State ex rel. McLeod v. Snipes
| Decision Date | 30 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20197,20197 |
| Citation | 223 S.E.2d 853,266 S.C. 415 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of South Carolina ex relatione, Daniel R. McLEOD, Attorney General, Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. Clinton Mitchell SNIPES, Individually, as a uniformed officer of the Florence City Police Force and as Representative of all officers and employees of the State of South Carolina and its political subdivisions entitled by Section 1--234 of the South Carolina Code of Laws to request in writing that the Attorney General of South Carolina appear and defend them in criminal actions arising out of any act done or omitted in good faith in the course of their employment, Respondent-Defendant, and William J. Seaborn, Assistant Director of Law Enforcement, as a member of and as representative of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, et al., Intervenors-Defendants. |
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Attys. Gen. A. Camden Lewis and Donald V. Myers, Columbia, for petitioner-plaintiff.
E. Lee Morgan, Jr., of Hyman, Morgan & Brown, and B. Hicks Harwell, Jr., of Harwell & Ballenger, Florence, for respondent-defendant.
Frank L. Taylor and Thomas E. McCutchen, Columbia, for intervenors-defendants.
This action for declaratory judgment, brought in the original jurisdiction of the Court by permission, involves a determination of the legality of the Attorney General providing, as directed by Section 1--234, 1962 Code of Laws, representation to officers and employees of the State or of any political subdivision thereof, in criminal prosecutions against such officials, in view of the provisions of Article 5, Section 20, of the South Carolina Constitution, which make the Attorney General the chief prosecuting officer of the State.
Section 1--234, here involved, directs:
Article 5, Section 20, of the State Constitution in pertinent part provides:
'The Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record.'
Section 1--234 imposes the duty upon the Attorney General to appear and defend public officials in criminal prosecutions against them, by reason of any act done or omitted in good faith in the course of employmemt. The individual respondent is a police officer of the City of Florence and is being prosecuted as a result of an incident in which one Marvin Muldrow was shot and killed by the respondent, admittedly, while acting in good faith in the course of his employment as a police officer.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1--234, respondent has requested, in writing, that the Attorney General represent him in the foregoing criminal prosecution. The Attorney General has refused to do so solely upon the ground that his duties as chief prosecuting officer prevent him from defending respondent as requested. This action was instituted by the Attorney General to determine his duties in the matter.
The basic position of the Attorney General is that the constitutional authority (Article 5, Section 20) to supervise criminal prosecutions presents an irreconcilable conflict with the duty imposed by statute (Section 1--234) to defend, and that the statutory duty must give way to the alleged paramount constitutional duty, thereby relieving him of the obligation to defend public officials. We find no such insurmountable conflict between the statutory and constitutional provisions.
By way of background, Section 1--234 was enacted in 1960 and Article 5, Section 20, was ratified in 1973. While this constitutional provision designated the Attorney General as the chief prosecuting officer for the first time, it represented no practical change in the situation of the Attorney General from that which existed prior to the adoption of this provision of the Constitution in 1973. For, prior to 1973, Code Section 1--237, enacted in 1868, provided for the participation of the Attorney General in prosecutions in the following language 'The Attorney General shall consult with and advise the solicitors in matters relating to the duties of their offices. When, in his judgment, the interest of the State requires it he shall:
(1) Assist the solicitors by attending the grand jury in the examination of any case in which the party accused is charged with a capital offense; and
(2) Be present at the trial of any cause in which the State is a party or interested and, when so present, shall have the direction and management of such prosecution or suit.'
It is apparent, therefore, that the present situation was not created by the adoption of Article 5, Section 20, in 1973; but rather the constitutional designation of the Attorney General as the chief prosecuting officer for the first time brought the matter to public attention.
When we examine the directions of Section 1--234, we find that the Attorney General is not required to personally...
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State v. Needs
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State v. Langford
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In The Matter Of Richland County Magistrate's Court
...the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record. S.C. Const. art. V, § 24 (emphasis added); cf. State ex rel. McLeod v. Snipes, 266 S.C. 415, 420, 223 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1976) (recognizing that the duty to actually prosecute criminal cases is performed primarily and almost exclusive......