State ex rel. Kinney v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 10 November 1944
• Docket Number: 29411.
• Citation: 21 Wn.2d 737,152 P.2d 978
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KINNEY v. CHAPMAN, Auditor.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

152 P.2d 978

21 Wn.2d 737

STATE ex rel. KINNEY v. CHAPMAN, Auditor.

No. 29411.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 10, 1944

Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1944.

Department 1.

Proceeding by the State, on the relation of C. A. Kinney, against Harley E. Chapman, as Auditor for Benton County, Washington, for a writ of mandamus to compel the Auditor to issue and deliver to relator a warrant upon current expense fund of the county for salary for one day's work as deputy sheriff. A peremptory writ of mandamus was issued, and defendant appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

GRADY J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, Benton County; Arthur McGuire, judge.

Cheney & Hutcheson, of Yakima, for appellant.

George O. Beardsley, of Prosser, for respondent.

MILLARD Justice.

As determined by the last (1940) federal census Benton county is classified as a county of the fifth class (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 4200-1a). The statute (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 4200-5a) which fixes the salary of the sheriff for counties of the fifth class at $2000 per annum, or $166.66 monthly, provides that no deputy 'shall receive larger compensation than provided for the officer employing him.' The sheriff employed relator as a deputy sheriff at an agreed salary of $2,700 per annum or $225 monthly, or $7.25 daily. Relator worked one day, March 11, 1944. Pay roll voucher was approved by the board of county commissioners for payment. Harley E. Chapman, auditor for Benton county refused to honor the voucher in the amount of $7.25 and to issue a warrant therefor on the ground that the voucher is for compensation of a deputy sheriff in excess of the salary provided by the statute for the sheriff who employed the deputy.

Relator instituted a proceeding for a writ of mandamus to compel the auditor for Benton county to issue and deliver to the relator a warrant upon the current expense fund of Benton county in the sum of $7.25. It was relator's position that the restrictive provision of the statute (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 4200-5a) is inapplicable for the reason that Benton county was faced with an emergency situation by reason of the great influx of population and increased volume of crimes produced by a defense project within its boundaries thereby necessitating employment of additional experienced and capable deputies to enable the sheriff to perform the mandatory duties of his office as required by law, which deputies could not be obtained if the sheriff were not permitted to pay wages to the deputies in excess of the sheriff's salary.

The trial court expressed the view that no constitutional question was involved; that the statute (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 4200-5a) was not unconstitutional when enacted and cannot become unconstitutional because of an abnormal and unanticipated condition subsequently arising which would prevent the sheriff from discharging the mandatory duties of his office under the limitation. The court stated that all the authority in the state is to the effect that the limitations of our constitution yield to the necessity of discharging governmental functions and that the limitation of a statute would fail to be operative in a like case.

State ex rel. Porter v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 551, 261 P. 90, which was an original action of certiorari in this court to review a judgment entered by a superior court affirming an order of the board of county commissioners declaring that an emergency existed in the office of the sheriff of that county and appropriating $1,000 to meet the emergency is cited to sustain the court's view that the maintenance of the sheriff's office is a mandatory necessity. The court concluded that the evidence established the facts that an emergency existed as alleged, that more deputies are required and that deputies cannot be procured at the maximum statutory salary of $2,000 per annum. Peremptory writ of mandamus was issued requiring the auditor to issue and deliver to relator a warrant in the sum of $7.25. The auditor appealed.

Counsel for respondent argues that the statute limiting the salary of deputy sheriffs to the amount of the salary of the sheriff is inapplicable or not relevant and 'must be laid aside' when, as in the case at bar, the sheriff is unable to perform the mandatory duties of his office as required by law unless he is permitted to pay a salary to his deputies in excess of the salary received by the sheriff.

Manifestly, the amount ($7.25) in controversy is insufficient to bring the action within the appellate jurisdiction of this court, unless the validity of a statute is involved.

Art. 4, § 4 of the constitution of this state, defining the appellate jurisdiction of this court prescribes '* * * its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in controversy or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred dollars, unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine, or the validity of a statute.'

The validity of the statute (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 4200-5a) is not involved within the meaning of the constitutional provision quoted above, but only the application of the statute to the facts presented.

In State ex rel. Ide v. Coon, 40 Wash. 682, 684, 82 P 993, we held that where the amount in controversy is less than $200 an appeal does not lie from a judgment of the superior court awarding a writ of mandate to compel the city...