State ex rel. Luria v. Wagener
Decision Date | 08 July 1897 |
Docket Number | 10,674--(244) |
Citation | 72 N.W. 67,69 Minn. 206 |
Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA ex rel. PETTER LURIA v. JOHN WAGENER |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Writ of habeas corpus to defendant, as sheriff of Ramsey county. Relator discharged.
Stevens O'Brien, Cole & Albrecht, for relator.
Hawking and peddling without a license is forbidden by Laws 1897, c 107, but section 5 excepts the manufacturer, with some others, from the application of the law. No such classification of hawkers and peddlers can be made, for no arbitrary distinction between different kinds or classes of business can be sustained, the conditions being otherwise similar. State v. Sheriff, 48 Minn. 236. See, also State v. Bease, 46 Minn. 138; Temple v Sumner, 51 Miss. 13; Chaddock v. Day, 75 Mich. 527; City v. Gugenheim, 61 Ill.App. 374.
H. W. Childs and George B. Edgerton, for respondent.
Exemptions like those expressed in section 5 have long been indulged in and are sustained by the courts of this country. People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428; Seymour v. State, 51 Ala. 52; State v. Morehead, 42 S.C. 211; Com. v. Crowell, 156 Mass. 215; Village v. Fisher, 140 N.Y. 187.
OPINION
Relator was by a justice of the peace convicted of peddling goods without a license in the town of Rose, in Ramsey county, contrary to chapter 107, Laws 1897, which provides:
Section 3 provides that the town clerk may issue the license, and section 4 provides that, on conviction of peddling without a license issued as provided by the act, a fine of not less than $ 10, or more than $ 100, or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days, may be imposed.
Section 5 reads as follows:
Relator was sentenced to imprisonment on such conviction, and sued out a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that this act is unconstitutional and void, for two reasons: (1) It contravenes sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution, prohibiting partial class legislation; and (2) it permits an excessive and unreasonable amount of money to be demanded as a license fee. We shall consider the first ground only.
We are of the opinion that the act is unconstitutional on the first ground. Section 33, aforesaid, provides:
"In all cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case, is hereby declared a judicial question, and, as such, shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject. * * *"
Section 34 provides:
"The legislature shall provide general laws for the transaction of any business that may be prohibited by section one [section 33] of this amendment, and all such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state."
This court has often held that, under these sections, the legislature must treat alike all who are in the same condition, must make the law apply to a whole class, and cannot make a law which applies only to a part of a class. And the class must be selected on some distinction, or be defined by some principle, which might naturally or properly distinguish it from all other classes.
We are of the opinion that these rules have not been complied with in the framing of this statute. It was proper to leave out of the class of persons to whom the act should apply several of the classes of persons excepted by section 5 thereof. But other persons are excepted by section 5 who cannot be left out of the...
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