State ex rel. Perry v. City of Seattle
| Decision Date | 05 September 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 36588,36588 |
| Citation | 62 Wn.2d 891,384 P.2d 874 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, On The Relation of Joseph A. PERRY, Jr., Respondent, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a Municipal Corporation, and the Civil Service Commission of the City of Seattle, Appellants. . Department 1 |
A. C. Van Soelen, Corp. Counsel, Jerry F. King, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Seattle, for appellants.
Merges, Brain & Hilyer, Edwards E. Merges, and William C. Goodloe, Seattle, for respondent.
1
On September 11, 1961, Joseph A. Perry, Jr., after approximately 20 years of faithful service, was removed by the Seattle chief of police from the Seattle police force. Officer Perry's position had been that of patrolman in the classified civil service. Following his removal, charter procedures culminated in a hearing before the Seattle Civil Service Commission. At its conclusion, the commission orally pronounced that the dismissal of officer Perry was sustained. Formal findings to that effect were entered, and the decision was certified to the chief of police, the appointing officer. Thereafter, a writ of certiorari was directed against the city and the commission.
The trial court reversed the commission, because, stated succinctly, its action, in the court's opinion, was arbitrary and capricious in a legal sense, in that the resultant, consisting of dismissal, loss of income, forfeiture of accumulated pension rights, loss of seniority rights, the ignominy of dismissal, and the disgrace upon his family and himself, was too severe a penalty, and was not commensurate in the premises. The court remanded the cause to the commission and ordered reinstatement of the patrolman. The city and the commission appealed.
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we have, and will continue to refer to the parties as the city, the commission, and the patrolman.
The principle assignment of error poses the following question: Did the commission lawfully exercise its charter function? Because of our disposition of this query, we do not reach appellants' remaining assignments of error.
It is recalled that, historically, the appointing power in municipal service may remove without cause, except as restrained by merit systems, and that, under original civil service concepts, a removal by the appointing power was administrative rather than judicial in essence, and was exercised summarily, without formality. Such act was not a denial of due process, and, by acquiescence, the removal became final. The Seattle charter follows this procedure and does not empower the appointing head to act as both an accuser and judge. On the contrary, under Art. 16, § 12, a removal is conditioned on the filing with the commission, by the department head, of a written statement of the reasons for removal. Further, there is a proviso that, upon demand by the officer or employee removed,
'* * * The commission shall forthwith make such investigation and its finding and decision shall be certified to the appointing officer, and if the removal is not sustained thereby, the officer or employee so removed shall at once be re-instated. * * *'
In the instant case, the stated reasons for removal are:
'Patrolman Joseph A. Perry, Jr. is dismissed from the Seattle Police Department for conduct unbecoming an officer for violation of state laws, for conduct likely to bring discredit upon the Seattle Police Department and for the good of the service.'
Evidence presented to the commission, if believed, will support the following findings: On two occasions within a 23-day period, the patrolman while off duty, but not in full uniform, was stopped on a public highway by state highway patrolmen for speeding and erratic driving. On one occasion, he had driven his car over the center line of the highway four times, and on the other, in the course of a mile he had driven over the center line five times. On the latter occasion, he fell down three times into a roadside ditch while walking from his car to the patrol car. On both occasions, he was affected by intoxicating liquors, and it was not safe for him to drive an automobile.
The commission, as created by the city charter, is an indispensable, independent arm of civil service. Civil service laws of recent extraction sometimes dispense with a commission and make no provision for a hearing. Under this influence, it is sometimes advocated that if a hearing is provided, the examining or reviewing board, on policy grounds, should not substitute its judgment for that of the appointing official.
Be that as it may, the patrolman's rights are entirely dictated by the written provisions of a charter, which has remained substantially in its present form...
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Danielson v. City of Seattle
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