State ex rel. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nortoni

• Decision Date: 16 December 1932
• Citation: 55 S.W.2d 272,331 Mo. 764
• Parties: State ex rel. the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, a Corporation, Petitioner, v. Albert D. Nortoni, Judge of the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Division No. 2
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

55 S.W.2d 272

331 Mo. 764

State ex rel. the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, a Corporation, Petitioner, v. Albert D. Nortoni, Judge of the Circuit Court, City of St. Louis, Division No. 2

Supreme Court of Missouri

December 16, 1932

Provisional rule made absolute.

Jones Hocker, Sullivan & Gladney and Frank Y. Gladney for petitioner.

(1) By procuring the restraining order below, Lena C. Meek has released errors that may have occurred in the injunction proceedings in the Indiana court. R. S. 1929, sec. 1506. (2) The injunction order and decree of the Indiana court is entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States. The injunction was issued by a court of general chancery jurisdiction after due service of process on Lena C. Meek, notice and a hearing; no appeal was taken and the judgment was and is final. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 455; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 452; 2 Black on Judgments (2 Ed.), sec. 858; 15 R. C. L. pp. 927-8. (3) The restraining order is void, for its necessary effect is to nullify the decree in Indiana, where it was issued. Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 419. (4) The power and authority of the Indiana court to issue a citation for contempt for disobedience of its decree is an inherent attribute of judicial power; without it the court would have no existence. State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 235. (5) The restraining order is void in that the circuit court has no colorable authority to interfere with or enjoin a contempt proceeding between nonresidents in a court of another state. State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 237; Debs Case 158 U.S. 595; 32 C. J. p. 84; Johnston Mining Co. v Morse, 90 N.Y.S. 107; Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn. 419. (6) The citation issued against Lena C. Meek is not a legal wrong. It is the exercise of a legal right in a lawful manner. It does not give rise to a cause of action, for its issuance does not violate any legal right of hers, nor breach any duty owing to her by the railroad company. 1 C. J. 965, secs. 56-7-8; Rice v. Railroad, 153 Mo.App. 53; Hailes v. Raines, 162 Mo.App. 59; Riddle v. Foreman, 178 S.W. 229. (7) The circuit court has no jurisdiction, at the instance of one nonresident, to enjoin another nonresident from prosecuting an action in a foreign jurisdiction which is the domicile of both plaintiff and defendant. Carpenter v. Hanes, 162 N.C. 46; Barrett v. Russell, 135 N.Y.S. 35. (8) The circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing a restraining order against a foreign corporation, enjoining it from doing certain acts in the state of its domicile. State ex rel. v. Shain, 245 Mo. 78; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 15 How. 233; Kimball v. St. Louis & S. F. Railroad Co., 157 Mass. 7, 31 N.E. 697; Hobbs v. Mining Co., 129 P. 781; Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 224.

OPINION

Frank, J.

Petitioner seeks our writ of prohibition directed to Honorable Albert D. Nortoni, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, presiding in Division Number Two thereof, commanding (1) the suspension of the execution of a restraining order issued against petitioner in cause No. 6281 pending in said court, and (2) that no further action be taken in said cause. Our provisional rule was issued to which respondent made return. Petitioner submitted the case on printed briefs and oral argument. Respondent has not favored us with either brief or argument.

The pertinent facts are, in substance, as follows:

On January 11, 1930, James C. Meek was in the employ of the railroad company, petitioner herein, as a switchman on its lines through the State of Indiana. The railroad is incorporated under the laws of Indiana. For more than five years next preceding January, 1930, Meek and his wife, Lena C. Meek were citizens of Indiana, residing in the city of Frankfort. On January 11, 1930, while in the employ of the railroad as aforesaid, and while in the line of his duty, Meek received injuries in consequence of which he died. On March 3, 1930, his widow, Lena C. Meek, was appointed administratrix of his estate by the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana. On March 14, 1930, she, as such administratrix brought suit against the railroad company in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband. On April 15, 1930, the railroad company filed a bill in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, asking an injunction against Lena C. Meek, administratrix, to restrain her from prosecuting said damage action in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. That court issued a temporary restraining order and set the cause for final hearing on April 28, 1930. Said administratrix was duly notified of said final hearing but made default. On final hearing the Indiana Circuit Court rendered a decree permanently enjoining said administratrix from prosecuting said suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. No appeal was taken and that decree became final.

Notwithstanding the restraining order, said administrtrix proceeded to prosecute said cause in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, and on March 18, 1932, obtained a verdict in her favor in the sum of $ 25,000. On March 26, 1932, the railroad company appeared in the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, and moved said court to issue a citation for contempt against said administratrix, which citation said court issued, returnable on April 4, 1932. On March 28, 1932, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Division No. 2, issued an order against the railroad company, enjoining said company, its agents, servants and attorneys from prosecuting the citation for contempt issued by the Indiana Circuit Court. On April 1, 1932, the railroad company petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition against the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, prohibiting it from entertaining jurisdiction of the proceedings to enjoin the railroad company from prosecuting the contempt proceedings in the Indiana Circuit Court. Our provisional rule was granted, to which respondent made return and the case is before us for final disposition.

It is settled law that, in a proper case, a court of equity having jurisdiction of the person may enjoin such person from prosecuting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. By a "proper case" we mean that the party seeking such an injunction must make a clear showing that it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to permit the prosecution of the suit in a foreign jurisdiction. 14 Ruling Case Law, page 411, section 112, states the rule thus:

"It is a doctrine, well recognized and universally conceded, that the courts of one country can exercise no jurisdiction or control over the courts of another country. Proceeding on this theory, the rule also prevailed at one time, that a court could not restrain a citizen within the jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in a court of a foreign nation. Gradually, however, recognition was given to the distinction between endeavoring to control the action of a foreign court, by a mandate directed to it, and controlling the action of a resident, over whose person the court had undisputed jurisdiction, until, according to later decisions, unqualified approval is given to the doctrine that, in a proper case, if the court has jurisdiction of the person it may enjoin him from prosecuting such a suit. The courts in these cases proceed on the theory that the restraint operates on the person of the litigant who, as a resident within the jurisdiction of the court from which the mandate is issued, may be compelled to recognize and obey its laws and the decrees of its tribunals."

The same author, in Section 114 at page 413 states the principles underlying the rule, as follows:

"The jurisdiction rests on the authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction, to restrain them from doing inequitable acts to the wrong and injury of others and on the power of the state to compel its own citizens to respect its laws, even beyond its own territorial limits. The court proceeds on the theory that as long as a citizen belongs to a state, he owes it obedience; and, that as between states, the state in which he is domiciled has jurisdiction over his person, and his personal relations to other citizens of the state. In the exercise of this power there is no attempt to render the foreign tribunal subject to the control or direction of the local court or to, in any way, exercise a supervisory power over it. There is a clear distinction between an injunction against the proceedings of a court in another state, and the power and authority of such court and one to restrain the personal action of a citizen. In the first case the court has no jurisdiction, while in the other it proceeds in personam against the defendant, directing him to proceed no further in the action, without regard to the fact that the res of the controversy may be outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court, for in such a case the court has the power to compel a party to do all the things necessary according to the lex loci rei sitae which he could do voluntarily to give full effect to the decree against him."

Two questions are presented by the record in this case, (1) did the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Indiana, have jurisdiction to enjoin Lena C. Meek, administratrix of the estate of her...