State v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company

• Citation: 71 N.W. 400,68 Minn. 381
• Decision Date: 27 May 1897
• Docket Number: 10,474,10,476,10,479,10,485--(52,53,54,55)
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY. SAME v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. SAME v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. SAME v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

71 N.W. 400

68 Minn. 381

STATE OF MINNESOTA v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. CHICAGO GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

SAME v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY

Nos. 10,474, 10,476, 10,479, 10,485--(52, 53, 54, 55)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

May 27, 1897

The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, the Great Northern Railway Company, the Chicago Great Western Railway Company, and the Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Company were indicted under Laws 1895, c. 149, for refusing to turn over unclaimed freight to a licensed public warehouseman after twenty days from the receipt thereof. Demurrers to the indictment were overruled with leave to defendants to plead, and the cases certified from the district court for Ramsey county, Brill, J. Orders overruling demurrers reversed.

The orders overruling the demurrers are therefore reversed and the causes remanded, with directions to the court below to dismiss the indictments.

H. W Childs, Attorney General, and M. L. Countryman, for the state.

Laws 1895, c. 149, is a valid exercise of legislative power. Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391; Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517; People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1; Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58; Brechbill v Randall, 102 Ind. 528; Delaware v. Central, 45 N.J.Eq. 50; Baker v. State, 54 Wis. 368; State v. Marshall, 64 N.H. 549; Pierce v. State, 63 Md. 592; Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265; Donnell v State, 48 Miss. 661; Cooley, Torts, § 285; Cooley Const. Lim., § 742; Tiedeman, Limit. Police Power, § 2; Plumley v. Mass., 155 U.S. 462; Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465.

W. H. Norris, for Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.

Goods shipped from one state into another are beyond interference by state legislation, until, after coming to the importer, he has sold them or broken up the original packages. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460; Robbins v. Shelby, 120 U.S. 489. The statute is also void as laying an impost upon imports. Under it the imposition of warehouseman's charges, whether with or without insurance premiums added to his own for storage, is not, like his license fee, a statutory charge upon his general occupation, or a tax upon the receipts from a particular storage, to be by him in turn exacted from the goods and their owner, but a direct charge upon the body of the goods themselves, made enforceable as a lien, without support of any voluntary contract, and without consent of the owner to its creation or enforcement. And this imposition upon the goods is to be made upon goods imported from another state while in the hands of the carrier as carrier for and with the consent of the importer, and in the original unbroken packages, while the importation is short of legal consummation, and the goods, because unsold and unbroken, are still articles of interestate commerce. The act also abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. It abridges freedom of contract between owner and shipper, if the latter be also consignee; between the carrier and a shipper contracting in behalf of the consignee; and between carrier and consignee further contracting at the termination of the technical transportation. It forbids the owner of goods, whether shipper or consignee, to keep the goods more than twenty days after arrival, as long as he chooses, where he chooses, and can arrange to have them kept to his satisfaction. No other owner of goods is so restricted or debarred of natural right. It abridges the owner's right to have his goods delivered to him by the carrier free from all charges and liens which he or the consignor for him did not contract. Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Printing v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. Cas. 462. The act authorizes taking without due process of law. Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U.S. 480; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542; Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 358 (480); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378; State v. Becht, 23 Minn. 411 The act allows a license to a domestic carrier and denies it to a foreign carrier, thus discriminating against a foreign carrier. In connection with the regulation of commerce it is said, concerning state laws excluding divers classes, that the right to exercise the police power can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and can not be carried beyond that necessity. Prentice, Police Powers, 10, 11; Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U.S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275; People v. Compagnie, 107 U.S. 59. Citing, as to the further extent of the police power, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Cooley, Const. Limit. 577; People v. Jackson, 9 Mich. 285; Lake View v. Rose Hill, 70 Ill. 192; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Tiedeman, Limit. Police Power, § 1; Robbins v. Shelby, 120 U.S. 489.

The act is unconstitutional and void as partial, unequal, and class legislation, based upon a classification wholly arbitrary, without natural reason, and unjust. See City v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264.

Frank B. Kellogg and Daniel W. Lawler, for Chicago Great Western Railway Co., M. D. Grover and C. Wellington, for Great Northern Railway Co., M. D. Munn, for Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.

To the point that the act interfered with the right of the carrier and the consignee or consignor to contract, cited In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 399; Tiedeman, Limit. Police Power, § 92; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380; Richie v. People, 155 Ill. 98; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163; In re House Bill No. 203, 21 Colo. 27; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171; State v. Fire, 33 W.Va. 188; Low v. Rees, 41 Neb. 127.

OPINION

MITCHELL, J.

The defendants in these actions were severally indicted for a refusal to turn over to a public warehouseman certain goods which had not been called for by the consignee, pursuant to the provisions of Laws 1895, c. 149, § 11, entitled

"An act to license and regulate the business of storage companies and public warehousemen (other than warehousemen of grain in bulk) and to provide a penalty for violation of the same."

Section one of the act provides that

"the governor may license any suitable person, persons, or corporations established under the laws of this state, and having their place or places of business within this state, to carry on the business of storage companies or public warehousemen, who may keep and maintain public warehouses for the storage of goods, wares and merchandise, etc., excepting grain in bulk. Said license must be obtained within thirty days from and after the passage of this bill, upon the payment into the treasury of the state of the sum of ten dollars, and annually thereafter, by the payment of a like sum, to be credited to the school fund of the state."

Section nine makes it unlawful for any one not duly licensed under the provisions of the act to conduct or carry on the business of a storage company or warehouseman in this state. Section ten makes a violation of the provisions of sections nine and eleven a misdemeanor punishable by fine. Section eleven, under which the indictments were drawn, reads as follows:

"Sec. 11. This act shall not be construed to apply to any railroad or transportation company who holds goods, wares, or merchandise in cars, freight houses or warehouses for a period not exceeding twenty days after receipt. Provided, such railroad or transportation company shall, within forty-eight hours after the receipt of such goods, wares, and merchandise, notify the consignee of the arrival thereof in writing, and in case such consignee, or his assigns, fails and neglects to call for or receive said goods, wares or merchandise within twenty days after such receipt of same by any railroad or transportation company as aforesaid, said railroad or transportation company must then turn over said goods, wares, or merchandise to a storage company or public warehouseman, licensed as in this act provided, upon the payment of the charges of said carrier thereon, which charges thus paid by said storage company or warehouseman to said carrier shall be a lien on said goods, wares or merchandise, and enforceable in accordance with sections one, two, three and four, chapter two hundred and two of the General Laws of 1885."

Among other objections to the sufficiency of these indictments, it is urged that the act in question is unconstitutional. The act is certainly a remarkable one. Its provisions contain strong intrinsic...