State ex rel. Nat'l Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners

• Decision Date: 31 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 2016–0505,2016–0505
• Parties: The STATE EX REL. NATIONAL LIME AND STONE COMPANY, Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

152 Ohio St.3d 393

97 N.E.3d 404

2017 Ohio 8348

The STATE EX REL. NATIONAL LIME AND STONE COMPANY, Appellant,

v.MARION COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Appellee.

No. 2016–0505

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 4, 2017

Decided October 31, 2017

Marshall & Melhorn, L.L.C., Thomas W. Palmer, and Meghan Anderson Roth, Toledo; and Bott Law Group, L.L.C., Dublin, Brian P. Barger, Columbus, and Mac Taylor, for appellant.

Brent W. Yager, Marion County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Brady, Coyle & Schmidt, Ltd., and Margaret G. Beck, Toledo, urging reversal for amici curiae, Ohio Concrete Association, Ohio Home Builders Association, Associated General Contractors of Ohio, Ohio Contractors Association, Ohio Aggregates and Industrial Minerals Association, and Flexible Pavements of Ohio.

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} The primary issue in this case is whether a railroad that holds land within a territory proposed for annexation is an "owner" as defined in R.C. 709.02 such that it must consent to the annexation or whether its property interest falls within an exception in that definition for "railroad, utility, street, and highway rights-of-way held in fee, by easement, or by dedication and acceptance." The answer to that question turns on whether the railroad's property interest is a railroad right-of-way held in fee.

{¶ 2} The court of appeals dismissed a complaint for a writ of mandamus filed by appellant, National Lime and Stone Company, seeking to compel appellee, the Marion County Board of Commissioners, to approve a petition for annexation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and hold that the railroad's property interest in the territory proposed for annexation in this case is a railroad right-of-way held in fee and that consequently, the railroad falls within the exception to the definition of "owner" set forth in R.C. 709.02(E). Therefore, we hold that the railroad is not a required signatory to the annexation petition at issue in this case. Because we find that National Lime has satisfied each of the statutory conditions for annexation and that the board therefore has no discretion to deny the petition, we issue a writ of mandamus compelling the board to approve the annexation petition.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} National Lime, a limestone-aggregates and industrial-minerals mining company, seeks to annex 224.257 acres of its real property in Grand Prairie Township, Marion County, Ohio, to the city of Marion under R.C. 709.021 and 709.023. One of the key requirements for the annexation, which was expedited under R.C. 709.023(E), is that all "owners" of land within the territory proposed for annexation sign the petition for annexation.

{¶ 4} Railroad tracks used by Norfolk Southern Railway ("Norfolk") pass through the southeast portion of the property that National Lime seeks to annex. Norfolk's property interest in the strip of land over which its tracks run is described in two deeds transferring the property to Norfolk's predecessors in interest.

{¶ 5} The first deed, executed in 1892, conveyed a 4.35–acre strip of land just 60 feet wide, over which one of the predecessor railroad companies had an existing track, to the predecessor railroad company and its assigns, forever. The second deed, executed in 1896, likewise conveyed to another predecessor railroad company and "its successors and assigns forever" a 75–foot–wide, 1.075–acre strip of land adjacent to the 4.35–acre parcel previously conveyed. The second deed also specified that as part of the consideration for the transfer, the railroad company agreed to construct on the conveyed real estate a spur of track, stock pens, and a scale as well as a shelter for passengers and freight.

{¶ 6} Neither deed identified the conveyed interest in the property as an easement or right-of-way or provided for a forfeiture or reversion of interests if a time came when the land was no longer used for purposes of operating a railroad. The parties do not dispute that the deeds grant a fee simple interest in the land.

{¶ 7} National Lime did not notify Norfolk of or seek its consent to the annexation petition, believing that the company fell within an exception—for railroad rights-of-way held in fee—to the definition of "owner" in R.C. 709.02(E) that would render its consent to the annexation unnecessary.

{¶ 8} The city of Marion issued a resolution approving the annexation petition. But after conducting a special meeting, the county commissioners unanimously passed a resolution objecting to the proposed annexation on two grounds. First, the commissioners found that Norfolk was an "owner" of real property in the territory proposed for annexation and that National Lime had failed to obtain the railway's signature on the annexation petition. See R.C. 709.02(E). Second, they found that because Norfolk's land separated "the bulk" of National Lime's territory from the city's corporation limits, the land to be annexed did not have the statutory minimum contiguous border with the city. R.C. 709.023(E)(4) (territory to be annexed must share a continuous contiguous boundary of at least 5 percent of its perimeter with the municipal corporation).

{¶ 9} National Lime sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for Marion County to compel the commissioners to approve its annexation petition, arguing that Norfolk was not an owner as defined by the plain language of the statute and that its representative’s signature, therefore, was not a condition for approval of the annexation petition. The court of appeals disagreed and dismissed the petition. 2016-Ohio-859, 62 N.E.3d 569, ¶ 12, 19–20 (holding that Norfolk owned the land in question in fee and therefore needed to consent to the annexation).

{¶ 10} This cause is now before us upon National Lime's appeal as of right.

Analysis

Statutory Interpretation

{¶ 11} For purposes of this annexation proceeding, R.C. 709.02(E) defines "owner" to include private corporations "seized of a freehold estate in land; except that easements and any railroad, utility, street, and highway rights-of-way held in fee, by easement, or by dedication and acceptance are not included within those meanings." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 12} National Lime contends that the term "right-of-way," as used in R.C. 709.02(E), does not describe a specific property interest but describes the way in which a piece of property is used (as a railroad, utility, street, or highway right-of-way), and that it is followed by a list of ways in which the property may be held (in fee, by easement, or by dedication and acceptance).

{¶ 13} In contrast, the commissioners argue that the first meaning listed in a dictionary for a given term is its usual, normal, and customary meaning. Therefore, they claim that the usual, normal, and customary meaning of "right-of-way" is "a legal right of passage over another person's ground." Merriam–Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/right-of-way (accessed October 26, 2017). Because Norfolk possesses a freehold estate in the land at issue rather than a right to pass over the land of another, the commissioners assert that the legislature could not have intended for Norfolk's property interest to fall within the statutory exception to the definition of ‘‘owner.’’ Consequently, the commissioners maintain that they lawfully denied the annexation petition and that the court of appeals properly dismissed National Lime's mandamus action because a representative of Norfolk—an owner of property in the territory proposed for annexation—did not sign the petition for annexation.

{¶ 14} Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Ceccarelli v. Levin , 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. When construing a statute, this court's paramount concern is legislative intent. State ex rel. Musial v. N. Olmsted , 106 Ohio St.3d 459, 2005-Ohio-5521, 835 N.E.2d 1243, ¶ 23. "If the meaning of the statute is unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is necessary." State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckeye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996). R.C. 1.42 instructs: "Words and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Words and phrases that have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed accordingly." Our role is to evaluate the statute as a whole and to interpret it in a manner that will give effect to every word and clause, avoiding a construction that will render a provision meaningless or inoperative. State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917).

{¶ 15} We have previously acknowledged that the term "rights-of-way" as used in R.C. 709.02(E) is ambiguous because it may refer to the land itself or the right to use the land. State ex rel. Butler Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 112 Ohio St.3d 262, 2006-Ohio-6411, 858 N.E.2d 1193, ¶ 25. Indeed, in 1891, the United States Supreme Court noted the multiple meanings of the term, stating, "It sometimes is used to describe a right belonging to a party, a right of passage over any tract; and it is also used to describe that strip of land which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road-bed." Joy v. St. Louis , 138 U.S. 1, 44, 11 S.Ct. 243, 34 L.Ed. 843 (1891) ; see also McCotter v. Barnes , 247 N.C. 480, 485, 101 S.E.2d 330 (1958) ; Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co. , 256 Mich. 143, 150, 239 N.W. 376 (1931) ; Miro v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Cty. , 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 96, 84 Cal.Rptr. 874 (4th Dist.1970) (all recognizing the dual meanings of the term ‘‘right-of-way’’).

{¶ 16} The commissioners' interpretation of the term, however, equates all rights-of-way with easements—which are commonly defined as "[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in...