State ex rel. A.R.C.
| Decision Date | 21 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 08-22-00149-CV |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas FOR the Best Interest and Protection of A.R.C. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: Kirk Cooper, Cooper Appeals, P.L.L.C., 10420 Montwood Dr., Ste. N-405, El Paso, TX 79936.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: Michael Gomez, Dana Irwin Carmona, Kevin McCary, Assistant County Attorneys, 500 E. San Antonio, Room 503, El Paso, TX 79901.
ATTORNEY AD LITEM: Frank Gonzalez, Texas Tech University System, 4801 Alberta Avenue, Suite B-09, El Paso, TX 79905.
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
Appellant, A.R.C., appeals the trial court's judgment ordering temporary inpatient mental health treatment.1 In two issues, A.R.C. argues the trial court erred in granting the State's application for court-ordered mental health services because the State failed to meet the strict statutory requirements for granting such an application or, alternatively, the evidence supporting the trial court's order was legally and factually insufficient. We reverse and render.
In July 2022, Ferney Paez, M.D., filed an application for temporary court-ordered mental-health services, alleging that A.R.C. was a mentally ill person who, because of his mental illness: (1) was likely to cause serious harm to himself and others; (2) was experiencing severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, as well as substantial mental or physical deterioration of his ability to function independently to provide for his basic needs; and (3) was unable to make rational, informed decisions as to whether or not to submit to treatment. Two certificates of medical examination (CME) were filed in support of the application: one completed by Dr. Paez and a second one completed by Roberto Kutcher-Diaz, M.D.
Prior to the trial court's hearing on the court-ordered mental health-services application, A.R.C. filed a motion urging the trial court to dismiss the application because the statutory requirements for holding the hearing had not been met. Specifically, he argued that the statute governing court-ordered mental-health services required that at least one of the CMEs be completed by a psychiatrist, and neither Drs. Paez nor Dr. Kutcher-Diaz—who were merely residents of a psychiatry resident program—qualified as such.
At the hearing on the application, Dr. Kutcher-Diaz, who identified himself as a "psychiatry resident," recommended that A.R.C. be committed for a period of up to 45 days so that he may receive mental health services and psychoactive medications. When cross-examined about his occupation,2 Dr. Kutcher-Diaz testified that he was a second-year psychiatry resident at the "Foster Medical School ... at Texas Tech[.]" When asked if he considered himself a psychiatrist, Dr. Kutcher-Diaz responded, "I'm a psychiatry resident, yes." When asked again, he responded, "Yes," explaining that he considered himself a psychiatrist because he treated patients with mental illness and used medications. As to his licensure status, Dr. Kutcher-Diaz clarified that he had a physician-in-training permit, which he considered to be the same as a license to practice medicine.
Under his physician-in-training permit, he "actively practice[d] medicine under the supervision of other physicians [which was] part of [his] training process[.]" Dr. Kutcher-Diaz testified that although a physician-in-training permit restricted him to the practice of medicine as part of a residency training or fellowship program, that did not mean he was a necessarily a student, but was, in fact, a medical doctor. He further explained that to become a psychiatrist, one had to first graduate from medical school and then complete an accredited residency program, which program he had not yet completed. He agreed that it was by virtue of his enrollment in the residency program that he was issued a physician-in-training permit, that he was not an employee of the University Medical Center (UMC), and that he had not yet applied for a "separate license as a medical doctor with the Texas Medical Board."
Dr. Kutcher-Diaz testified that Dr. Paez, the doctor who completed the first CME, was also a second-year psychiatry resident. The trial court granted the application for temporary court-ordered mental health services for a period of 45 days.
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court had a ministerial duty to dismiss the application and order his immediate release because two statutorily compliant CMEs were not on file by the time of the hearing. We agree.
Review of Appellant's first issue requires us to construe the statutory requirements of the Texas Health and Safety Code with respect to court-ordered mental health services. See TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 571.003, 574.009 (). "Statutory construction is a legal question that we review de novo in order to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent" as expressed by the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. Rio Valley, L.L.C. v. City of El Paso , 441 S.W.3d 482, 491 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) ; see Butler v. City of Big Spring , No. 11-21-00026-CV, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2022 WL 2975948, at *2 () ; TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.005. We must presume that every word of a statute has been used for a purpose; likewise, we presume every excluded word has been purposefully excluded. See Butler , ––– S.W.3d at ––––, 2022 WL 2975948 at *2. As such, when a term is included in one section of a statute but excluded in another, we do not imply the term where excluded. See id.
When the plain language of a statute does not convey the Legislature's apparent intent, however, a reviewing court may resort to construction aids in determining that intent, such as the Code Construction Act, found in Chapter 311 of the Texas Government Code. Mitchell v. State , 473 S.W.3d 503, 514 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). In accordance with Section 311.011 of the Texas Government Code, in ascertaining the meaning of an undefined term, we look to any definitions prescribed by the Legislature, as well as any acquired technical or particular meaning of the words. See id. ; TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.011. We are also permitted to look to, among other things, prior court opinions construing the term in other contexts. Mitchell , 473 S.W.3d at 515 (citing Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc. , 438 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. 2014) ).
Moreover, when a term is "connected with and used with reference to a particular trade or subject matter or is used as a word of art, the word shall have the meaning given by experts in the particular trade, subject matter, or art." TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.002. We read the statute as a whole and not just its isolated portions, giving effect to every part. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003) (citing Jones v. Fowler , 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998) ).
Section 574.009 of the Texas Health and Safety Code (the Code) sets out the requirements for medical examination in an action for court-ordered mental health services, stating, in relevant part:
TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.009(a), (d) (emphasis added). "The provision that two certificates must be on file at the time of the hearing is mandatory." State ex rel. E.A. , No. 14-14-00980-CV, 2015 WL 5173036, at *3 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.], Sept. 3, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing State ex rel. L.A. , No. 06-15-00028-CV, 2015 WL 4381340, at *1 (Tex.App.— Texarkana July 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; In re J.J. , 900 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.App.— Texarkana 1995, no writ) ; State ex rel. M.S. , No. 12-02-00061-CV, 2002 WL 1900020, at *2 (Tex.App.—Tyler Aug. 14, 2002, no pet.). "If statutorily compliant certificates are not on file at the time set for the application hearing, the application must be dismissed." State ex rel. E.A. , 2015 WL 5173036 at *3. Failure to comply with the mandates of Section 574.009 effectively deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to issue an order for mental health services. See Porter v. State , 703 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) ( TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5547–46, now TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.009 and holding that requirement that two certificates are on file is jurisdictional in nature).
The Texas Health and Safety Code defines "physician" as "a person licensed to practice medicine in this state ... or a person authorized to perform medical acts under a physician-in-training permit at a Texas postgraduate training program approved by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education [(ACGME)] ... or the Texas Medical Board." TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 571.003(18)(A), (C). It does not define "psychiatrist." See generally id. § 571.003.
The Texas Medical Board—the body responsible for establishing standards for and regulating the practice of medicine through licensure and discipline of physicians—has defined a "postgraduate resident" as "[a] physician who is in postgraduate training as an intern, resident, or fellow in an approved postgraduate training program or a board-approved fellowship." 22 TEX.ADMIN.CODE ANN. § 171.3(a)(...
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