State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304, Service Employees Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 24 April 1985
• Docket Number: CLC,No. 85-106,AFL-CI,85-106
• Citation: 476 N.E.2d 1060,17 OBR 45,17 Ohio St.3d 54
• Parties: , 17 O.B.R. 45 The STATE, ex rel. RACING GUILD OF OHIO, LOCAL 304, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATL. UNION,, v. MORGAN, Judge, et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 54

17 Ohio St.3d 54

476 N.E.2d 1060, 17 O.B.R. 45

The STATE, ex rel. RACING GUILD OF OHIO, LOCAL 304, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATL. UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC, v. MORGAN, Judge, et al.

No. 85-106.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 24, 1985.

Schwarzwald, Robiner, Wolf & Rock Co., L.P.A., Melvin S. Schwarzwald and David M. Fusco, Cleveland, for relator.

Lynn C. Slaby, Pros. Atty., and Larry G. Poulos, Akron, for respondents.

Schwartz, Einhart & Simerka, Eugene B. Schwartz and Gregory P. Szuter, Cleveland, for intervening respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Three requirements must be satisfied before a writ of prohibition will issue: (1) the court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power; (2) the exercise of such power must be unauthorized by law; and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in injury for which there is no other adequate remedy at law. State, ex rel. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., v. Guzzo (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 270, 271, 452 N.E.2d 1314. The first requirement is clearly satisfied in this case; the dispute occurs with regard to the latter two requirements.

Relator argues that Summit County does not have jurisdiction in the action filed by Northfield, and that any orders issued by respondents pertaining to the case are unauthorized by law. Respondents argue that the two injunctive actions are independent causes that can be adjudicated in separate jurisdictions.

In State, ex rel. Phillips, v. Polcar (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 279, 364 N.E.2d 33 , this court held at the syllabus:

"As between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties. (John Weenink & Sons Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 150 Ohio St. 349, 82 N.E.2d 730 , approved and followed.)"

In Phillips, the relators had originally filed suit in Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County for rescission of a realty purchase contract. The defendants in that action subsequently filed suit for damages in Parma Municipal Court, based upon the same purchase agreement involved in the Cuyahoga County action. The court of appeals allowed a writ of prohibition to prevent the Parma court from taking jurisdiction, despite the fact that different remedies were sought, and this court affirmed.

In Weenink & Sons, supra, relators filed suit in municipal court against the city of Cleveland for money judgments stemming from a rodeo held in Cleveland. The city then filed suit in the court of common pleas against relators and others, seeking declaratory relief with regard to a fund which the city had collected as a result of holding the rodeo. This court affirmed the allowance of a writ of prohibition to prevent jurisdiction in the court of common pleas.

In the case at bar, each pa...