State ex rel. Karrenbrock v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co.
| Citation | 108 S.W. 97,209 Mo. 472 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. KARRENBROCK, Collector of St. Louis County, Appellant, v. MISSISSIPPI VALLEY TRUST COMPANY |
| Decision Date | 26 February 1908 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Walter B. Douglas Judge.
Modified and affirmed.
E Henry Wolfsberger and Henry Higginbotham for appellant.
(1) While the State may present its claim for taxes, it is not compelled to do so; it is the duty of the executor to pay the taxes without any demand therefor being presented to the court for allowance. R. S. 1899, sec. 184, subd. 3; secs 4259, 4260 and 9246; State ex rel. v. Tittmann, 103 Mo. 553, 119 Mo. 661; State ex rel. v. Burr, 143 Mo. 209; State ex rel. v. Donaldson, 28 Mo.App. 192; United States v. Hahn, 37 Mo.App. 584; Kansas City v. Simpson, 90 Mo.App. 50; Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465; United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251; State ex rel. v. Kenrick, 159 Mo. 631, distinguished. (2) The "executor, administrator or other person" becomes a trustee for the State and is bound to pay its debt as a preferred claim in the third class of demands. Such is the rigor of the statute that he cannot invoke the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction directing him to distribute the assets to specified creditors as a justification, when it does not appear that the State was a party to the proceedings, or that he took the proper measures to secure the priority of the State in the distribution. R. S. 1899, secs. 4259, 4260; United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 707; In re Vetterlein, 44 F. 57; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251; Greely v. Bank, 98 Mo. 458; State ex rel. v. Burr, 143 Mo. 209; Kansas City v. Simpson, 90 Mo.App. 50; Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465. (3) The doctrine of waiver, laches and estoppel cannot be invoked against the State. United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 709; United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason 314; Parkes v. State, 7 Mo. 194; Ray Co. v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 244; State ex rel. v. Tittmann, 119 Mo. 661; State ex rel. v. Fullerton, 143 Mo. 682. (4) The assessment books and tax books are public records, and as such are open to the inspection of all persons. And they impart notice to everybody of their contents. State ex rel. v. Reid, 159 Mo. 85; State ex rel. v. Fullerton, 143 Mo. 687; Fleckenstein v. Baxter, 114 Mo. 496; Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465. (5) Executors and administrators are affected with notice of taxes due upon the property in their custody, whether assessed before or after the death of the testator or intestate. Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465. (6) Taxes are debts within the meaning of sections 4259 and 4260, Revised Statutes 1899. R. S. 1899, sec. 184, subd. 3; Greely v. Bank, 98 Mo. 458; State ex rel. v. Tittmann, 119 Mo. 661; In re Vetterlein, 20 F. 109; United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705, 44 F. 57; In re Kirkland, 2 Hughes (U.S.) 208; United States v. Bank, 6 Pet. 34. Whether taxes should be considered as an ordinary debt, or not so considered, can make no difference in the duty and obligation to the delinquent. Phelps v. Brumbach, 107 Mo.App. 25. (7) Where a statute creates a right (to a tax) and gives no remedy, the party may resort to the usual remedy applicable to such a case. State ex rel. v. Severance, 55 Mo. 389; State ex rel. v. Tittmann, 103 Mo. 568; Phelps v. Brumbach, 107 Mo.App. 25. Under the Federal statute (secs. 3466, 3467, R. S. U. S.) the "executor, administrator, or other person" is held to be a trustee for the United States, and the usual remedies of cestui que trust against trustee apply. United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason 311; Matter of Rosey, 6 Ben. (U.S.) 507; United States v. Bank, 6 Pet. 34; Greely v. Bank, 98 Mo. 458; United States v. Hahn, 37 Mo.App. 580. (8) The statute makes no distinction between the case where the person assessed is the "owner" (that is, in his own right) of the property and where he has the "care, charge or management" of the same (as, for example, as trustee). R. S. 1899, secs. 9144, 9147, 9246; State ex rel. v. Burr, 143 Mo. 209; Kansas City v. Simpson, 90 Mo.App. 50; Elevator Co. v. Traill County, 50 L. R. A. 266; Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441. (9) A valid assessment is the jurisdictional matter in taxation. The statute, as to matters thereafter, is directory merely. When the assessments and levy are completed, the details relate back and take effect as of June 1st. State ex rel. v. Philips, 137 Mo. 264; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 136 Mo. 368; DeArman v. Williams, 93 Mo. 158; McLaren v. Sheble, 45 Mo. 130; Cooley on Taxation (3 Ed.) 604. (10) Neither the State, county nor the collector is liable for costs, nor can any be taxed against them or any of them. R. S. 1899, sec. 9246; Pollard v. Atwood, 79 Mo.App. 193.
Hamilton Grover for respondent.
(1) Under the law of this State, a suit in the circuit court for a personal judgment for taxes on personal property can only be maintained against the "party assessed with the taxes." The taxes here involved were assessed against "Rebecka W. Briggs, T. T. Turner, trustee." The Mississippi Valley Trust Company is not "the party assessed with the taxes" herein sued for. R. S. 1899, sec. 9246; State ex rel. v. Kenrick, 159 Mo. 631. (2) Relator bases his right to recover in this suit upon four sections of the statutes of this State, to-wit: section 184, sections 4259-4260, and section 9246, Revised Statutes 1899. If his construction of any one section is erroneous, this suit must fail. (3) The taxes which sec. 184, Revised Statutes 1899, make it the duty of an executor to pay without being presented to the probate court for allowance, are taxes levied upon the property of the decedent during his lifetime, or accruing on his estate after his death, as distinguished from taxes levied after his death upon property in which he had no interest, but held merely as trustee. Langston v. Canterbury, 173 Mo. 135; State ex rel. v. Tittmann, 103 Mo. 553, 119 Mo. 665. (4) Sections 4259 and 4260 simply establish a priority of payment in cases of insolvency. They have no application whatever to an estate which, like Turner's, was always abundantly solvent. United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 390; United States v. Griswold, 8 F. 502; United States v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 89; United States v. Wood, 28 Fed. Cases 753; United States v. Couch, 25 Fed. Cases 674; Prince v. Bartlett, 8 Cranch 434; United States v. Langton, 5 Mason 208; Conrad v. Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 438; Beaston v. F. B. of D., 12 Pet. 133; United States v. McClellan, 3 Sumn. 350; United States v. Canal Bank, 3 Story 81. (5) "Taxes" are not "debts" within the meaning of sections 4259-4260, but even if they are, they must be limited (in cases of deceased persons) to taxes levied against the decedent in his lifetime or accruing on his estate after his death, as distinguished from taxes levied after his death upon property in which he had no interest, but held merely as trustee. Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 130; State ex rel. v. Snyder, 139 Mo. 553; Cooley on Taxation, p. 13; Bonaparte v. Maryland, 63 Md. 470; State v. Ruby, 77 Mo. 610. (6) The "taxes" herein sued for, even if a "debt," were not a "debt" until they were levied, six months after Turner's death, and therefore were not "a debt due from the deceased," within the meaning of sections 4259 and 4260. Langston v. Canterbury, 173 Mo. 135. (7) Even if "taxes" are "debts" within the meaning of sections 4259 and 4260, there is nothing in those sections which waive the necessity of presenting them to the probate court for allowance in the case of deceased persons. The only waiver in the statutes is in section 184, which does not apply, for reasons given under point 3. (8) Statutory provisions for the collection of taxes are exclusive. Sections 4259 and 4260 simply establish a priority of payment, and the means of enforcing that payment (where the debt claimed is a tax), are found elsewhere in the statutes and are exclusive. Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 130; State ex rel. v. Snyder, 139 Mo. 553. (9) Under no circumstances could the executor be liable under section 4260, unless he had notice of the claim before distribution was made. The Mississippi Valley Trust Company had no notice of the existence of this claim until nearly a year after distribution and discharge. United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705; United States v. Hahn, 37 Mo.App. 584; In re Vetterlein, 44 F. 57; Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465.
Judgment going in favor of defendant in a tax suit, plaintiff appealed. Defendant was sued in its individual capacity for the recovery of a personal judgment for taxes levied upon $ 142,760 of personal property for the year 1897. On that assessed valuation was levied $ 356.90 State and State interest tax, $ 713.80 county tax, and $ 499.66 school tax -- aggregating $ 1,570.36. The case has troublesome and singular features.
The petition was filed on the 31st of December, 1902 -- one day before the taxes became uncollectible by limitation (R. S 1899, sec. 9246). After alleging relator was collector of the revenue for the county of St. Louis, that relator in writing appointed appellant's counsel, Mr. Wolfsberger, with the approval of the county court, tax attorney, that defendant was a domestic corporation organized under the laws of this State relating to the incorporation of trust companies and having its place of business in the city of St. Louis, the petition proceeds to charge that T. T. Turner was a resident of the county of St. Louis on the first day of June, 1896, and either owned or had the possession and care, charge or management of personal property situate in said county of the foregoing amount, subject to assessment and taxation for the taxes and funds mentioned; that said property was duly listed to him at said value in his name, as...
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