State v. Shain
| Decision Date | 02 July 1912 |
| Citation | 149 S.W. 479 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. HARTFORD LIFE INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN., v. SHAIN, Circuit Judge, et al. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
In Banc. Original prohibition proceeding by the State, on the relation of the Hartford Life Insurance Company, against Hopkins B. Shain, Judge of the Circuit Court of Pettis County, and Peter Courtney. Writ made perpetual.
This is an original proceeding begun in this court by the petitioner, seeking to prohibit the respondent, as judge of the circuit court of Pettis county, from further proceeding with the trial of the case of Peter Courtney against the Hartford Life Insurance Company, a mutual concern, pending in said court.
The substance of the charges made in the petition in that case is that the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, by which it insured his life, for a certain sum, evidenced by a certificate of membership, dated January 27, 1882, for and in consideration of the premiums stated in a;table of rates stated in said certificate, which rates vary according to the age of the insured and the amount of outstanding insurance in force at the time each quarterly assessment is made. Said table of rates is as follows.
Table of Graduated Rates for Death Losses for Every $1,000 of a Total Indemnity of $1,000,000.
Age. Rate. Age. Rate. Age. Rate
15 to 21 $0 65 35 $0 97 49 $1 40
22 67 36 1 00 50 1 47
23 69 37 1 03 51 1 54
24 71 38 1 06 52 1 63
25 73 39 1 09 53 1 72
26 75 40 1 12 54 1 81
27 77 41 1 14 55 1 92
28 79 42 1 16 56 2 03
29 81 43 1 18 57 2 15
30 83 44 1 20 58 2 32
31 85 45 1 22 59 2 50
32 88 46 1 25 60 2 68
33 91 47 1 30
34 94 48 1 35
At the bottom of this table was the following statement: "These rates decrease in proportion as the total indemnity in force increases above one million dollars in amount, and are calculated so as to cover the usual expense for collecting."
The plaintiff alleges "that on the 25th day of January, 1896, he reached the age of 60 years, and since that date the defendant has fraudulently assessed the plaintiff on each of the five certificates or contracts, which he held in defendant's company, in excess of $2.68 for every $1,000 on a total indemnity of $1,000,000, and `prays judgment against defendant that the (1) defendant be perpetually enjoined from assessing the plaintiff upon his contract at a rate in excess of $2.68 per $1,000 on a total indemnity of $1,000,000; (2) that the defendant render an accounting to the plaintiff in excess of said rate since the 25th day of June, 1896, with interest upon each excessive payment since the date of said payment, and (3) that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum so found to be due the plaintiff upon such accounting; and that the plaintiff have such other and further relief as may to the court seem just and equitable, besides the costs and disbursements of this action.'"
The defendant appearing specially demurred to this petition, on the ground that the court had no, jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or the subject of, the action, nor jurisdiction to grant the relief therein prayed for, which demurrer was overruled by the court of which the respondent, H. B. Shain, is the judge.
The petition for the writ filed in this court charges that the circuit court of Pettis county has no jurisdiction of the defendant in that cause, for the reason that the remedies sought, if granted, would interfere with and disturb the internal affairs of the petitioner company, a corporation of Connecticut, with its principal office and officers located in that state; also for the reason that said court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff in that case.
Shortly after the circuit court overruled the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's petition in that cause, the former filed in this court its petition in this cause for a writ of prohibition. After due consideration, the preliminary rule was granted and duly served upon the respondent. In due time he filed his return, admitting the facts pleaded, but tendered issues of law upon the facts. Thereupon the petitioner moved for judgment upon the pleadings.
Jones, Jones, Hocker & Davis and Montgomery & Montgomery, for relator. Orville M. Barnett, for respondents.
WOODSON, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The facts of this case are admitted and are embraced within a small compass, and thereupon are predicated, for determination, but two legal propositions, namely: First, Has the circuit court of Pettis county jurisdiction to order an accounting of the petitioner's business affairs, and to determine therefrom whether or not the plaintiff, in the case of himself against the petitioner, pending in said court, has been and I's being charged excessive and illegal premiums upon his policy of insurance; and, second, if so, has said court jurisdiction to render judgment for the excessive sums so paid and to enjoin the future collection of said excessive premiums?
The latter proposition depends upon the former, and whichever way that question is disposed of will largely control the disposition of the latter; consequently we will consider the propositions in the order stated.
Counsel for respondent has with much care and due deliberation stated the rule which, in his opinion, should govern the interpretation of the policy of insurance in question regarding the premiums due thereunder; but he cites no authority whatever in support of his position. It seems to us that learned counsel had misconceived the object and purpose of this proceeding. The questions involved, as previously stated, challenge the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Pettis county to pass upon the propositions stated, and not the correctness or incorrectness of the interpretation to be given to the policy of insurance mentioned in the evidence. If it has not the jurisdiction to pass upon those questions, then it would be useless to announce the rule of interpretation which is to govern the policy, for the simple reason that it would have no force or effect whatever, even though it should be conceded that the correct rule should be announced and the proper decree entered.
The principal proposition here presented for determination is not a new one. It has been before this court and other courts of alio country in a number of cases; and so thoroughly and ably has it been considered that there remains but little, if anything, new that can be said upon the subject. We will therefore be content with the disposition of the question by quoting from a few of the opinions of some of the courts passing upon the question.
The case of Clark v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 14 App. D. C. 154, involved this precise question. There the company was a mutual concern, organized under the laws of New York; and the plaintiff brought suit in the District of Columbia against the defendant, who held a certificate of membership therein, charging in the bill that the defendant company had illegally, and contrary to the contract of insurance, adopted an arbitrary and unauthorized method of levying assessments, and in pursuance thereto was levying, and was threatening to continue to levy, illegal and' excessive assessments against the plaintiff and his comembers; that said illegal and fraudulent assessments had been and were being made and enforced as a part of a scheme on the part of the officers and directors of the company to force plaintiff and other members, either to pay such fraudulent and excessive assessments for their insurance, or to drive them out of the company and compel them to forfeit all moneys that had been paid in and contributed thereto. The relief asked was: (1) Injunction to restrain the defendant and its agents from levying illegal and excessive assessments in the future. (2) Discovery and the proper ascertainment of the correct and true amounts that should have been levied upon the plaintiff and other members, and that an accounting be had between the plaintiff and defendant in that regard. (3) That the court determine the true and proper amount of the assessments that should have been levied, and that the defendant be compelled to refund the unauthorized excess.
A demurrer was filed by defendant to the bill, upon the ground that the court for the District of Columbia had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by plaintiff, a member of the defendant association, to grant the relief sought against a foreign corporation, which demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the courts of the District of Columbia were without jurisdiction in the premises, and said:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ellis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York
... ... corporation, existing under the laws of New York, and ... qualified to transact its business in Alabama, and was so ... engaged in this state when notice was issued and suit ... brought. There is no question presented as to the sufficiency ... of service of process upon the respondent ... Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 35 S.Ct. 692, 59 L.Ed ... 1165, L.R.A.1916A, 765; Allen v. Montana Ref. Co., ... 71 Mont. 105, 227 P. 582; State v. Shain, 245 Mo ... 78, 149 S.W. 479; Hamilton v. United Laundries ... Corp., 111 N.J.Eq. 78, 161 A. 347; Condon v. Mutual ... Reserve Fund Life ... ...
-
Mo. Cattle Co. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co.
...it has no power to enforce such decree upon the officers of the corporation. Hence no jurisdiction to render such decree. State ex rel. v. Shain, 245 Mo. 85; State ex rel. v. Reynolds, 275 Mo. 123; State ex rel. v. Denton, 229 Mo. 196; State ex rel. v. Deering, 180 Mo. 63; Clark v. Mutual R......
-
Frick v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.
...subject-matter of the action. In support of the proposition appellant cites the following authorities: State ex rel. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Shain, 245 Mo. 78, 149 S. W. 479;Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct. 692, 59 L. Ed. 1165, L. R. A. 1916A, 765;Clark ......
- State ex rel. Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Shain