State ex rel. Lundgren v. Dist. Court of Wash. Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1918
• Docket Number: No. 21110.,21110.
• Citation: 141 Minn. 83,169 N.W. 488
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LUNDGREN v. DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

141 Minn. 83

169 N.W. 488

STATE ex rel. LUNDGREN

v.DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY.

No. 21110.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 15, 1918.

Certiorari to District Court, Washington County; J. N. Searles, Judge.

Certiorari by the State, on the relation of Viktor Lundgren, against the District Court of Washington County, etc., to review an order of that court holding plaintiff not entitled to recover under Workmen's Compensation Act. Judgment reversed, and new trial granted.

Syllabus by the Court

The construction of the building referred to in the opinion held within the ‘usual course of the employer's business,’ within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230). M. E. Louisell, of Duluth, for relator.

Wilson & Thoreen, of Stillwater, for respondent.

BROWN, C. J.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, §§ 8195-8230), in which the trial court held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the reason, as found by the court, that the employment in which plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury was not ‘in the usual course of defendant's business.’ Judgment was ordered and entered accordingly, and plaintiff sued out a writ of certiorari to review the same.

In stating the facts in the case, which are not in dispute, we refer to the interested parties as plaintiff and defendant; plaintiff being the employé and defendant the employer.

Defendant is a corporation created under and pursuant to the laws of the state, and since its organization has been engaged in the retail lumber and building business. In May, 1917, the company decided to enlarge its business by adding thereto coal and other fuel. To accomplish this it became necessary to build a shed in which to store a supply of coal for the trade. Plaintiff was employed by defendant for a specific part of the work of constructing this shed. In the performance of the work he received an accidental injury, arising out of the employment, for which he claims compensation. He was an employé of defendant. The employment was for the specific purpose of laying a concrete foundation and concrete floor for the shed, and for an agreed compensation, and the court found that it was not casual, within the meaning of the Compensation Act. The court further found, as a conclusion of law, based upon the facts stated, that the employment was not in the usual course of the business or occupation of defendant, and not therefore within the Compensation Law. Judgment was accordingly ordered dismissing the proceeding.

Whether the learned trial court was right in that conclusion is the only question presented by the record. We are unable to concur in that view of the case. While the courts of the different states are somewhat at variance in defining or applying the particular provision of the Compensation Act here involved, namely, the clause excluding liability of the employer when the employment in which an injury is received is not within ‘the usual course of the business or occupation’ of the employer (Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271 Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128, L. R. A. 1916E, 329, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1; Carter v. Industrial Com. [Cal.] 1 Workmen's Com. J. 497; Geller v. Republic Novelty Works [N. Y.] 1 Workmen's Com. J. 691; Boyle v. Mahony et al. [Conn.] 1 Workmen's Com. J. 937; Holbrook v. Olympia Hotel Co. [Mich.] 166 N. W. 876), we think the liberal view heretofore followed in our former decisions construing the...