State ex rel. Moritz v. Troop

• Decision Date: 03 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 75-634,75-634
• Citation: 338 N.E.2d 526,73 O.O.2d 349,44 Ohio St.2d 90
• Parties: , 73 O.O.2d 349 The STATE ex rel. MORITZ, Dir., Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. TROOP, Judge, Court of Claims.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 90

44 Ohio St.2d 90

338 N.E.2d 526, 73 O.O.2d 349

The STATE ex rel. MORITZ, Dir., Dept. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. TROOP, Judge, Court of Claims.

No. 75-634.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 3, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Court of Claims Act, R.C. Chapter 2743, is a remedial law, and, as such, R.C. 1.11 requires that the Act, and all proceedings under it, be liberally construed in order to promote its object and to assist the parties in obtaining justice.

2. Practice and procedure in the Court of Claims is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, unless such rules are inconsistent with R.C. Chapter 2743.

3. Civ.R. 20(A) is not inconsistent with R.C. 2743.03(A).

On January 2, 1974, Geraldine Boggess voluntarily committed herself to the care of the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (the Department) at the Toledo Mental Health Center facility. The next day she allegedly suffered a severe beating at the hands of two health center attendants.

Mrs. Boggess instituted an action in the Court of Claims by filing a two-count complaint which named as defendants the two attendants, the acting director of the Department, the superintendent of the Toledo facility, and the Department. The complaint alleges alternatively that the two attendants had been acting within (first court) and outside of (second count) the scopes of their employment at the time of the alleged beating.

The state moved the court to dismiss the first count, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B) (6), alleging that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The state moved to dismiss the second count, alleging lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the persons, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Civ.R. 12(B)(1)(2) and (6).

Horace W. Troop, Judge of the Court of Claims, respondent herein, granted the motion to dismiss for one attendant who had not been served with process, but overruled the motion for the other attendant. The court granted the motion to dismiss for the director of the Department and the superintendent of the Toledo facility because the complaint did 'not allege any wrong on' their part.

After the court overruled a motion to reconsider, Dr. Timothy B. Moritz, the present director of the Department, relator herein, instituted an original action in this court seeking a writ to prohibit respondent from allegedly exceeding the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by adjudicating the liability of an individual state employee to respond in damages.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. and Ronald Boyd Brown, columbus, for relator.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. and Ms. Nina Rose Hatfield, Reynoldsburg, for respondent.

WILLIAM B. BROWN, Justice.

The question presented is whether the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extends to private persons and to subject matter other than claims against the state of Ohio. Inasmuch as that question involves the imminent exercise of an alleged usurpation of judicial power, the invocation of this court's original jurisdiction in prohibition is proper (State ex rel. Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v. Winter (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 8, 260 N.E.2d 827; State ex rel. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Kornowski (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d 20, 317 N.E.2d 920), and we proceed to the merits of the case.

By the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, R.C. Chapter 2743, the General Assembly has determined the court and the manner in which lawsuits are to proceed against the state. That Act is a remedial law, and R.C. 1.11 requires that such laws 'and all proceedings under them * * * be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice.'

Looking to the language of the Act, we find that liability of the state is to be determined 'in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *.' R.C. 2743.02(A). (Emphasis added.)

Practice and procedure in the Court of Claims is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, unless such rules are 'inconsistent' with R.C. Chapter 2743. R.C. 2743.03(D).

The Court of Claims has 'full equity powers'; 'exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state'; exclusive, but not original, jurisdiction of the claims in actions removed to that court; and jurisdiction over counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party claims. R.C. 2743.03(A).

'A civil action aginst the state shall be heard and determined by a single judge * * *' (R.C. 2743.03(C)), and '(n)o claimant in the court of claims shall be entitled to have his claim against the state determined by a trial by jury. Parties retain their right to trial by jury in the court of claims of any claims not against the state.' R.C. 2743.11 (Emphasis added.)

Relator argues that the language of the Act precludes bringing the subject pending action against state employees essentially for the following reasons: (1) R.C. 2743.02 mentions only 'its (the state's) liability'; (2) the definition of 'state' in R.C. 2743.01(A) does not include employees; (3) R.C. 2743.13 provides for complaints or pleadings only 'against the state'; (4) the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is allegedly limited to actions 'against the state' in R.C. 2743.03; (5) R.C. 2743.19, which provides for the rendering of judgments, is silent as to judgments against individuals, and therefore a claim does not lie where judgment thereon is unavailable; and (6) if individual state employees are not excluded from being sued in the Court of Claims, the above-quoted portions of R.C. 2743.03(C) and 2743.11 allegedly allow for a conflicting decision on the same issue-scope of employment-were the court to try it as to the state, and a jury to try it as to the employee-defendant.

Those contentions are without compelling force. That the Act mentions liability of the state (R.C. 2743.02(A)), 'awards against the state' (R.C. 2743.02(B)), 'actions against the state' (R.C. 2743.03(A)), 'judgments against the state' (R.C. 2743.12), 'the complaint or other pleading asserted * * * against the state' R.C. 2743.13(A)) and 'execution * * * against the state' (R.C. 2743.19(B)) is to imply that other types of liabilities, awards, actions, judgments and parties are contemplated by the Act and, resultantly, are included within the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. Certainly, we should not assume that all that is to be included in the Act is expressly so stated therein. ¹

As to possibly conflicting decisions by judge and jury, such are not clearly inevitable. First, it could only arise where the defendant-employee requests a trial by jury of a claim 'not against the state.' (R.C. 2743.11, supra. In the subject action, such claim is that the employees acted outside the scopes of their employment. Inasmuch as the scope of employment is a question peculiarly susceptible to determination by a jury (Nelson Business College v. Lloyd (1899), 60 Ohio St. 448, 54 N.E. 471, paragraph two of the syllabus; Kellerman v. J. S. Durig Co. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 320, 324, 199 N.E.2d 562), the court is empowered to utilize the determination of the jury summoned to try the issue as to the defendant-employee, as an advisory determination of the rights of the other parties in the cause, or as a conclusive determination if all parties consent to a trial by jury. Civ.R. 39(C). ²

From the foregoing, the only conclusion is that the Act neither expressly prohibits, nor clearly authorizes, the subject pending action against an individual state employee.

However, the vast wealth of the Civil Rules is available where the Act is silent concerning any aspect of practice and procedure. R.C. 2743.03(D), supra.

Civ.R. 20(A), in pertinent part, provides:

'All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or succession or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff ...