State ex rel. Ohio Council 8, American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Spellacy, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 22 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1442,AFL-CIO,84-1442
• Parties: , 17 O.B.R. 260, 1984-86 SERB 366 The STATE, ex rel. OHIO COUNCIL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,, et al., Appellants, v. SPELLACY, Chief Justice, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 112

17 Ohio St.3d 112

478 N.E.2d 229, 17 O.B.R. 260, 1984-86 SERB 366

The STATE, ex rel. OHIO COUNCIL 8, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellants, v. SPELLACY, Chief Justice, et al., Appellees.

No. 84-1442.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 22, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

Prior to the enactment of the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, R.C. 4117.01 et seq., officers of a court of common pleas had no authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements with employees of the court. Subsequent to the enactment of the collective bargaining Act, the determination to recognize collective bargaining within the courts became a matter of judicial discretion.

For more than twenty years, the General Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County and appellants, AFSCME Council 8 and AFSCME Local 1746 (hereinafter "relators"), had entered into a series of agreements setting forth the terms and conditions of employment for probation officers and clerk-typists in the probation department of the court. These agreements were titled "Statements of Policy." The last statement of policy entered into between relators and appellees, Leo M. Spellacy, the Administrative Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, and John J. Curran, court administrator (hereinafter "respondents"), became effective on February 1, 1980, and expired on January 31, 1983.

On November 22, 1982, relators notified respondent Curran of their desire to commence negotiations for a new statement of policy which would become effective February 1, 1983. On January 27, 1983, the parties agreed to an extension of the 1980-1983 statement of policy to March 1, 1983, as agreement on a new statement of policy had not yet been reached. On March 1, 1983, the parties agreed to a day-to-day extension of the 1980-1983 statement of policy. This final extension agreement provided that either party had the right to terminate upon three days' notice. On February 28, 1984, respondents, through administrator Curran, served written notice upon relators that they were exercising their option to terminate the 1980-1983 statement of policy, which had been extended on a day-to-day basis since March 1, 1983.

On March 30, 1984, relators filed an action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. In their complaint, relators alleged that a new statement of policy had been entered into on March 29, 1983. Relators contended that this agreement was to be effective from February 1, 1983 through January 31, 1986, and that relators' membership had ratified the agreement. Relators further posited that until the time respondents served notice of termination, all matters relating to grievances, wages, and benefits had been governed by the new agreement. The purported agreement was never finalized. Relators, through their complaint in mandamus, sought to compel respondents to sign and honor this new statement of policy.

In their motion to dismiss the complaint, respondents denied the existence of any new agreement and maintained that all negotiations were formally terminated by the February 28, 1984 notice of termination. The court of appeals granted respondents' motion to dismiss.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, Bernard A. Berkman, George W. Palda and Lorraine R. Baumgardner, Cleveland, for appellants.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Thomas P. Gill, Cleveland, for appellees.

WRIGHT, Justice.

It is well-settled that in order for a writ of mandamus to issue the relator must demonstrate "(1) that he has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for, (2) that respondents are under a clear legal duty to perform the acts, and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." State, ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 28, 29, 451 N.E.2d 225, citing State, ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 41, 42, 374 N.E.2d 641 ; State, ex rel. Heller v. Miller (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 399 N.E.2d 66 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Westchester v. Bacon (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 42, 399 N.E.2d 81 , paragraph one of the syllabus. Relators have failed to satisfy any of the stated requirements necessary for the issuance of this high peremptory writ.

Initially, relators have not proven that they have a clear legal right to the relief prayed for. Relators claim they are legally entitled to require respondents to sign and honor a new statement of policy. In effect, relators are seeking to implement and enforce the functional equivalent of a collective bargaining agreement. The facts presented, however, do not clearly establish relators' contention that any new agreement was entered into prior to respondents' notice of termination. Simply stated, relators have failed to conclusively prove the existence of a legally enforceable contract or collective bargaining agreement.

Secondly, and more importantly, relators have not demonstrated that respondents were under a clear legal duty to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. During the course of negotiations commencing November 22, 1982, the respondents lacked the authority to collectively bargain with court employees. Malone v. Court of Common Pleas (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 245, 344 N.E.2d 126 . Cf. F.O.P. v. Dayton (1978), 60 Ohio App.2d 259, 396 N.E.2d 1045 ; American Federation of Employees v. Polta (1977), 59 Ohio App.2d 283, 394 N.E.2d 310 . All statements of policy entered into prior to this time were merely statements of understanding between the relators and the respondents.

In the period between the expiration of the statement of policy ending on January 31, 1983, and the breakdown in negotiations on February 28, 1984, the Ohio General Assembly enacted the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act which extended collective bargaining rights to public employees. Officers and employees of the courts were specifically excluded from the purview of this legislation, however, ¹ unless the court, as employer, expressly elected to engage in collective bargaining. ² R.C. 4117.01(C)(8) and 4117.03(C). Thus, the decision to recognize collective bargaining is strictly a matter of judicial discretion. R.C. 2731.03 states that:

"The writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot control judicial discretion." (Emphasis added.)

In sum, prior to the enactment of the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act, R.C. 4117.01 et seq., respondents, as officers of a court of common pleas, had no authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements with employees of the court. Subsequent to the enactment of the collective bargaining Act, the determination to recognize collective bargaining within the courts became a matter of judicial discretion. As such, there is no absolute legal duty which would warrant granting the extraordinary remedy of mandamus in the present case.

Finally, relators have failed to prove that they have no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. This case involves essentially whether a contractual obligation exists between the relators and the respondents. The proper vehicle for resolving this issue is through the filing of a declaratory judgment action in the court of common pleas. Cf. State, ex rel. Square v. Planning Comm. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 128, 413 N.E.2d 825 ; State, ex rel. McGarvey v. Zeigler (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 320, 405 N.E.2d 722 ; State, ex rel. Buian v. Kadlec (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 116, 383 N.E.2d 119 .

Relators claim that a declaratory judgment action would be inappropriate because it must be filed with the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County and because it would involve a matter between that court and its employees. We nevertheless believe that a declaratory judgment proceeding would provide a plain and adequate remedy. The Chief Justice of this court, pursuant to the Rules of Superintendence for Courts of Common Pleas and upon request of the administrative judge of the common pleas court, may assign a visiting judge to hear the declaratory judgment action.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, C.J., and LOCHER, HOLMES and CLIFFORD F. BROWN, JJ., concur.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, C.J., and CLIFFORD F. BROWN, J., concur separately.

SWEENEY and DOUGLAS, JJ., dissent.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice, concurring.

I concur in the syllabus and judgment based upon the proposition, and rationale in support thereof, articulated in the opinion that respondents lacked the authority to bargain collectively with court employees. Malone v. Court of Common Pleas (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 245, 344 N.E.2d 126 . The relators, probation officers and clerk typists in the probation department of the court, were court employees who are in a position of public officers or employees to which the principle stated in Fuldauer v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 114, 290 N.E.2d 546 , paragraph three of the syllabus, applies:

"A public officer or employee holds his office as a matter of law and not of contract, nor has such officer or employee a vested interest or private right of property in his office or employment. (Paragraph one of the syllabus in State, ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499, 83 N.E.2d 393 , approved and followed.)" See Malone, supra, 45 Ohio St.2d at 248, 344 N.E.2d 126.

The court employees in Malone, supra, served at the pleasure of the juvenile judge who appointed them pursuant to R.C. 2151.13. Id. In the case here the probation employees of the general division of the common pleas court are appointed by the court under the authority of R.C. 2301.27, which, in pertinent part, provides:

" * * * The court shall make such appointments, fix the salaries of appointees, and supervise the work of...