State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 19 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–15–0303–PR.,CR–15–0303–PR. |
| Citation | 239 Ariz. 405,372 P.3d 929 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona ex rel. Sheila Sullivan POLK, Yavapai County Attorney, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Jennifer B. CAMPBELL, Judge of Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Yavapai, Respondent Judge, Francis Frederick Kraps, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Sheila Sullivan Polk, Yavapai County Attorney, Dennis M. McGrane (argued), Chief Deputy County Attorney, Bill R. Hughes, Deputy County Attorney, Prescott, Attorneys for State of Arizona.
John M. Sears (argued), Law Offices of John M. Sears, P.C., Prescott, Attorneys for Francis Frederick Kraps.
, opinion of the Court.
, enhanced and consecutive sentencing provisions apply when a defendant is convicted of engaging in child prostitution knowing that the person is a minor aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. We today hold that these provisions also apply when the “minor” is actually an undercover peace officer.
¶ 2 The State indicted Francis Kraps on two counts of child prostitution in violation of A.R.S. § 13–3212(B)(2)
.1 During a pre-trial hearing, the superior court advised Kraps that if he was convicted, the court was required to impose an enhanced sentence between seven and twenty-one years' imprisonment for each count without the possibility of early release, and that the sentences would be served consecutively. See A.R.S. §§ 13–3212(D), (G). Kraps moved for reconsideration, asserting that because the “minors” involved were actually undercover police officers posing as sixteen-year-old girls, these sentencing provisions did not apply. The court agreed, ruling that “engaging in any form of child prostitution is a Class 2 felony,” but that the enhanced sentencing and consecutive sentencing provisions apply only when actual minors are involved. At the State's request, the court stayed the case to permit special action review.
¶ 3 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that the enhanced sentencing provisions in § 13–3212(G)
apply when an undercover police officer poses as a minor aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. State ex rel. Polk v. Campbell, 238 Ariz. 109, 110 ¶ 1, 357 P.3d 144, 145 (App.2015). The court did not address consecutive sentencing under § 13–3212(D). We granted Kraps's petition for review because it presents a recurring legal question of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
¶ 4 Because the interpretation of § 13–3212
is an issue of law, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Cf.
Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d 139, 142 (2014).
¶ 5 Our objective in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislature's intent. Baker v. Univ. Physicians Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383 ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013)
. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as written without further analysis. Cf.
Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 8, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007). If, however, the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as “the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n, 234 Ariz. at 325 ¶ 11, 322 P.3d at 142 (quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991) ).
¶ 6 A person commits child prostitution by causing or enabling a minor to engage in prostitution, § 13–3212(A)
, or by engaging in prostitution with a minor, § 13–3212(B). Kraps is charged with committing child prostitution in violation of § 13–3212(B)(2), which provides that “[a] person who is at least eighteen years of age commits child prostitution by knowingly ... [e]ngaging in prostitution with a minor who the person knows is fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years of age.” Although the undercover police officers involved here were over age eighteen, “[i]t is not a defense to a prosecution” under subsection (B)(2) “that the other person is a peace officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer posing as a minor.” A.R.S. § 13–3212(C). Kraps does not contest that the State's allegations support the charges under § 13–3212(B)(2).
¶ 7 The parties' dispute instead concerns these sentencing provisions set forth in § 13–3212
:
¶ 8 Both parties argue that the plain meaning of these provisions supports their views. Kraps asserts that “minor” commonly means a person under age eighteen, and subsections (D) and (G) therefore do not apply when an adult police officer poses as a minor. The State counters that because a defendant can be convicted under § 13–3212(B)(2)
when the “minor” is actually an undercover peace officer, the term “minor” in subsections (D) and (G) means a person under age eighteen or a peace officer, or someone assisting a peace officer, posing as a minor. Both interpretations are reasonable, and we therefore consider secondary principles of interpretation as well as the statutory language to identify legislative intent.
¶ 9 Unless a statute's context requires another definition, “minor” “means a person under the age of eighteen years.” A.R.S. § 1–215(22)
. Considering § 13–3212's history and reading the statute in its entirety convinces us that the legislature intended to use a different definition of “minor” in § 13–3212(D) and (G).
¶ 10 Before 2010, § 13–3212(A)
provided that a person commits child prostitution, among other ways, by “[e]ngaging in prostitution with a minor,” and designated child prostitution a class 2 felony. A.R.S. § 13–3212(A)(8), (D) (2010). In 2010, the legislature deleted the above-quoted language and substituted subsection (B), which delineates three ways a person engages in child prostitution:
Id. (Supp.2010); 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 6 (2d Reg.Sess.). The legislature also enacted separate sentencing provisions, and specified different felony classifications, that depended on how the offender committed child prostitution and whether the minor involved was older or younger than fifteen. A.R.S. § 13–3212(D)–(G)
(Supp.2010). It provided harsher sentences and more serious felony classifications for offenders convicted of violating subsections (A), (B)(1), and (B)(2) than for those persons convicted of violating subsection (B)(3). Id. Notably, the legislature simultaneously enacted subsection (C) to permit convictions under subsections (A), (B)(1), and (B)(2) when the “minor” involved was actually a peace officer posing as a minor or a person assisting a peace officer by posing as a minor. Id. (Supp.2010). In 2011, the legislature enacted subsection (D) to require consecutive sentences for convictions under subsections (A) and (B)(2) involving a minor aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. Id. (Supp.2011).
¶ 11 The 2010 and 2011 amendments to § 13–3212
demonstrate that the legislature intended to punish most harshly offenders who engage in prostitution with a minor under age fifteen, regardless of the offender's knowledge of the minor's age, and those who engage in prostitution with a minor who the offender knows or believes is fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years old. Because the legislature simultaneously provided that it is no defense to these offenses that the “minor” is a peace officer posing as a minor, and it did not separately provide a sentencing provision or a felony classification for a person convicted of engaging in child prostitution with an undercover officer, it follows that the legislature intended that the sentencing provisions set forth in subsections (D) and (G) apply to such offenders. Indeed, the 2010 Arizona Bill Summary transmitted to the Governor applied what is now subsection (G) to the (B)(2) offense, without exception, by characterizing the offense as “a Class 2 felony punishable by a presumptive 10.5 year prison term for a first offense.”
¶ 12 In arguing that the sentencing enhancements should not apply in cases in which undercover officers have posed as minors, Kraps urges us to “apply the ordinary rules of grammar” to “shift the first dependent clause of subsection (G) to where it logically and grammatically belongs, and to insert the connector ‘and.’ ” So reconstructed, the statute would provide a class 2 felony designation for all (B)(2) offenses before requiring enhanced sentences for offenses involving minors aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. This would cause...
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