State ex rel. Morley v. Lordi

• Decision Date: 19 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 95-128,95-128
• Citation: 651 N.E.2d 937,72 Ohio St.3d 510
• Parties: The STATE ex rel. MORLEY, Judge, v. LORDI et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 510

72 Ohio St.3d 510

651 N.E.2d 937

The STATE ex rel. MORLEY, Judge, v. LORDI et al.

No. 95-128.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 9, 1995.

Decided July 19, 1995.

Relator, Judge Leo P. Morley of the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Probate Division, requests a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, the Board of Commissioners of Mahoning County and its members, to appropriate certain sums demanded for the probate court's expenses for 1995. Specifically, in a journal entry filed December 30, 1994, relator requested $499,166 for administrative salaries, $7,500 for other salary requirements, including temporary help, and $18,478.02 for indigent guardian salaries. Respondents appropriated $24,533 less than relator determined to be reasonable and necessary for administrative salaries, $7,500 less than he determined to be reasonable and necessary for other salary requirements, and $528.02 less than he determined to be reasonable and necessary for indigent guardianship salaries.

On March 1, 1995, we overruled respondents' motion to dismiss and granted an alternative writ. The alternative writ required the filing of (1) evidence by March 21, 1995, (2) relator's brief within the next ten days, (3) respondents' brief twenty days after relator's brief, and (4) relator's reply within the succeeding five days. No evidence or briefs were submitted pursuant to this schedule.

The cause is now before us on relator's motion for summary judgment, which was unopposed.

Avetis G. Darvanan, Youngstown, and David R. White, Canfield, for relator.

James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Pros. Atty., and Diane Politi, Asst. Pros. Atty., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This cause presents two issues for our review: (1) Is mandamus available to compel appropriations to fund probate court expenses? and (2) Should the motion for summary judgment be granted? For the reasons that follow, we hold that a writ of mandamus may issue to compel the reasonable and necessary expenses of the courts of common pleas and their divisions, that the record contains no evidence to suggest that relator abused his discretion in determining the reasonable and necessary expenses of the probate court, and, therefore, that relator is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we grant the motion for summary judgment and the requested writ of mandamus.

Mandamus

In State ex rel. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Hoose (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 220, 221-222, 569 N.E.2d 1046, 1048, and State ex rel. Weaver v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 204, 205, 580 N.E.2d 1090, 1092, we recognized that a juvenile court, as a division of the court of common pleas, has inherent authority to require funding that is reasonable and necessary to the administration of the court's business. We explained:

"This court has held, time and again, that it is incumbent upon the legislative authority to provide funds which are reasonable and necessary to operate a court which requests such funding. See, e.g., State ex rel. Giuliani v. Perk (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 235, 43 O.O.2d 366, 237 N.E.2d 397, and State ex rel. Arbaugh v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 14 OBR 311, 470 N.E.2d 880. Therefore, a board of county commissioners must provide the funds requested by a court of common pleas unless the board can show that the requested funding is unreasonable and unnecessary. State ex rel. Britt v. Bd. of Franklin Cty. Commrs. (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 2, 18 OBR 1, 2, 480 N.E.2d 77, 78. The burden of proof is clearly upon the party who opposes the requested funding. Id. In effect, it is presumed that a court's request for funding is reasonable and necessary for the proper administration of the court. The purpose of this 'presumption' is to maintain and preserve a judicial system and judiciary that are independent and autonomous." Hoose at 221-222, 569 N.E.2d at 1048; Weaver at 205-206, 580 N.E.2d at 1092.

Weaver also recognized that a writ of mandamus is available in this court to compel funding for the reasonable and necessary expenses of the court of common pleas and its divisions. Accord State ex rel. Rudes v. Rofkar (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 69, 71-72, 15 OBR 163, 165, 472 N.E.2d 354, 356, overruled on other grounds, Weaver at 208, 580 N.E.2d at 1094; Arbaugh, supra; Giuliani, supra.

Relator submitted proof--his journal entry, documents prepared by the county auditor, and his affidavit--that he determined the reasonable and necessary funding required for the probate court's 1995 operating expenses, and that respondents did not appropriate all the funding he requested. Respondents, who bear the burden of proof, have submitted no evidence that relator abused his discretion in making this determination. Relator, therefore, has a valid claim for a writ of mandamus to compel the appropriation of the difference in funding requested.

Summary Judgment

Relator, as "a party seeking to recover upon a claim," may file a motion for summary judgment seeking affirmative relief after expiration of the time for a responsive motion or pleading. Civ.R. 56(A). To grant his motion, we must find that:

" '(1) [N]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.' " Welco Industries, Inc. v. Applied Cos. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 344, 346, 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1132, quoting Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.

Courts are to award summary judgment with caution, being careful to resolve doubts and construe evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Leibreich v. A.J. Refrigeration, Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 266, 269, 617 N.E.2d 1068, 1071, citing Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 604 N.E.2d 138. However, " * * * we do not wish to discourage this procedure where a * * * [nonmoving party] fails to respond with evidence supporting the essentials of its claim. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party does not 'produce evidence on any issue for which that party bears the burden of production at trial.' " Leibreich, id., citing Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, paragraph three of the syllabus.

Relator's journal entry and affidavit, at least, are properly considered in support of his motion. Civ.R. 56(C) (only the pleadings, and timely filed depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, may be considered on summary judgment). Such proof is not required, however, as Civ.R. 56(A) permits the motion "with or without supporting affidavits," providing it "specifically delineate[s]" the reasons why summary judgment is appropriate. Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798, syllabus. But even without...