State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Department of Public Service, 27653.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1939
• Docket Number: 27653.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PORT OF SEATTLE v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

95 P.2d 1007

1 Wn.2d 102

STATE ex rel. PORT OF SEATTLE v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE et al.

No. 27653.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 31, 1939

Department 1.

Proceeding by the State, on the relation of the Port of Seattle, a municipal corporation, against the Department of Public Service of Washington and others, to review an order of the Department of Public Service requiring the relator to procure a warehouse license and to comply with the rules and regulations of the department regulating certain tariffs of the port. To review a judgment of the Superior Court affirming the order of the department, except in so far as it required the port to apply for a license immediately and to fix rates on the same schedules as had already been fixed by the department, the port appeals.

Modified and as modified, affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F Wright, judge.

Fairbrook & Williams, of Seattle, for appellant.

G. W Hamilton and Don Cary Smith, both of Olympia, for respondents.

Frederick J. Lordan, of Seattle, for Washington State Warehousemen's Ass'n.

SIMPSON Justice.

This case involves the right of the department of public service to compel the Port of Seattle to procure a warehouse license and the authority of the department to regulate certain tariffs of the port.

March 30, 1938, the Washington State Warehousemen's Association filed a complaint with the department of public service in which they charged: 'That the Port of Seattle is conducting a storage warehouse business in the City of Seattle as defined by Chapter 154 of the Laws of 1933 as amended by Chapter 202 of the Laws of 1937 in violation of the provisions of said laws in that the Port of Seattle has not secured a warehousemen's license to transact business in the state, has not filed tariff containing the rates, rules and regulations as prescribed by the Department of Public Service in its Cause No. 7043, effective November 15, 1937, and is charging rates different from those prescribed therein.'

The association requested that the department of public service investigate the operations of the Port of Seattle, and require the port to comply with the rules and regulations of the department and the provisions of Chapter 154, page 554, Laws of 1933, as amended by Chapter 202, page 981, Laws of 1937, Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. §§ 11569-1 to 11569-12.

A hearing was had Before the supervisor of the department and, after some testimony had been taken, the interested parties entered into the following stipulation of facts:

'1. That the Port of Seattle is a municipal corporation, existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Washington.

'2. That said municipal corporation owns and operates certain public buildings and docks in the City of Seattle which are held out for hire to the general public for the storage of goods, wares and merchandise.

'3. That goods are stored for hire in the Bell Street Dock, owned by said municipal corporation, and that said goods are received at said dock in the following manner:

'(a) Goods are received at said dock by water haul and leave said dock by water haul.

'(b) Goods are received at said dock by water haul and leave said dock by land haul.

'(c) Goods are received at said dock by land haul and leave said dock by water haul.

'(d) Goods are received at said dock by land haul and leave said dock by land haul.

'4. That in some instances goods are received on one dock or pier by water and taken from said dock or pier by land and transported to a second pier where they are stored, and in some instances taken from said second pier or dock by land haul.'

The department found for the association, requiring the port to apply immediately for a license, and to file tariffs fixing rates for storage in the same amount as fixed by the department at a hearing to which the port was not a party.

The order of the department was reviewed by the superior court of Thurston county and affirmed except in so far as it required the port to apply for a license immediately and to fix rates on the same schedules as had already been fixed by the department. The Port of Seattle has appealed.

Appellant is a municipal corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the port district act. Chapter 92, page 412, Laws of 1911, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 9688 to 9709, inclusive. The portion of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9692, which it is necessary to consider in this case, reads: '* * to fix absolutely and without right of appeal or review the rates of wharfage, dockage, warehousing and port and terminal charges upon all improvements owned and operated directly by the port district itself and ferry charges of ferries operated by itself: Provided, however, that the port commission shall file with the public service commission of the state of Washington its schedule of rates and charges so fixed, as is required by the laws of the state of Washington of public service corporations, and may not change any rate or charge so filed without first filing a notice of such change of rate or charge with the public service commission not less than thirty days prior to the going into effect of such change of rate or charge, * * *.'

The legislature of 1933 passed an act known as chapter 154 which gave control of the rates charged by public storage warehouses to the department of public service. Ports were not mentioned. That act was amended by chapter 202, page 981, Laws of 1937, Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. §§ 11569-1, 11569-5, and 11569-6, the relevant portions of § 11569-1 provide:

'The word 'person' whenever used in this act shall be held to mean and include an individual, copartnership, association, joint stock association, corporation, or their lessees, trustees, receivers or trustees, appointed by any court whatsoever, and shall include port commissions and districts.

'The term 'storage warehouse' whenever used in this act shall be held to mean and include a building or structure or any part thereof in which goods, wares or merchandise is received for storage for compensation * * * Further provided, The term 'storage warehouse' shall not include any building or structure or part thereof in which freight is handled in transit exclusively, * * * nor include docks and wharves.

'The term 'dock' or 'wharf,' when used in this act, includes any and all structures at which any steamboat, vessel or other water craft lands for the purpose of receiving or discharging freight from or for the public, together with any building or structure used for storing such freight while in transit exclusively for the public for hire.

'The term 'while in transit' when used in this act shall be held to mean and include all goods, wares and merchandise received on any dock or wharf, destined to or consigned from waterborne commerce, it being the intention of the legislature to exempt all goods received on any dock or wharf for shipments from the land via water or received on said dock or wharf by water to be transshipped by land, or water, irrespective of the time of its retention upon said dock or wharf.

'The term 'storage warehouseman' and 'warehouseman' when ever used in this act shall be held to mean any person operating any storage warehouse.' Laws of 1937, chapter 202, p. 981, § 1.

The question presented is whether the act of 1937 applies to those port districts which store in their docks and wharves goods entering or leaving by land haul.

Appellant contends that so much of the act of 1937 as applies to port districts is unconstitutional in that the title to the act does not comply with the following provisions of the state constitution:

'No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.' Art. II, § 19.

'No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length.' Art. II, § 37.

The title to the 1937 act reads: 'An Act relating to storage warehouses and warehousemen in any county of this state having a population of thirty thousand or more, defining the same, providing for payment of fees thereby, providing for the regulation and supervision thereof by the department of public service, providing for the enforcement of the provisions of this act and penalties for the violation thereof, and amending sections 1, 6 and 11 and repealing section 5 of chapter 154 of the Session Laws of 1933.'

Counsel for appellant base their argument upon the fact that the title of the act of 1937 does not mention ports or docks or goods in transit, nor does it indicate a purpose to transfer the right to control rates from the dock commissioners to the department of public service.

In State ex rel. Zenner v. Graham, 34 Wash. 81, 74 P. 1058, 1059, it is stated: 'The purpose of the constitutional provision that the subject of the act shall be expressed in the title does not mean that the title shall be an index to the act, as this one is. It is only necessary that the title shall state the general purpose and scope of the act, so that, making every reasonable intendment in favor of the act, it may be said that the subject is expressed in the title. Black's Const.Law (2d Ed.) p. 329; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (5th Ed.) p. 173; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, pp. 95, 96.'

The rule relative to the requirements of the title to an act is expressed in Maxwell v. Lancaster, 81 Wash. 602, 143 P. 157, 158, as follows:

'The general rules relating to titles of legislative acts with respect to expression of the subject-matter are well settled. The title need not be an index to the body of the act, nor need it express in detail every phase of the subject which is dealt with by the act. The essential requirement is notice,...