State ex rel. Millar v. Toberman
Decision Date | 02 October 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 42279,42279 |
Citation | 360 Mo. 1101,232 S.W.2d 904 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. MILLAR et al. v. TOBERMAN, Secretary of State et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Taylor Sandison, St. Louis, Arthur U. Simmons, W. H. Leyhe, Jr., Clayton, Thomas F. McDonald, St. Louis, for relators.
Walter N. Davis, St. Louis, Erwin Tzinberg, Wm. J. Becker, Clayton, for respondents.
J. E. Taylor, Atty. Gen., of Missouri, C. B. Burns, Jr., Richard H. Voss, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent Walter H. Toberman, Secretary of State of Missouri.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel respondents in their respective official capacities to submit to the qualified voters of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri the question whether the non-partisan court plan shall be adopted in that Judicial Circuit under the provisions of Section 29(b) of Article V of the Constitution of Missouri, Mo.R.S.A.
Each of the respondents waived issuance of the alternative writ and filed separate returns.
Relators are citizens and qualified voters of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, which comprises the County of St. Louis. Respondent, Walter H. Toberman, is the Secretary of State of the State of Missouri. The other respondents constitute the Board of Election Commissioners of the County of St. Louis.
On the 6th day of September, 1950, relators presented to both respondent Secretary of State and respondent Board of Election Commissioners duplicate sets of petitions signed by themselves and 'more than 800' other citizens and qualified voters of said Circuit. These petitions were jointly addressed to both respondents. They made demand on respondents that they submit to the qualified voters of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for their approval or rejection at the regular November, 1950, election the question: .
Respondents, and each of them, refused to accept the petitions so tendered by relators.
Alleging these facts as grounds, relators, on behalf of themselves and the 'more than 800' other qualified voters, brought this action, pleading further that a construction of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, and particularly Section 29(b), Section 29(g) and Sections 29(a)-(g) of Article V thereof, was involved in this action; that the petitions were filed pursuant to the provisions of Section 29(b), and that said section by its terms was self-enforcing and fully effective without need of any legislation.
The return of respondent Secretary of State is a demurrer based upon grounds that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that Section 29(b) is not self-enforcing, and that if it is held to be self-enforcing, then the petitions tendered for filing to the Secretary of State and Board of Election Commissioners fail to comply with Section 50, Article III of the Constitution of Missouri, relating to initiative petitions.
The return of respondent Board of Election Commissioners admits all facts alleged by relators and pleads: that a permanent writ of mandamus should be denied relators for the reason that their petition does not state a cause of action; that neither Section 29(b) nor any existing law provides a manner of submission of the question, nor has the General Assembly provided such a manner as is required by the section itself, nor is there any authority of law or precedent vested in any agency or official to submit the question, and that relators have no right or authority so to do.
This court clearly has jurisdiction to determine the cause.
Section 29(b) reads:
Quite obviously it vests in the qualified voters of any judicial circuit the right to determine at any general election by a majority of those voting whether the non-partisan plan shall become effective in such circuit, but it does not set up any manner of submission of the question to the people. It authorizes, but limits the authority of, the Legislature to do only that one thing.
Many rules and criteria have been adopted and applied by this court and those of other jurisdictions in determining whether a given constitutional provision is self-enforcing. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 48, pages 98, 101; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 74, pp. 691, 692. No useful purpose would be served by a discussion of any of them, except such as are necessary to a decision of this case.
In State ex inf. Barker v. Duncan et al., 265 Mo. 26, 175 S.W. 940, loc. cit. 945, this court, quoting with approval from an opinion of the Supreme Court of Colorado, held that: 'Constitutional provisions are self-executing when it appears that they shall take immediate effect, and ancillary legislation is not necessary to the enjoyment of the right thus given, or the enforcement of the duty thus imposed; in short, if a constitutional provision is complete in itself, it executes itself'; and further held, quoting from an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 21 S.Ct. 210, 45 L.Ed. 249, that:
In State ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 355 Mo. 27, 194 S.W.2d 302, 304, this court quoted with approval from 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec. 74, pp. 691, 692, as follows:
Relators' action is based on the law as declared in the foregoing cases and texts and the following cases cited in the City of Fulton case, supra: State ex rel. Clark County v. Hackmann, 280 Mo. 686, 218 S.W. 318; State ex rel. Miller v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 164 Mo. 208, loc. cit. 213, 64 S.W. 187, loc. cit. 188. Their contention is that the respondent Secretary of State is vested with authority in all matters relating to election of state officers (judges of the circuit court), and that respondent Board of Election Commissioners is vested with similar power in regard to the election of all county officials (judges of the probate court), and that Section 29(b) places upon them the mandatory duty to do all acts and things necessary to submit the question set forth in said petitions, and that, therefore, a sufficient means exists under our present laws and Section 29(b) for the submission of the question here involved.
Although there is no provision in Section 29(b) for the manner of initiating and holding the election, and the Legislature as yet has not provided any means for so doing, nevertheless, the cases and authorities cited above establish that it may be self-enforcing if there exists in our election lows sufficient authorization of an efficacious means of so doing. But these cases do not establish, nor purport to establish, that any authority is vested in any person or agency or governing body of either the State or any judicial circuit to initiate or order the election here involved. Neither do they establish that any manner or means exists for holding such an election. All that they do hold is that the elections in question in those cases were ordered and held by the proper governing body, to wit, the city council in the city elections, and the county court in the county elections, and that in each instance these respective agencies had lawful authority under existing statutes or...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
V, In re, 46356
...not and cannot be self-executing. State ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 355 Mo. 27, 194 S.W.2d 302, 304; State ex rel. Millar v. Toberman, 360 Mo. 1101, 232 S.W.2d 904, 905-906; 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Secs. 74, 75, pp. 691-694. And, obviously, if the provision is so vague as not t......