claim arises has provided an otherwise appropriate local remedy. State of Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra.
In other words, the Inhibition upon the power of the states to exercise their own unhampered will with respect to matters essentially maritime has its basis in the constitutional provision vesting such jurisdiction in the federal government, all to the undoubted end and purpose that a system of maritime law might follow coextensive with, and operating uniformly throughout, the whole country. If the contrary was true, and the paramount power of the federal government was to be abrogated by making the rules end limits of maritime law in anywise subject to the individual disposal and regulation of the several states by either legislation or judicial decision, then there would obviously be discordancy and confusion instead of uniformity, harmony, and consistency upon such matters, and the very fundamental and salutary purpose sought to be served by the Constitution would be thus...
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