State ex rel. Lee v. Trumbull County Probate Court, 98-411

• Decision Date: 14 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-411,98-411
• Citation: 700 N.E.2d 4,83 Ohio St.3d 369
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. LEE, Appellant, v. TRUMBULL COUNTY PROBATE COURT, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 369

83 Ohio St.3d 369

700 N.E.2d 4

The STATE ex rel. LEE, Appellant, v. TRUMBULL COUNTY PROBATE COURT, Appellee.

No. 98-411.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Aug. 19, 1998.

Decided Oct. 14, 1998.

In 1990, Florence J. Isaly moved from Trumbull County, Ohio, to West Bloomfield, Michigan, to live with her son, appellant, Fletcher Orlan Lee, a.k.a. Orlan Lee. While there, Isaly entered into a land installment contract for Michigan real estate. Isaly and her son subsequently moved to Hong Kong.

In 1995, Isaly died in Hong Kong. The Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court, Probate Jurisdiction, which assigned a net value to Isaly's estate of five hundred dollars, admitted Isaly's will to probate and appointed Lee executor of his mother's estate. The Hong Kong court determined that Isaly was domiciled in Hong Kong when she died, and her will was proved and registered in that court.

After appellee, Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division ("probate court"), appointed attorney Douglas J. Neuman special administrator of Isaly's estate, Neuman brought an action in California to determine the ownership of California property Isaly owned at the time of her death. Neuman subsequently applied to be appointed a full administrator of Isaly's estate.

In June 1997, the probate court granted the application and appointed Neuman administrator of Isaly's intestate estate. The probate court concluded:

"Based upon the evidence and briefs filed by the parties, the Court finds that outside of these proceedings, the only administration of the decedent's estate pending is in Hong Kong where the gross value of the estate is $500.00. Additional property remains in the decedent's name in Ohio and no other estate has been filed in Ohio or any other state. An estate proceeding is necessary in order to deal with the property which remains in the name of the decedent in order for those assets to be administered.

"The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the decedent's assets in that the decedent was domiciled in the state of Ohio at the time of her death. The evidence established that the decedent resided in Trumbull County throughout most of her life, her husband established his business in Trumbull County, and her children attended Trumbull County schools. She executed a will and other legal documents and conducted her business affairs in Trumbull County. Even after she left the area, the decedent maintained contact with her lifelong friends in the Trumbull County area. She held funds in local bank accounts and continued to maintain her membership in the local temple. The decedent's husband is buried in Trumbull County, and she made arrangements to be buried beside him in a gravesite with a shared headstone."

Neuman thereafter advised Lee that he felt Isaly's will was defective and that the assets remaining in Isaly's name needed to be transferred. Lee filed an action in Massachusetts to obtain assets located in that state that had been owned by Isaly.

In 1997, Lee filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County for a writ of prohibition to prevent the probate court from proceeding with the administration of Isaly's estate. The court of appeals initially stayed any pending proceedings in the probate court, but subsequently modified the stay to permit Neuman to "take any steps necessary to protect the interests of the estate in the Massachusetts proceedings." The probate court filed an answer to Lee's prohibition complaint and subsequently filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The court of appeals converted the probate court's motion to dismiss to a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted the motion, and entered judgment in favor of the probate court.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right and Lee's request for oral argument.

Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., Robert S. McGeough and Angela M. Battaglia, Warren; Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Wiley Dinsmore and Mark A. Vander Laan, Cincinnati, for appellant. ¹

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and LuWayne Annos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Oral Argument

Lee requests oral argument "pursuant to the terms and provisions of" S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(B).

We deny Lee's request for the following reasons. First, S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2) does not mandate that the court order oral argument in this case. S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A) provides that in "an appeal that is not scheduled for oral argument pursuant to Section 1 of this rule, the Supreme Court may order oral argument on the merits either sua sponte or in response to a request by any party." (Emphasis added.) Second, Lee neither established nor asserted any of the usual factors that might warrant oral argument. See State ex rel. McGinty v. Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 283, 287, 690 N.E.2d 1273, 1276. Third, Lee does not even specify why oral argument would be beneficial here.

Based on the foregoing, we proceed to the merits of Lee's appeal.

Prohibition

Lee asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in granting the probate court's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his prohibition action. The court of appeals converted the probate court's untimely Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See State ex rel. Pirman v. Money (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 591, 592, 635 N.E.2d 26, 28.

In order to be entitled to dismissal under Civ.R. 12(C), it must appear beyond doubt that Lee can prove no set of facts warranting the requested relief, after construing all material factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom in Lee's favor. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 134, 136, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1224.

Lee requested a writ of prohibition, which required him to establish that the probate court is about to exercise judicial power, that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and that denial of the writ will cause injury for which no other legal remedy exists. State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 674 N.E.2d 1381, 1382. Lee sufficiently alleged that the probate court had exercised jurisdiction by appointing Neuman administrator of Isaly's estate and that it was continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the administration of the estate.

Regarding the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, the general rule is that absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 142, 144-145, 684 N.E.2d 1228, 1231. If, on the other hand, the inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie to prevent the unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction as well as to correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions. State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98, 671 N.E.2d 236, 238.

Because the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction, probate proceedings are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the Constitution. State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 655 N.E.2d 1303, 1306; Corron v. Corron (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708, paragraph one of the syllabus. Under R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(b) and (c), probate courts have general, exclusive jurisdiction "[t]o grant and revoke letters testamentary and of administration" and "[t]o direct and control the conduct and settle the accounts of executors and administrators and order the distribution of estates." These provisions, however, do not bestow specific subject-matter jurisdiction to administer Isaly's estate here.

In this regard, the probate court claimed in its dismissal motion that it had properly assumed jurisdiction over Isaly's estate pursuant to R.C. 2107.11 and 2113.01. But neither of these statutes confers jurisdiction on the probate court to administer Isaly's estate. R.C. 2107.11 does not apply because it merely addresses the jurisdiction of probate courts to probate a will. The probate court specifically found that Isaly died intestate. R.C. 2113.01 does not apply because it empowers the probate court to grant letters of administration only "[u]pon the death of a resident of this state intestate." (Emphasis added.) Despite the probate court's contention that Isaly was domiciled in Trumbull County at the time of her death, this is irrelevant for purposes of R.C. 2113.01 becaus...