State ex rel. Noll v. Industrial Com'n of Ohio

• Decision Date: 24 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-2045,89-2045
• Citation: 567 N.E.2d 245,57 Ohio St.3d 203
• Parties: The STATE, ex rel. NOLL, Appellee, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 203

57 Ohio St.3d 203

567 N.E.2d 245

The STATE, ex rel. NOLL, Appellee, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, Appellant.

No. 89-2045.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Aug. 29, 1990.

Decided Jan. 24, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

In any order of the Industrial Commission granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the commission must specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision.

Appellee, Russell M. Noll, was injured in 1984 in the course of and arising from his employment with the Ben Company. His workers' compensation claim was allowed for neck strain, head concussion, and cervical degenerative disc disease. At the time of the injury Noll was fifty-five years old, had a seventh grade education and had been a carpenter, involved in construction work, all of his working life. Noll had been employed at the Ben Company for twenty-two years prior to the accident.

In 1987, appellee applied to appellant, the Industrial Commission, for compensation for permanent total disability. He had been under the care of his personal physician, O. Daniel Fox, M.D., who on August 31, 1987, stated in a report that "I believe Mr. Noll is 100% permanently and totally disabled from any gainful employment." He was subsequently examined by appellant's specialist, Dr. Gerald S. Steiman, who concluded that appellee had a twenty-seven percent permanent partial impairment and could return to sustained remunerative employment. Also contained in the record is the report of Michael T. Farrell, Ph.D., an industrial psychologist, who found Noll to be permanently and totally disabled, stating that "there are no jobs in significant numbers in the local economy which I feel Mr. Noll could perform on a sustained basis which would be considered substantially remunerative."

Appellant denied appellee's application for permanent total disability benefits, stating that its order was " * * * [b]ased particularly upon the reports [sic ] of Doctors [sic ] Steiman, a consideration of the claimant's age, education, work history and other disability factors including physical, psychological and sociological, that are contained within the Statement of Facts prepared for the hearing on the instant Application, the evidence in the file and the evidence adduced at the hearing."

Appellee filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion by denying his application for permanent total disability compensation. Appellee contended that the commission had failed to explain why the nonmedical factors set forth in State, ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946, did not render him permanently and totally disabled. The appellate court agreed in part and issued a limited writ ordering the commission "to vacate its order of June 14, 1988 denying claimant's application for permanent total disability and to issue a new order, either allowing claimant's application for permanent total disability or denying it with a sufficient explanation of how it applied the nonmedical factors to support a denial of the application."

This cause is before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Clements, Mahin & Cohen and William E. Clements, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Michael L. Squillace, Cincinnati, for appellant.

Stewart R. Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Stewart R. Jaffy, Columbus, urging affirmance for amici curiae, Ohio AFL-CIO and United Auto Workers.

ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, Justice.

In 1983, we addressed a similar problem in State, ex rel. Mitchell, v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483-484, 6 OBR 531, 533-534, 453 N.E.2d 721, 724, wherein it was stated:

"This appeal highlights a problem which is becoming increasingly prevalent; that is, the commission's failure to state with any precision the basis for its decisions. Claimants and employers alike, who appear before the commission, are frequently informed that requested benefits are either being granted or denied based on 'the evidence in the file and/or the evidence adduced at the hearing.' See State, ex rel. Berry, v. Indus. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 193, 196-198 (Clifford F. Brown, J., concurring). In the present case, this problem is exemplified as a result of the parties' dispute over the meaning of the district hearing officer's report.

"For the reasons that follow, we will, when necessary, henceforth grant a writ of mandamus directing the commission to specify the basis of its decision. Cf. State, ex rel. Cox, v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 235 [21 O.O.3d 147, 423 N.E.2d 441]; State, ex rel. GF Business Equipment, Inc., v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 86 . In other words, district hearing officers, as well as regional boards of review and the Industrial Commission, must specifically state which evidence and only that evidence which has been relied upon to reach their conclusion, and a brief explanation stating why the claimant is or is not entitled to the benefits requested. Moreover, this court will no longer search the commission's file for 'some evidence' to support an order of the commission not otherwise specified as a basis for its decision." (Emphasis added.)

Thus in Mitchell, supra, we required that the regional board of review and the commission specifically state which evidence was relied upon and provide a brief explanation stating why the claimant is or is not entitled to benefits. In spite of our holding in Mitchell, supra, the issue of what evidence the Industrial Commission relied upon in making its decision has continued to arise in many cases which come before us.

Because the problem persisted, in State, ex rel. Stephenson, v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 31 OBR 369, 509 N.E.2d 946, we stated the following:

" * * * We hold it to be necessary that the commission look at the claimant's age, education, work record, and all other factors, such as physical, psychological, and sociological, that are contained within the record in making its determination of permanent total disability.

"Perhaps these factors were considered by the commission, but because we find no indication in the commission'- order that such factors were considered by the commission in reaching its decision on the percentage of permanent total disability * * * we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the commission for consideration of said factors, if previous consideration had not been given, and an amended order stating the commission's findings after such consideration." Id. at 173, 31 OBR at 374-375, 509 N.E.2d at 951.

The problem, however, was not eliminated by Stephenson, supra. Rather, the commission started to release boilerplate orders simply reciting the foregoing nonmedical factors and totally failing to explain its decision, as required by Mitchell, supra. Thus, it was necessary for this court to once again reiterate the procedure to be followed by the commission. Accordingly, in State, ex rel. Frigidaire Division, General Motors Corp., v. Indus. Comm. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 105, 518 N.E.2d 1194, at paragraph one of the syllabus, we stated: "An order of the Industrial Commission must briefly explain the reasoning of the commission in granting or denying the benefits requested by the claimant, and must specifically state which evidence, in particular, the commission relied upon in reaching its decision. (State, ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 6 OBR 531, 453 N.E.2d 721, followed.)" See, also, State, ex rel. Swan, v. Midland Indus. Elec. Co. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 53, 521 N.E.2d 787; State, ex rel. Huntley, v. Interlake Steel Corp. (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 168, 538 N.E.2d 103.

The foregoing requirements have been repeated in cases too numerous to cite. The Industrial Commission, however, continues to simply make formal, boilerplate incantations, such as in this case, wherein the commission stated that its order was "based particularly upon the reports [sic ] of Doctors [sic ] Steiman, * * * the claimant's age, education, work history and other disability factors including physical, psychological and sociological * * *." Such an order is totally meaningless on review. It does not comply with any of the requirements set forth in Mitchell, supra, Stephenson, supra, and all of the other cases which followed. We have repeatedly called for orders which briefly explain the reasoning and specifically state which evidence was relied upon.

This court recently decided State, ex rel. Hartung, v. Columbus (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 257, 560 N.E.2d 196, wherein we noted that "[o]rders denying permanent total disability benefits * * * remain frustratingly vague. These orders often indicate only that the claimant is 'not permanently and totally disabled.' Again, such general wording provides no insight into the basis for the commission's decision and can lead to the sort of confusion seen here. * * * " Id. at 259, 560 N.E.2d at 198. In Hartung, we gleaned from a similar order denying benefits (our criticism of which we now affirm) that the claimant " * * * had a psychological impairment of five percent and an orthopedic impairment of twenty percent. He was sixty years old at the time of application and had an eleventh grade education. He was employed for many years after his initial injury in 1967. Moreover, although their conclusions are not determinative, all of the medical reports relied on by the commission indicated that appellant was capable of some sustained remunerative employment. Obviously, the commission was not convinced that the combination created permanent total disability. We find no abuse of discretion." Id. at 259-260, 560 N.E.2d at 199. Thus, Hartung was a fact-specific case. Indeed, the vast majority of these cases are by their nature fact-specific, and must be treated on an individual...