State ex rel. Meyers v. Columbus

• Decision Date: 08 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-1966,94-1966
• Citation: 646 N.E.2d 173,71 Ohio St.3d 603
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. MEYERS, Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 603

71 Ohio St.3d 603

646 N.E.2d 173

The STATE ex rel. MEYERS, Appellant, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS et al., Appellees.

No. 94-1966.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 24, 1995.

Decided March 8, 1995.

Appellant, John Meyers, is employed by appellee city of Columbus, as a police sergeant. In June 1990, then-Officer Meyers took the first three written parts of a four-part promotional examination for the position of police sergeant. Based on the results of the written parts of the examination, Meyers placed in the top forty of the one hundred forty-two applicants eligible to take the fourth part. After taking the fourth, oral, part of the examination, Meyers dropped to sixty-fourth in rank. Meyers challenged the inclusion of the oral part of the promotional examination in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, but the action was subsequently dismissed by Meyers's counsel without Meyers's consent.

On November 11, 1991, Meyers was certified as one of sixteen eligible candidates for promotion to the classification of police sergeant. Meyers was not selected for promotion. In January 1992, Meyers was certified as one of three eligible candidates for promotion to police sergeant, but he was again not selected. On February 13, 1992, Meyers was certified as one of three eligible police sergeant candidates, but he was later advised that the certification list had been canceled.

According to Meyers, on May 7, 1992, he was certified as the candidate with the highest rating of three officers eligible for promotion. Meyers was not promoted and was subsequently removed from the eligibility list. After Meyers was restored to the eligibility list, a new certification list was issued on July 1, 1992, from which Meyers was promoted to police sergeant.

On February 16, 1993, Meyers filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, naming Columbus and various past and current city officials as respondents. Meyers's complaint sought a writ of mandamus compelling respondents to amend Meyers's promotion to police sergeant retroactive to November 1990 and restore any benefits to which he would have been entitled.

In April 1993, Meyers filed an application with respondent Columbus Civil Service Commission to take a police lieutenant promotional examination. Meyers's application was rejected because he lacked the necessary one year in grade (i.e., as sergeant) pursuant to the rules of the commission. The executive director of the commission denied Meyers's request for review of the decision and the commission denied Meyers's subsequent appeal from the executive director's denial.

Meyers amended his complaint to request an order compelling respondents to accept his application to take the police lieutenant promotional examination. Following the filing of stipulations and briefs, the court of appeals denied the writ.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

John P. Meyers, pro se.

Ronald J. O'Brien, Columbus City Atty., and Douglas K. Browell, Chief Labor Atty., for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

The court of appeals denied Meyers's request for a writ of mandamus because (1) Meyers was guilty of laches in bringing the mandamus action, and (2) pursuant to the city charter, Meyers failed to establish a right to be appointed police sergeant earlier than the date he was promoted.

"The elements of a laches defense are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for such delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party." State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmsted (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 315, 325, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1056. Prejudice will not be inferred from a mere lapse of time. State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 26, 35, 641 N.E.2d 188, 196. In the case at bar, the court of appeals determined that laches barred Meyers's mandamus action because his "failure to seek relief in mandamus prior to the expiration of the first eligible list constitutes an unreasonable delay in bringing the instant action." The court of appeals therefore erroneously inferred prejudice from the time lapse. Respondents introduced no evidence of prejudice from the alleged delay of Meyers in instituting his action for extraordinary relief.

However, reversal is not necessitated by the court of appeals' erroneous reliance on laches because a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis thereof. State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309. The court of appeals further determined that, irrespective of laches, Meyers was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because of Section 151 of the Columbus City Charter, which provides:

"When a position in the competitive classified service is to be filled, the appointing authority shall notify the commission of the fact and the commission shall certify to such authority the names and addresses of three candidates standing highest on the eligible list for the class or grade to which such position belongs. The appointing authority shall appoint one of the three persons certified to him, to such position."

In contrast to the foregoing charter provision, R.C. 124.44 specifies:

" * * * Whenever a vacancy occurs in the position above the rank of patrolman in a police department, and there is...