State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates

• Citation: 104 N.W. 709,96 Minn. 110
• Decision Date: 27 October 1905
• Docket Number: 14,560 - (175)
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LOUIS PATTERSON v. WILLIAM J. BATES
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

104 N.W. 709

96 Minn. 110

STATE ex rel. LOUIS PATTERSON v. WILLIAM J. BATES

Nos. 14,560 - (175)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

October 27, 1905

Appeal by relator from an order of the district court for St. Louis County, Cant and Dibell, JJ., discharging a writ of habeas corpus and remanding relator to the custody of respondent as sheriff of that county. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Construction of Statute.

Where the first section of a statute conforms to the obvious policy and intent of the legislature, it is not rendered inoperative by inconsistent provisions in a later section which do not conform to this policy and intent. In such case the later provision is nugatory and will be disregarded.

Delegation of Powers.

The fact that a statute confers powers or imposes duties upon a judicial or executive officer which are not strictly judicial or executive, or which are of an ambiguous or mixed character, does not render the statute void, as within the inhibition of article 3, § 1, of the state constitution.

Sale of Intoxicating Liquor.

Chapter 346, p. 626, Laws 1905, when properly construed, is consistent in all its parts, does not violate article 3 § 1, of the constitution of the state, and is constitutional and effective.

Baldwin Baldwin & Dancer, for appellant.

Edward T. Young, Attorney General, George T. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, and John M. McClintock, County Attorney, for respondent.

OPINION

ELLIOTT, J.

The relator was charged with soliciting parties to purchase intoxicating liquors in quantities of less than five gallons in violation of the provisions of chapter 346, p. 626, Laws 1905. He was arrested and brought before the municipal court of the city of Duluth, and after hearing was held to await the action of the grand jury, and in default of bail was committed to the custody of the sheriff. Thereafter he caused a writ of habeas corpus to issue out of the district court, and after a hearing thereon an order was entered refusing to release the petitioner and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff. From this order an appeal was taken to this court under the provisions of chapter 327, p. 734, Laws 1895.

We are not embarrassed by any controversy about the facts. It is admitted that the relator was legally convicted in the municipal court, and the writ of habeas corpus properly discharged, if chapter 346, p. 626, Laws 1905, is constitutional and effective. This is the only question presented by the record. It is contended by the appellant that the statute is invalid, for the reason (1) that its several parts are so inconsistent and contradictory that the legislative intention cannot be ascertained, and (2) that it violates section 1, article 3, of the constitution of the state. The statute is entitled

An act prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, and for the granting of license for the sale of spirituous and vinous liquors, and providing for a penalty for the violation thereof.

Section 1 provides

That whoever on his own behalf or as an agent for others, without having a license so to do as provided for in this act, shall solicit any person or persons, firm or corporation or association not having a license to keep a dram shop or saloon under the laws of this state or to a licensed physician or druggist to buy or contract for the future delivery or to make order for any spirituous or vinous liquors in any less quantity than five gallons or either on his own behalf or as said agent or as an agent for the purchaser make an order contracting for the future delivery of any such liquors to any said person, persons, firm, corporation or association shall be subject to a fine, etc.

Section 2 provides that

The board of county commissioners may grant license to persons to act on their own behalf or as agents for others in the sale of spirituous or vinous liquors for future delivery in quantities not less than five gallons to others than those duly licensed to keep a dram shop or saloon under the laws of the state in their respective counties as they think for the public good requires.

To say that the act is drawn with reasonable skill and accuracy would be to use the language of flattery. It is crude in construction and awkward in phraseology, and it is doubtful whether so brief a legislative enactment ever contained more bad grammar or a greater number of verbal inaccuracies. But such defects are not necessarily fatal to the statute, so long as the court, according to well-known rules of construction, is able to discover the intention of the legislature. "Neither bad grammar nor bad English will vitiate a statute, if the meaning of the legislature can be clearly discovered. Awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical phrases and sentences may yet convey a definite meaning, and, if they do, the courts must accept it as the meaning of the lawmakers." Black, Int. Law, § 34; Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555; Murray v. State, 21 Tex.App. 620, 2 S.W. 757; Lane v. Schomp, 20 N.J.Eq. 82. The statute must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference. An interpretation which renders a statute null and ineffective cannot be admitted. It is an absurdity to suppose that after it is reduced to terms it means nothing. It ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have effect, and not be found vain and nugatory. Vattel (Law of Nations, 253); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 281, 293, 37 N.W. 782; State v. Board of County Commrs. of Polk County, 87 Minn. 325, 334, 92 N.W. 216.

In order to render this statute consistent and intelligible, it is only necessary to omit the word "not" from the clause "quantities not less than five gallons" in the second section. There is no doubt of the power and right of courts to thus omit a word, when necessary to render a statute intelligible which as it stands is devoid of sensible meaning. The books are full of cases in which words have been omitted, supplied, or transposed. Moody v. Stephenson, 1 Minn. 289 (401); Woodruff v. Town of Glendale, 26 Minn. 78, 1 N.W. 581; Donohue v. Ladd, 31 Minn. 244, 17 N.W. 381; McGee v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Hennepin County, 84 Minn. 481, 88 N.W. 6; Chapman v. State, 16 Tex.App. 76; Hutchings v. Commercial, 91 Va. 68, 20 S.E. 950; Bird v. Board, 95 Ky. 195, 24 S.W. 118; Paxton v. Farmers, 45 Neb. 884, 64 N.W. 343; County v. Frey, 128 Pa. St. 593, 18 A. 478; Lancaster v. Lancaster, 160 Pa. St. 411, 28 A. 854; Black, Int. Law, § 37.

But it is contended by counsel that there is no more reason why the court should by construction omit the word "not" from the clause in the second section than supply it in the first section, which would make the section consistent and the statute valid, but render it entirely inapplicable as far as the defendant in this case is concerned. The rule that the part of the act which is later in position in the statute is to be deemed a later expression of the legislative will, and thus repeal a contradictory earlier provision, is usually, although not universally, accepted, but does not rest upon a very satisfactory foundation. It has been criticized by Bishop upon the very substantial ground that, as all the provisions of an act are adopted at the same time, there can be no priority in point of time on account of their relative position. Bishop, Written Law, §§ 62-65. If any inference is to be drawn from mere position, it would seem but reasonable to give the preference to what appears first in order. The draftsman would ordinarily express the dominant idea in his mind in the opening paragraph or section, and what follows would naturally and logically agree with what precedes. "For it is to be presumed," says Vattel, "that the authors of a deed had a uniform and steady train of thinking." But it is not necessary to invoke such a presumption in the present instance, as the rule of construction which presumes that what appears last in the act is the latest expression of the legislative will should not be applied where the provision standing first in the act is more in harmony with the other statutes in pari materia.

This exception to the rule was applied by this court in McCormick v. Village of West Duluth, 47 Minn. 272 276, 50 N.W. 128. The statute there under consideration contained independent provisions in respect to the character of certain improvement bonds which were authorized by the act. By the first clause the bonds were to be made payable in five annual installments, the first maturing one year from date, while the second clause provided that the bonds should be made payable at the option of the village after five years, and absolutely at the expiration of seven years, from their date. It was claimed that either the word "shall" appearing in each clause should be read "may," which would harmonize the two clauses and permit the municipal authorities to exercise discretion, or the clause last in order should be upheld as the later expression of the legislative will. The court said: "The rules of construction invoked by defendants' counsel in support of their demurrer are well recognized, but the true rule to be applied here is that, where the first clause of a section conforms to the obvious policy and intent of the legislature, it is not rendered inoperative by a later inconsistent clause which does not conform to this policy and intent. In such cases the later clause is nugatory and must be disregarded." This principle was recognized and applied in Dickerson v. Nelson, 4 Ind. 280, State v. Williams, 8 Ind. 191, and Sams v. King, 18 Fla. 557. In Kansas v. Commissioners, 16 Kan. 587, Justice Brewer said that where there is no way of reconciling conflicting clauses, and nothing to indicate which the legislature regarded as of paramount importance, force should...