State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton

• Decision Date: 28 July 1916
• Docket Number: Nos. 19,773 - (163).,s. 19,773 - (163).
• Citation: 134 Minn. 226
• Parties: STATE EX REL. SAMUEL LACHTMAN v. JAMES G. HOUGHTON.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

134 Minn. 226

STATE EX REL. SAMUEL LACHTMAN v. JAMES G. HOUGHTON.¹

Nos. 19,773 - (163).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 28, 1916.

Upon the relation of Samuel Lachtman the district court for Hennepin county granted its alternative writ of mandamus directing James G. Houghton, as inspector of buildings for the city of Minneapolis, to issue to the relator a permit for the electrical wiring of a certain building described in the writ or show cause why he had not done so. The answer of respondent set up the ordinance of the city council regulating the construction of buildings within that city and an ordinance amending the former ordinance passed on August 20, 1915, designating certain districts as industrial districts and designating certain other districts as residential districts. The matter was heard before Fish, J., who made findings and quashed the writ. From the judgment entered pursuant to the order for judgment, relator appealed. Reversed.

George B. Leonard and M. Rose, for appellant.

C. D. Gould and R. S. Wiggin, for respondent.

TAYLOR, C.

The relator owns two lots on Fourteenth avenue south in the city of Minneapolis, and, on August 12, 1915, procured from the building inspector of that city a permit for the erection of a small one story store building thereon. Immediately thereafter, he contracted with the Hennepin Lumber Company to erect the building, and also executed to Aaron Rudoy a lease of the building so to be erected for a term of two years for use as a store. Pursuant to the contract and before August 20, 1915, the contractor began excavating for the building and delivered some materials therefor upon the premises. On August 20, 1915, the city council passed an ordinance establishing a residential district which provided that "no person shall hereafter erect within said district any building except those used for residence purposes, including duplex and double houses, flats, tenement and apartment houses, and there are hereby prohibited within said district the erection and maintenance of hotels, stores, factories warehouses, dry cleaning plants, public garages or stables, or any industrial establishment or any business whatsoever."

The relator's property was within the residential district so established, and, at the same meeting at which the ordinance was adopted, the city council, by motion, directed the building inspector to revoke the permit issued to him for the erection of the store building. It does not appear that the building inspector took any action toward revoking the permit, and the relator completed the building ready for the installation of wires and other appliances for lighting it by electricity. The ordinances of the city prohibit the installation of such appliances without a permit therefor from the building inspector, and relator applied to him for such permit. He refused to issue it upon the sole ground that the erection and maintenance of a store building was prohibited by the ordinance above quoted. Thereupon relator sought to compel the issuance of the permit by mandamus. The district court rendered judgment against him and he appealed.

Relator contends that the ordinance infringes the provision of the state Constitution prohibiting the taking or damaging of private property for public use without compensation; and the provision of the United States Constitution prohibiting the state from depriving any person of his property without due process of law; also that when he obtained his permit and began construction thereunder he acquired a vested right to erect and maintain his building which could not be impaired by an ordinance adopted thereafter. Respondent contends that the ordinance was enacted under the police power of the state and is a proper exercise of that power.

The city had legislative authority for adopting the ordinance (G. S. 1913, §§ 1581-1585); and the question presented is whether it violates rights secured to property owners by the Constitution, or whether it can be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power. It is presumed to be valid and will not be declared invalid unless it clearly transgresses some constitutional inhibition. The legislature has power to regulate and restrict the manner in which the owner may make use of his property so far as may be necessary for the general welfare; but such regulations and restrictions must tend in some degree to prevent harm to the public or to promote the common good, and must not unreasonably impair or abridge his property rights. In State v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N. W. 633, 778, 1134, in which the validity of the statute regulating the business of persons selling agricultural products on commission was upheld, it is said:

"The term `police power,' as understood in American constitutional law, means simply the power to impose such restrictions upon private rights as are practically necessary for the general welfare of all. Rippe v. Becker, 56 Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331 . And it must be confined to such restrictions and burdens as are thus necessary to promote the public welfare, or, in other words, to prevent the infliction of public injury. State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 68 Minn. 381, 71 N. W. 400 [38 L.R.A. 672, 64 Am. St. 482]. And in the exercise of its police powers a state is not confined to matters relating strictly to the public health, morals, and peace, but, as has been said, there may be interference whenever the public interests demand it; and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature, to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499 . If, then, any business becomes of such a character as to be sufficiently affected with public interest, there may be a legislative interference and regulation of it in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state, provided the measures adopted do not conflict with constitutional provisions, and have some relation to, and some tendency to accomplish, the desired end. The subjects which may be legislated upon are, of necessity, continually arising as business increases, and new phases, conditions, and methods appear. The development of the law relating to the proper exercise of the police power of the state clearly demonstrates that it is very broad and comprehensive, and is exercised to promote the general welfare of the state, as well as its health and comfort."

It is well settled that under this power cities may regulate and control the construction of buildings in the interest of health and safety and for the purpose of guarding against fires, and to accomplish this end may prohibit the erection of any building without first obtaining a permit therefor. To promote the general well-being, cities may also prescribe districts within which no business or occupation of a noxious or offensive character, or which tends to interfere with the comfort and prosperity of others, may be carried on. The dividing line between restrictions which may be lawfully imposed under the police power and those which invade the rights secured to the property owner by the constitutional provisions that his property shall not be taken or damaged without compensation, nor he be deprived of it without due process of law, has never been distinctly marked out, and probably cannot be. As different cases arise, the courts determine from the facts and circumstances of the particular case whether it falls upon one side or the other of the line. The rule governing the exercise of the police power and defining the duty of the courts in respect thereto is stated in general terms in State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 68 Minn. 381, 71 N. W. 400, 38 L.R.A. 672, 64 Am. St. 482, as follows:

"While the police power of the state is a very extensive one, it is not without limits. A law enacted in the exercise of the police power must be a police regulation in fact. If it will not conduce to any legitimate police purpose, or if it amounts to an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with the right of the citizen to pursue any lawful business, the courts have a right, and it is their duty, to declare the law unconstitutional."

Of the cases cited by the city as supporting its contention that the erection of store buildings in residential districts may be prohibited under the police power, the following are the most nearly in point: In re Montgomery, 163 Cal. 457, 125 Pac. 1070, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 130. Montgomery had been convicted of maintaining a lumber yard in a residence district of the city of Los Angeles in violation of an ordinance which enumerated several industrial districts, declared the remainder of the city to be a residence district, and prohibited establishing or maintaining within the residence district, "any stone-crusher, rolling-mill, machine-shop, planing-mill, carpet-beating establishment, hay-barn, wood yard, lumber yard, public laundry or wash-house." The court did not discuss the constitutional question further than to say that the ordinance had been held constitutional in Ex Parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714, and that what was there said applied with equal force to this case. Turning to the case cited we find an extended discussion of the question and of the cases in that state and elsewhere bearing thereon; and that the decision was placed upon the ground that the occupations enumerated in the ordinance were proper matters for police regulation in the interest of the health, safety and comfort of the people of the city. The court said:

"The design of the ordinance here involved undoubtedly was to protect such portions of the city of Los Angeles as are devoted principally to residence purposes from the dangers and discomfort attendant upon the operation of certain kinds of business which, while not necessarily nuisances per se, have always been...