State ex rel. Lafayette County Com'n v. Ravenhill, 71301

• Decision Date: 08 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 71301,71301
• Citation: 776 S.W.2d 17
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LAFAYETTE COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Relators, v. Honorable Robert RAVENHILL, Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 17

776 S.W.2d 17

STATE ex rel. LAFAYETTE COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Relators, v. Honorable Robert RAVENHILL, Judge, 15th Judicial Circuit, Respondent.

No. 71301.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

Sept. 8, 1989.

Weldon W. Perry, Jr., Lexington, for relators.

Robert L. Rasse, Marshall, for respondent.

RENDLEN, Judge.

We issued our preliminary rule in prohibition on the contention of the Lafayette County Commission and Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney that respondent, after the passage of more than six months, was without jurisdiction to amend a final judgment of forfeiture allocating funds pursuant to the Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act (CAFA), §§ 513.600 to 513.645, RSMo 1986. This cause falls within the ambit of this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Mo. Const. art. V, § 4, ¹ and our preliminary rule in prohibition is now made absolute.

The funds in question here are part of a $635,420 sum seized during a narcotics arrest in Lafayette County, upon which the Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney, after conviction of the defendants in that action, instituted a forfeiture proceeding entitled State vs. Keith Weakley and Kermit Williams, Cause No. CV188-101CC, under the authority of § 513.607, RSMo 1986. The statute provides that property used in connection with criminal activity may be subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding instituted by the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the property was seized. On June 29, 1988, the Honorable William Bellamy, then judge of the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, entered a judgment of forfeiture in the cause declaring that the entire sum was "forfeited to Lafayette County, Missouri for deposit in a special fund or forfeiture account to be allocated, and thereafter distributed (emphasis added)" to the following:

(1) 25% to the Lafayette County Crime Fund, which had been established by Resolution 87-1-13 of the Lafayette County Commission and was to be used by the Lafayette County Sheriff or Prosecuting Attorney to pay costs of "criminal investigations, victim-witness services, or other matters reasonably related to the functions and duties of those respective offices." Resolution 87-1-13 had further provided that withdrawals from the crime fund were permitted upon the signatures of at least two of the authorized signatories, who were the Presiding Commissioner, the Prosecuting Attorney, and the Sheriff.

(2) 25% to the Missouri Highway Patrol, Troop A;

(3) 10% to the Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney's Office;

(4) 40% to the various municipal police departments in Lafayette County. ²

The Superintendent of the Missouri State Highway Patrol, however, determined that the highway patrol should not participate in the CAFA account and should relinquish its portion to the Lafayette County Crime Fund. Therefore, on December 22, 1988, the superintendent wrote a letter to the Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney, who as stated above was a county officer authorized to use the monies in the crime fund and was a designated signatory on its account. This letter purported to yield to the Lafayette County Crime Fund the highway patrol's rights in the proceeds, yet the superintendent expressed the highway patrol's keen interest in obtaining funding for equipment to perform DNA testing in its laboratory. The superintendent concluded, "I am hopeful that you and the court will conclude that this is a proper use of the Lafayette County CAFA forfeiture funds and will provide the equipment through a Deed of Gift as we previously discussed."

Upon receipt of the highway patrol superintendent's letter, the Lafayette County Prosecuting Attorney was at first unsuccessful in convincing the county treasurer to transfer the funds to the crime fund, for the treasurer had received contrary instructions from the county auditor. The prosecutor, however, then submitted a written request to the Lafayette County treasurer and auditor to execute the transfer of funds from the highway patrol to the crime fund, stating that the superintendent's letter was effective as an assignment of the funds to the crime fund "and does not need or require any further court orders or directives to effectuate the transfer." Acting under direction of the Lafayette County Commission, the county treasurer transferred the funds from the highway patrol's CAFA account to the crime fund on January 9, 1989.

However, on January 10, his first day sitting as circuit judge, respondent (who succeeded Judge Bellamy) on his own initiative and without notice to any interested party of record entered an amended order of forfeiture which revoked the previous order with respect to the allocation of funds to the highway patrol, accepted the voluntary return of the funds by the patrol, and allocated them instead to the Saline County Commission to be deposited in that county's "Juvenile Law Enforcement" Account. Quite interestingly the creation of that account had occurred earlier that same day by resolution of the Saline County Commission to be "maintained and used by the Saline County Commission for official juvenile law enforcement purposes and related juvenile rehabilitation purposes." The authorizing resolution further required that "the Saline County Commission accept for deposit into said Fund all moneys allocated and ordered distributed to the Saline County Commission by order of the Circuit Court of Lafayette County, Missouri, ... Cause No. CV188-101CC, entitled State of Missouri ex rel. Missouri State Highway Patrol, Plaintiff vs. Keith Weakley and Kermit Williams, Defendants." Thus, with a remarkable display of omniscience, the Saline County Commission had only hours or moments before provided for funding of its new Juvenile Law Enforcement Fund with monies to be allocated to it in the forfeiture proceeding at bar, even though Saline County was not to be a recipient of such funds under the original judgment of forfeiture and respondent had not yet "amended" that judgment entered more than six months earlier.

We agree with relators' contention that respondent lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgment of forfeiture, for the language of the Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act indicates the judgment entered by Judge Bellamy in this forfeiture proceeding was a final judgment. Section 513.607.2 states that civil forfeiture proceedings are to be governed by the Missouri rules of civil procedure, which would include the rules as to...