State ex rel. Klein v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 06 July 1943
• Docket Number: 37770
• Parties: State of Missouri at the Relation of William Klein, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson as Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

173 S.W.2d 877

351 Mo. 651

State of Missouri at the Relation of William Klein, Relator, v. William C. Hughes, Edward J. McCullen and Lyon Anderson as Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals

No. 37770

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 6, 1943

Motion to Transfer to Banc Overruled September 7, 1943.

Record of Court of Appeals quashed.

Phil C. Donnelly, George A. Rozier and Matthes & Weier for relator.

(1) When a statute plainly can have only one meaning under canons of construction established by this court and a Court of Appeals gives it another meaning, this court may interfere by certiorari because the necessary effect of such erroneous holding is to violate the canons of construction. State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 124 S.W.2d 1072. (2) A portion of an original act omitted in an amendatory act shall be treated as repealed. Sec. 683, R. S. 1939; Belfast Inv. Co. v. Curry, 264 Mo. 483, 175 S.W. 201. (3) Effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, sentence paragraph and section of a statute, and a statute should be so construed as to give effect to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous contradictory, or conflicting. Graves v. Little Tarkio Drain. Dist. No. 1, 134 S.W.2d 70.

Albert S. Ennis for respondents.

(1) The only question which will be considered is whether the opinion as rendered conflicts with a controlling decision of the Supreme Court, and in determining that question the Supreme Court will take as true and consider only facts as found and stated by the Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Bennett v Becker, 76 S.W.2d 363, 335 Mo. 1177; State ex rel Continental Ins. Co. v. Becker, 77 S.W.2d 100, 336 Mo 59; State ex rel. Mo. Mut. Assn. v. Allen, 78 S.W.2d 862, 336 Mo. 352. (2) Supreme Court in certiorari proceedings cannot interfere with construction of statute by a Court of Appeals unless contrary to prior controlling construction. State ex rel. Harrington v. Trimble, 31 S.W.2d 783, 326 Mo. 623; State ex rel. Timmons v. Cox, 282 S.W. 694, 313 Mo. 672. (3) On certiorari for alleged conflict between Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, opinions of Court of Appeals are considered only to determine whether decision contravenes Supreme Court rulings and a relator must point out alleged conflicts; question of conflict in a particular ruling will not be considered where . . . matter was not discussed by Court of Appeals. State ex rel. Quercus Lbr. Co. v. Robertson, 197 S.W. 79. (4) Supreme Court cannot interfere with construction of a statute by a Court of Appeals unless the Supreme Court has previously given a different construction to the statute. State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 124 S.W.2d 1072. (5) Where the meaning of a statute is debatable, Supreme Court cannot, on certiorari, overturn construction of a Court of Appeals merely because it violates some general canon of construction recognized in Supreme Court's decision. State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, supra. (6) If the construction of a statute by a Court of Appeals turns on its application to specific facts, Supreme Court must have construed statute differently with reference to the same or similar facts before it may interfere on certiorari. State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, supra. (7) In a certiorari case the Supreme Court is limited to the law pronounced by the Court of Appeals and the facts stated in its opinion. State ex rel. Arndt v. Cox, 38 S.W.2d 1078, State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 233 S.W. 219, 289 Mo. 479.

OPINION

Ellison, J.

Certiorari to the respondent judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals bringing up the record in State ex rel. Klein v. Balsiger et al., 151 S.W.2d 521. The case involves the construction of Sec. 4906, R. S. 1939, Mo. R. S. A., sec. 4906, in the Liquor Control Act. Relator's principal contention is that respondents' opinion gives the statute an impossible interpretation, conflicting with canons of construction which are well settled by the decisions of this court; and that certiorari therefore will lie under State ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 959, 124 S.W. 1072, 1078. That decision holds: "when a statute plainly can have only one meaning under canons of construction established by this court, and a Court of Appeals gives it another meaning, we may interfere because there the necessary effect of such erroneous holding is to violate the cannons of construction -- as much so as if they were expressly denounced."

Before stating the facts of the case, let us say the above doctrine quoted from the Wors opinion confines our review within very narrow limits. Earlier in the same paragraph the opinion concedes the Courts of Appeals have the same right as we have to construe statutes, even erroneously. It is only when the proper construction of the statute is uncontrovertible that we can intervene. The doctrine is analogous to that stated in State ex rel. K. C. So. Ry. Co. v. Shain, 340 Mo. 1195, 1203(7), 105 S.W.2d 915, 920(9, 10), where it was held a Court of Appeals has the same right as this court to decide that a given state of facts substantially tends to prove another ultimate fact; but if that conclusion be contrary to physical laws or universal knowledge, then this court can interfere by certiorari. (Again, a rare occurrence.) On the other hand, in construing a statute we may consult the same canons and resort to the same extrinsic aids to construction as were available to the lower courts. And although the meaning of the statute on its face may be debatable and open to construction, yet if in the light of those canons and aids the meaning of the statute is certain, then certiorari will lie.

Since the facts are fully stated in the reported opinion, supra, of the relators, we shall merely sketch them here. The case was tried in the circuit court on a written agreed statement of facts. It was a mandamus suit to compel the mayor and board of aldermen of Crystal City, in Jefferson County, to issue to relator a license to sell intoxicating liquor in the original package in his drug store in that city. There was a city ordinance forbidding the granting of such a license to any person who was not a qualified legal voter and taxpaying citizen of Crystal City. Relator was not a voter and taxpayer of Crystal City but resided in Festus, another city in the same county, where he was a voter and taxpayer. The mayor and board of aldermen refused to grant the license because he did not come within the provisions of the ordinance since he was not a voter and taxpayer of Crystal City. It is conceded he was otherwise qualified. The trial judge granted a peremptory writ; and respondents reversed that decision on appeal.

The question in the case was whether the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with the statute, Sec. 4906, supra, which, in turn, called for a proper construction of the statute. The latter provides (we italicise the words directly involved):

"No person shall be granted a license hereunder unless such person is of good moral character and a qualified legal voter and a taxpaying citizen of the county, town, city or village, nor shall any corporation be granted a license hereunder unless the managing officer of such corporation is of good moral character and a qualified legal voter and taxpaying citizen of the county, town, city or village; . . . Provided, that nothing in this section contained shall prevent the issuance of licenses to nonresidents of Missouri or foreign corporations for the privilege of selling to duly licensed wholesalers and soliciting orders for the sale of intoxicating liquors, to, by or through a duly licensed wholesaler, within this state."

Respondents' opinion reasons the statute clearly evidences an intention that the licensee must be more than a voter and taxpaying citizen of the county because immediately following that word in the section are the words "town, city or village." The opinion then points out that sometimes a liquor selling business drives other legitimate businesses from the locality, and often has other objectionable features. It then argues that the public would be better protected and the licensee would have more inducement to conduct an orderly place, if he were a voter and taxpayer of the city, town or village where it is located. But the opinion then acknowledges: "However, it is not for the court to seek or point out the reasons which actuated the legislative mind; rather our concern is whether from what the Legislature has said, a definite and clear meaning can be attached to each and every word in the legislative Act, and not do violence to correct and reasonable thinking."

From this observation it will be seen the opinion assertively bases its construction of the statute upon a consideration of "each and every word in the legislative Act." But it makes no express reference anywhere to any other part of the Liquor Control Act, nor to any other part of the section itself, save that set out above dealing with corporate licensees and requiring the managing officer thereof to be a voter and taxpayer "of the county, town, city or village." The opinion concludes that where liquor is sold at a place in a county outside of any city, town or village, the licensee must be a voter and taxpayer only of that county; but where it is sold in a city, town or village, the licensee must be a voter and taxpayer of that municipality. Then the opinion considers a contention made by relator in the Court of Appeals, which pointed out that the Attorney General had ruled the managing officer of a corporate licensee is not required to be a voter and taxpayer of the municipality where the liquor is sold, and argued the same privilege should be accorded to individual licensees. In answer (and expressly without either approving or disapproving ...