State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 17 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 69312,69312
• Citation: 745 S.W.2d 152
• Parties: STATE ex rel. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Relator, v. Hon. Brendan RYAN, Judge, Circuit Court, St. Louis City, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 152

745 S.W.2d 152

STATE ex rel. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Relator, v. Hon. Brendan RYAN, Judge, Circuit Court, St. Louis City, Respondent.

No. 69312.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Feb. 17, 1988.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 15, 1988.

Thomas C. Walsh, Bruce E. Clark, Elizabeth C. Carver, St. Louis, for relator.

Mark I. Bronson, St. Louis, for respondent.

WELLIVER, Judge.

Relator, McDonnell Douglas Corporation challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court in a lawsuit alleged to be a workers' compensation matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Respondent denied relator's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals, Eastern District denied relator's writ of prohibition. We issued our preliminary rule in prohibition, and now make that rule absolute.

I

Relator is a defendant in a common law action for the wrongful death of Matthew L. Colonna, an employee. The decedent's parents, Eugenia Colonna and Joseph Colonna filed this action alleging that (1) at all times mentioned relator was a corporation operating by and through their respective agents, servants and employees acting within the scope of their agency, employment and service; (2) Power Energy Industries inspected the relator's lightning generator for hazards to relator's employees and others; (3) Power Energy Industries' negligence in failing to discover that the generator was being used without any automatic interlock system, without keys to lock entrances to the test cell containing the generator prior to and as a requirement of activation of the generator, and without a safety policy or periodic evaluation and enforcement of safety policies and procedures, directly caused or directly contributed to the cause of decedent's death; (4) on or about April 6, 1983, decedent Matthew L. Colonna was exposed to electric shock from relator's lightning generator which caused his death; (5) relator knew of the specific risk and likelihood of death or serious physical harm to which decedent and other employees were exposed by using the lightning generator without an automatic interlock system and without keys to lock entrances to the test cell containing the lightning generator prior to and as a requirement for activation of the generator; (6) relator did not utilize an interlock system but rather consciously chose not to alleviate the risk of harm to decedent and other employees; and, that further misfeasance occurred when relator's supervisory employees "either recklessly, or deliberately, or intentionally or deliberately with the specific intent and/or purpose of thereby harming or injuring Matthew Colonna" directed to him in the test cell; and (7) relator "either recklessly, or deliberately, or intentionally or deliberately with the specific intent and/or purpose of thereby harming or injuring Matthew Colonna, exposed Matthew Colonna to the aforedescribed conditions, and acted as aforedescribed, and caused his electrocution." The plaintiffs also alleged that because relator was fined $720.00 by OSHA for the aforementioned conduct, that such violation establishes a tort per se, negligence per se or reckless, deliberate or intentional per se conduct with the specific purpose of harming the decedent. The Colonnas further allege that the described conduct did not constitute an accident within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law, § 287.120.2, RSMo 1986. The Colonnas admit that the decedent was a employee working at relator's lightning lab. The Colonnas have settled with Power Energy Industries.

In response to the Colonnas' petition, relator filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction alleging that the injury to decedent was an accident, and that plaintiffs' remedy is a proceeding under workers' compensation. The Colonnas workers' compensation claim is pending. Relator submitted affidavits from decedent's supervisors in which they state that they did not intend any harm towards decedent, and other exhibits from lawsuits previously filed by the Colonnas. The Colonnas did not submit any affidavits to the trial court. The trial court denied relator's motion.

II

Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a court from acting without jurisdiction State ex rel. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Luten, 679 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. banc 1984); State ex rel. Barnes Hospital v. Tillman, 714 S.W.2d 538 (Mo.App.1986). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the proper method to raise the defense of workers' compensation Shaver v. First Union Realty Management, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Mo.App.1986). Parmer v. Bean, 636 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo.App.1982). See also Jones v. Jay Truck Driver Training Center, 709 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. banc 1986). The court shall dismiss the action "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." Rule 55.27(g)(3).

III

The liability of employer under workers' compensation is

1. Every employer subject to the provision of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the...