State ex rel. Mashburn v. Stice

• Decision Date: 24 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. MA–2012–239.,MA–2012–239.
• Citation: 2012 OK CR 14,288 P.3d 247
• Parties: STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. Greg MASHBURN, District Attorney, Petitioner, v. Honorable Steve STICE, Special Judge, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

288 P.3d 247

2012 OK CR 14

STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel. Greg MASHBURN, District Attorney, Petitioner,

v.Honorable Steve STICE, Special Judge, Respondent.

No. MA–2012–239.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Oct. 24, 2012.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

¶ 1 On March 15, 2012, Petitioner, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. Greg Mashburn, District Attorney, Carl Buckholts, Assistant District Attorney, filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus requesting this Court to direct Respondent, the Honorable Steve Stice, Special Judge, to order the Defendant in Cleveland County District Court Case No. CM–2011–3112, to pay the District Attorney a supervision fee of Forty Dollars ($40.00) per month, pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 991d(A)(2).

¶ 2 On November 21, 2011, the State of Oklahoma charged the Defendant with Aggravated Driving Under the Influence (47 O.S.2011, § 11–902(D)). On February 23, 2012, the State and the Defendant presented Respondent with a negotiated plea agreement wherein sentencing would be deferred for a period of one (1) year. As required by § 11–902(D), the plea agreement required one year supervision, periodic testing, and installation of an ignition interlock device for a period of ninety (90) days. The agreement further reflected that the Defendant was to be supervised by the District Attorney's office.¹ Based upon this plea agreement, the Defendant entered his guilty plea to the offense.

¶ 3 Respondent held a hearing concerning the statutory requirements of supervision and periodic testing and determined the following: The District Attorney's office did not have the means to conduct the periodic testing required by statute but instead intended to direct the Defendant to a private supervision provider to complete those services. The District Attorney's office did not employ a probation officer but instead intended for the Defendant to be supervised by one of the administrative assistants in the District Attorney's office.

¶ 4 Based upon these findings, Respondent announced to the parties that the court would not accept the agreement. Respondent indicated that the court approved of all of the terms of the agreement with the exception of supervision by the District Attorney's Office. Respondent determined that the court believed additional resources were necessary to protect the public and facilitate the Defendant's success because of the aggravated use of alcohol involved in the offense. For those reasons, Respondent concluded that supervision by a private supervision provider was necessary.

¶ 5 Respondent provided the Defendant with an opportunity to withdraw his plea. The Defendant announced that he wanted to persist in his plea. Respondent deferred sentencing in the Defendant's case for a period of one (1) year under terms identical to those set forth in the plea agreement but directed supervision for a period of one year by the private supervision provider. Respondent refused to order the Defendant to pay a supervision fee to the District Attorney pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 991d(A)(2). The State objected to these terms and announced on the record its intent to challenge the trial court's ruling.

¶ 6 The State raises a single proposition in its Petition:

I. The trial court failed to comply with a clear statutory provision requiring payment of supervision fees to the District Attorney's office.

¶ 7 The requirements for the issuance of an extraordinary writ are set forth in Rule 10.1, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2011). For a writ of mandamus, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (1) he or she has a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent's refusal to perform a plain legal duty not involving the exercise of discretion; and (3) the adequacy of mandamus and the inadequacy of other relief. State, ex rel. Lane v. Bass, 2004 OK CR 14, ¶ 5, 87 P.3d 629, 631 ( overruled on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 2006 OK CR 1, 127 P.3d 1135);Bednar v. District Court of Kay County, 2002 OK CR 41, ¶ 7, 60 P.3d 1, 3;Woolen v. Coffman, 1984 OK CR 53, ¶ 6, 676 P.2d 1375, 1377; Rule 10.6(B), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.18, App. (2011).

¶ 8 Petitioner claims that Respondent had a legal duty to direct the Defendant to pay the District Attorney a supervision fee of Forty Dollars ($40.00) per month. Petitioner further claims that the trial court did not have any discretion in the matter as § 991d(A)(2) was the later enacted statute and thus modified the provisions of 22 O.S.2011, § 991a(A)(1)(s).

¶ 9 On April 23, 2012, we directed Respondent to file a response to the Petition. That Response was filed on May 15, 2012, by and through Respondent's counsel, Stanley M. Ward and Scott F. Brockman. Respondent claims that § 991a(A)(1)(s) and § 991d(A)(2), are not irreconcilable and, when read in conjunction, the two statutes permit the trial court discretion to determine the issue of supervision and the correlating supervision fee.

¶ 10 Oral argument was heard in this matter May 24, 2012.².... Whereupon we granted the request of the Oklahoma District Attorney's Association (“ODAA”) to file an amicus curiae brief. The amicus curiae brief echoes the State's claim and relates the many benefits of the District Attorney's Offender Supervision Program. The ODAA asserts that § 991d(A)(2), does not require the District Attorney to provide any supervision services in exchange for the monthly supervision fee. However, the ODAA relates that on February 16, 2012, its council adopted “suggested minimum standards” for the District Attorney's Offender Supervision Program.

¶ 11 Regardless of the many benefits of the District Attorney's Offender Supervision Program and the financial impact on the 27 District Attorneys across the State, this Court must abide by the well settled rules of statutory interpretation.

Statutes are to be construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, reconciling provisions, rendering them consistent and giving intelligent effect to each. Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶ 17, 932 P.2d 22, 28;State v. Ramsey, 1993 OK CR 54, ¶ 7, 868 P.2d 709, 711. It is also well established that statutes are to be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their language. Wallace v. State, 1997 OK CR 18, ¶ 4, 935 P.2d 366, 369–370;Virgin v. State, 1990 OK CR 27, ¶ 7, 792 P.2d 1186, 1188. We also recognize that the fundamental principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. Wallace v. State, 1996 OK CR 8, ¶ 4, 910 P.2d 1084, 1086;Thomas v. State, 1965 OK CR 70, ¶ 4, 404 P.2d 71, 73. However, it is not our place to interpret a statute to address a matter the Legislature chose not to address, even if we think that interpretation might produce a reasonable result.

State v. Young, 1999 OK CR 14, ¶ 27, 989 P.2d 949. 955. “[T]o ascertain the intention of the Legislature in the enactment of [a] statute, we may look to each part of the statute, to other statutes upon the same or relative subjects, to the evils and mischiefs to be remedied, and to the natural or absurd consequences of any particular interpretation.” Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d 22, 28 (quotations and citation omitted). Each part of the various statutes must be given intelligent effect.

This Court will not presume the Legislature to have done a vain thing. We are mindful that elementary rules of statutory interpretation require us to avoid any statutory construction which would render any part of a statute superfluous or useless. See, Vilandre v. State, 2005 OK CR 9, ¶ 5, 113 P.3d 893, 896;Byrd v. Caswell, 2001 OK CR 29, ¶ 6, 34 P.3d 647, 648–649.

State v. Doak, 2007 OK CR 3, ¶ 17, 154 P.3d 84, 87. Where possible the statutory amendments should be reconciled or construed together. Id.

¶ 12 However, where an irreconcilable conflict exists between two statutes, the latter statute controls.

Oklahoma law [ ] provides a remedy for interpreting conflicting statutes where the statutory language of the statutes cannot be reconciled. The latter statute controls. See,75 O.S. § 22. The general rule of statutory construction is that the later-enacted legislation controls over the earlier-enacted provisions. We find that in the case of an irreconcilable conflict in statutory language, the later enacted statute modifies the earlier statute, even where both statutory amendments were enacted in the same Legislative session. See, Taylor v. State, 1982 OK CR 8, ¶ 5, 640 P.2d 554, 556;City of Sand Springs v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1980 OK 36, ¶ 28, 608 P.2d 1139, 1151;Pickett v. Okla. Dep't of Human Serv., 1996 OK CIV APP 142, ¶ 6, 932 P.2d 543, 545 (1996); 2006 OK AG 3. ¶¶ 6–8.

Id., 2007 OK CR 3, ¶ 18, 154 P.3d at 87–88. Deference to our sister branch of the government requires that we apply a strong presumption against implied repeals of statutory amendments. Id., 2007 OK CR 3, ¶ 17, 154 P.3d at 87. When it is unfeasible to reconcile the language of the statutes, “application of the ... rules of statutory construction becomes impossible.” Id.

¶ 13 Reviewing the plain language of § 991a(A)(1)(s) and § 991d(A)(2), we find that the two statutes are not irreconcilably conflicting. Although the two statutes relate to the same subject it is possible to apply the rules of statutory construction. As such, we must reconcile the provisions of the statutes to give operative effect to each. Construing § 991a and § 991d together, we find that the Legislature intended for the court to have the authority and discretion to determine who will supervise a suspended or deferred sentence and direct payment of the supervision fee associated with that supervision.

¶ 14 Title 22 O.S.2011, § 991a(A)(1), permits the trial court following conviction of a crime to “[s]uspend the execution of sentence, in whole or in part, with or without probation” and order the defendant to...