State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley

• Decision Date: 11 July 1921
• Docket Number: No. 22498.,22498.
• Citation: 183 N.W. 956,149 Minn. 435
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PLATZER v. BEARDSLEY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

149 Minn. 435

183 N.W. 956

STATE ex rel. PLATZER

v.BEARDSLEY et al.

No. 22498.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 11, 1921.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Chas. S. Jelley, Judge.

Habeas corpus by the State, on the relation of Ruth Platzer, against R. W. Beardsley and another. Judgment for relator, and respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

An illegitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of the mother. Her consent, though given in writing and accompanied by a transfer of the custody of the child, may be revoked at any time before the child is legally adopted.

On appeal from the judgment of the district court in a habeas corpus proceeding to determine the custody of a child, there is a trial of the issue de novo, although the parties stipulated that the cause should be heard and decided solely upon the record in the district court, and this court will ascertain as best it may from the return to the writ, which was not traversed, what is for the best interests of the child.

The presumption that a mother is a fit and suitable person to be intrusted with the care of her infant child was not overcome by the uncontroverted allegations of the return. Wm. T. Coe, of Minneapolis, for appellants.

Edwin C. Garrigues, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

LEES, C.

Respondent is the mother of a female child born out of wedlock on February 20, 1921. On April 30th, she signed an agreement consenting to its adoption by the appellants, and on May 18th the child was placed in their custody. On May 23d, they filed in the district court of Hennepin county a petition for leave to adopt the child. It came on for hearing on that day. The respondent appeared in person and in open court stated that she withdrew and revoked her consent to such adoption, whereupon the court declined to go on with the proceeding. On the same day she applied to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus to regain possession of her child. Her petition alleged that the child had been given into the custody of appellants by a third person without the consent of the petitioner and that she had revoked her consent to its adoption. The return to the writ was that appellants held the custody of the child by virtue of the agreement of April 30th, which was set out at length. The agreement recited that respondent was destitute and unable to provide suitable care and nourishment for her child. The return also alleged that appellants had performed their part of the agreement and incurred expenses in so doing amounting to about $100; that they were as much attached to the child as though it was their own, and that it was for its best interests to leave it in their custody. They also alleged that respondent had no suitable place to keep the child; was without means to support it, and that there was no valid reason why she should not keep her agreement with them. No evidence was taken in the district court, the matter being submitted on the pleadings and an admission of counsel as to the length of time the child had been in appellants' custody, namely, five days prior to the filing of the petition for the writ. The findings in the district court were that it did not appear that the child would become a public charge if returned to the mother, and it did not appear from the pleadings and there was no evidence that it would not be for the best interests of the child so to return it. Judgment was ordered accordingly, and this appeal is from the judgment.

Prior to the hearing in this court the parties stipulated ‘that the cause may be heard and decided without the taking of further evidence and upon the record as certified by Hon. C. S. Jelley, District Judge.’ The record so certified includes the findings and order for judgment to which we have made reference. The hearing was had in this court pursuant to the stipulation on July 7, 1921.

[1] Appellants could not adopt the child without obtaining respondent's consent. Section 7153, G. S. 1917 Supp. Her refusal to consent still left the child in appellants' custody. They base their right to retain the custody on her agreement with them and on the claim that it is for the best interest of the child that it be left with them.

[3] The written agreement created no binding obligations respecting the custody of the child. State v. Anderson, 89 Minn. 198, 94 N. W. 681;State v. Armstrong, 141 Minn. 47, 169 N. W. 249;State v. Pelowski, 145 Minn. 383, 177 N. W. 627. The vital question is whether it is best for the child to leave it where it is or to restore it to its mother. The hearing in this court, by virtue of the statute, is a trial of the issues de novo. Section 8312, G. S. 1913; Gauthier v. Walter, 110 Minn. 103, 124 N. W. 634. The stipulation of the parties has made the record in the district court our only source of information in ascertaining the facts. We would have been better satisfied if testimony had been taken to show the actual conditions. In determining the future custody of a child, the formal allegations of pleadings do not adequately enlighten the court as ot the actual situation. The pleadings consisted of the petition for the writ and the return to the writ. The return was not traversed as it might have been. Section 8301, G. S. 1913; State v. Sheriff, 24 Minn. 87;State v. Billings, 55 Minn. 467, 57 N. W. 206, 794,43 Am. St. Rep. 525. The claim of each party to the custody of the child rests entirely on the uncontroverted allegations of the pleadings. In considering these allegations, we are guided by the rule that a mother has a natural right to and should not be deprived of the custody of her child unless it is made to appear that the best...