State ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Allen

• Citation: 85 S.W.2d 469,337 Mo. 525
• Parties: State of Missouri at the Relation of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Relator, v. Perry T. Allen, Robert J. Smith and Walter E. Bailey, Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 30 July 1935
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

85 S.W.2d 469

337 Mo. 525

State of Missouri at the Relation of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, Relator, v. Perry T. Allen, Robert J. Smith and Walter E. Bailey, Judges of the Springfield Court of Appeals

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 30, 1935

Rehearing Denied July 30, 1935.

Writ quashed.

Oliver & Oliver, Fordyce, White, Mayne & Williams, Fred M. Switzer Jr., and Walter R. Mayne for relator; Leroy A. Lincoln of counsel.

(1) The terms of the policy providing for total and permanent disability benefits are plain and unambiguous. Under the provisions of the policy the insured clearly is not entitled to recover. Adams v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 74 S.W.2d 899. (2) The insured's own evidence in this case, as set out in the opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals, shows clearly and unquestionably that, after the termination of the insurance and up to the date of the trial, he was actually engaged in work for compensation or profit, and that he was not prevented by his deafness from performing any work for compensation or profit. Parten v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 117 S.E. 772, 30 Ga.App. 235; Life & Casualty Co. v. Jones, 73 So. 566, 112 Miss. 506; Buckner v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 90 S.E 897, 172 N.C. 762; Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 125 S.E. 186, 188 N.C. 538; Whitton v. American Natl Ins. Co., 87 S.E. 827, 17 Ga.App. 525; Thigpen v Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 168 S.E. 845; Pannone v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 157 A. 876; Katz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 250; Nickolopulous v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 166 A. 178; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 67 F.2d 264; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Wann, 28 S.W.2d 196; Duhaime v. Prudential Ins. Co., 167 A. 269; American Natl. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 70 S.W.2d 491; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Barela, 44 S.W.2d 494; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 52 F.2d 537; Herwig v. Business Men's Accident Assn., 234 S.W. 853; Hickman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 S.E. 878; Corsant v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 211 N.W. 222, 51 A. L. R. 1035; Cato v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 138 S.E. 787; Maresh v. Peoria Life Ins. Co., 299 P. 934, 133 Kan. 191; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Dause, 76 S.W.2d 233. (3) The decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals in this cause is in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in that it construes, or misconstrues, the plain and unambiguous language of the policy. State ex rel. Casualty Co. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38; State ex rel. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Trimble, 68 S.W.2d 685; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 306 Mo. 295; State ex rel. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 659; State ex rel. American Fire Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 269 Mo. 410; Wendorff v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99; Prange v. International Life Ins. Co., 329 Mo. 651, 46 S.W.2d 523. (4) The judgment of a Court of Appeals will be quashed by the Supreme Court on certiorari where the decision of the Court of Appeals construes the plain and unambiguous language of a policy of insurance in such a way as to distort its meaning and write a new contract. State ex rel. Mut. Benefit Health & Accident Assn. v. Trimble, 68 S.W.2d 685; State ex rel. Casualty Co. v. Cox, 322 Mo. 38; State ex rel. Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 306 Mo. 295; State ex rel. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 297 Mo. 659.

Finch & Finch and Rush H. Limbaugh for respondents.

(1) Points not considered nor discussed in opinion of the court are not considered on certiorari, and therefore the pleadings and instructions are not to be considered in this proceeding. State ex rel. Major v. Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals, 310 Mo. 386, 276 S.W. 1026; State ex rel Burton v. Allen, 312 Mo. 111, 278 S.W. 772. (a) The provisions of the policy providing for total and permanent disability benefits are ambiguous, and the best evidence of that fact is shown by decisions from almost every state in the Union and by the Federal Courts, finding it necessary to define the language of the total and permanent disability clauses and reaching varying results as to the meaning of same. Katz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 250; Cole v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 170 A. 74; Bullock v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 S.E. 185; Colovos v. Life Ins. Co., 28 P.2d 607; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Person, 67 S.W.2d 1097; Hays v. Life Ins. Co., 171 S.E. 824; Janney v. Life Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 200, 173 A. 819; Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Wiggins, 155 So. 327; Wood v. Life Ins. Co., 271 Ill.App. 103; Rezendes v. Life Ins. Co., 189 N.E. 826; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. McKee, 176 S.E. 118; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Turner, 239 Ky. 291, 39 S.W.2d 216; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Blue, 133 So. 707; Pannone v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 157 A. 876; Life & Casualty Co. v. Jones, 112 Miss. 506, 73 So. 566; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Foster, 67 F.2d 264; Clarkson v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 4 F.Supp. 791; United States v. Perry, 55 F.2d 819; Law v. United States, 290 F. 972; Nicolay v. United States, 51 F.2d 170. (2) The question of whether the evidence sustained a finding that respondent was totally and permanently disabled is not for consideration on certiorari. State ex rel. Brenner v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 702, 32 S.W.2d 760; State ex rel. Fichtner v. Haid, 324 Mo. 130, 22 S.W.2d 1045; State ex rel. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 313 Mo. 384, 282 S.W. 46; State ex rel. Shaw Transfer Co. v. Trimble, 250 S.W. 396; State ex rel. Raleigh Inv. Co. v. Allen, 294 Mo. 214, 242 S.W. 77; State ex rel. Security Benefit Assn. v. Cox, 9 S.W.2d 953; State ex rel. Cox v. Trimble, 312 Mo. 222, 279 S.W. 60; State ex rel. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 303 Mo. 608, 262 S.W. 43; State ex rel. Brown v. Broaddus, 216 Mo. 336, 115 S.W. 1018. (a) Only when the Court of Appeals exceeds its jurisdiction by failing to follow a decision by the Supreme Court on the same or similar facts does the Supreme Court have the right to quash the opinion on certiorari, and the proceeding is limited to the sole question of whether there is a conflict, and the Supreme Court never has the right to correct errors of the Court of Appeals on certiorari except where there is such a conflict. State ex rel. Gillman v. Robertson, 264 Mo. 661, 175 S.W. 610; State ex rel. Mechanics American Natl. Bank v. Sturgis, 276 Mo. 549, 208 S.W. 458; Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds, 186 S.W. 1072. (b) Cases from other jurisdictions cited by relator are not helpful in determining whether there is any conflict between the opinion of the Court of Appeals and any decision by the Supreme Court. State ex rel. Mechanics American Natl. Bank v. Sturgis, 276 Mo. 549, 208 S.W. 458. (c) The definition adopted by the court is the same as that recognized by relator, and even under relator's contention that the language of the policy is unambiguous there could be no error in expressing the recognized meaning in different terms, conveying that same meaning, and in relator's third assignment of errors it defines the language of the policy in harmony with the definition adopted by the Court of Appeals. (3) The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court holding that unambiguous language may not be construed for the reason that the language is ambiguous and relator's cases have no relation thereto. (4) The Court of Appeals can construe and define for itself an ambiguous provision of a policy where the Supreme Court has not previously passed upon and defined such provision. State ex rel. Am. Surety Co. v. Haid, 325 Mo. 949, 30 S.W.2d 100; State ex rel. Harrington v. Trimble, 326 Mo. 623, 31 S.W.2d 783; State ex rel. Caraker v. Becker, 62 S.W.2d 899; State ex rel. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 305 Mo. 607, 267 S.W. 379; State ex rel. Raleigh Inv. Co. v. Allen, 294 Mo. 214, 242 S.W. 27; State ex rel. Shaw Transfer Co. v. Trimble, 250 S.W. 396; State ex rel. Tummons v. Cox, 313 Mo. 672, 282 S.W. 694; State ex rel. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Ellison, 204 S.W. 396. (a) The Supreme Court of this State never having been called upon to say whether or not the language with respect to total and permanent disability in this or similar policies is ambiguous or unambiguous, that question was an open question and the Springfield Court of Appeals had the right to construe the language in the policy in this case for itself, and the fact that the Springfield Court of Appeals in effect held it ambiguous and therefore open to construction could not create a conflict between the opinion of the Springfield Court of Appeals and prior controlling decisions of the Supreme Court. Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds, 186 S.W. 1072; State ex rel. Mechanics American Natl. Bank v. Sturgis, 276 Mo. 549, 208 S.W. 458. (b) Not only did the Court of Appeals have the right to determine for itself what constituted total and permanent disability, but it adopted what is clearly the majority rule and the sound view of the meaning of the provision. Katz v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 44 S.W.2d 250; Rickey v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 71 S.W.2d 88; Buis v. Life Ins. Co., 77 S.W.2d 127; Foglesong v. Modern Brotherhood, 121 Mo.App. 548, 97 S.W. 240; Wall v. Casualty Co., 111 Mo.App. 504, 86 S.W. 491; McMahon v. Supreme Council, 54 Mo.App. 468; Bullock v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 S.E. 185; Ursaner v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 262 N.Y.S. 462; Medlinsky v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y.S. 179; McCutcheon v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 153 S.C. 401, 151 S.E. 67; Mo. State Life Ins. Co. v. Copas, 265 Ill.App. 478; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Spencer, 32 S.W.2d 310; Hickman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 166 S.C. 316, 164 S.E. 878; Manuel v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 139 So. 548; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Torrence, 141 So. 547; Gresham v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 156 S.E. 878; Mays v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 246 N.W. 737; Henderson v. Continental Cas. Co., 239 Ky. 93, 39...