State Ex Rel. Reginald Griffin v. Denney, SC 91112.

Decision Date04 October 2011
Docket NumberNo. SC 91112.,SC 91112.
PartiesSTATE ex rel. Reginald GRIFFIN, Petitioner,v.Larry DENNEY, Superintendent, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

347 S.W.3d 73

STATE ex rel. Reginald GRIFFIN, Petitioner,
v.
Larry DENNEY, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. SC 91112.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Aug. 2, 2011.Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 2011.


[347 S.W.3d 75]

Kent E. Gipson, Law Office of Kent Gipson LLC, Kansas City, for Petitioner.Stephen D. Hawke, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for Respondent.RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Chief Justice.

Reginald Griffin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his murder conviction should be vacated because newly discovered evidence proves that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by withholding material evidence during his trial. Griffin has met his burden of proving entitlement to habeas relief.

I. Facts

On July 12, 1983, James Bausley was stabbed fatally in the chest at the Missouri Training Center for Men in Moberly. Within minutes of the stabbing, prison guards confiscated a sharpened screwdriver from inmate Jeffrey Smith as Smith attempted to leave the area where Bausley was stabbed. Smith was placed in administrative segregation and eventually was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon for possessing the screwdriver. The State never disclosed this evidence to Griffin.

During the investigation of Bausley's murder, inmates Paul Curtis and Wyvonne Mozee told prison investigators that fellow inmate Reginald Griffin stabbed Bausley.

[347 S.W.3d 76]

Curtis and Mozee also stated that inmates Doyle Franks and Arbary Jackson assisted Griffin. In 1987, the State charged Griffin with Bausley's murder.

At trial, the State relied primarily on testimony from Curtis and Mozee. Curtis testified that he saw Griffin, Franks and Jackson arguing with Bausley over a television set. According to Curtis, Griffin hit Bausley in the back and then stabbed him in the chest with a foot-long knife that had a yellow rag for a handle. Griffin threw the knife on the roof of the prison gymnasium and fled. Curtis admitted that he agreed to testify in exchange for the State's promise to assist him on unrelated stealing charges and by writing a letter to the board of probation and parole noting his cooperation. Curtis also testified that the State paid his rent for one month following his release on parole.

Mozee died before trial. The State introduced a transcript of Mozee's preliminary hearing testimony. Like Curtis, Mozee testified that Griffin and Bausley were arguing about a television set. Mozee further testified that Griffin, Jackson, Franks and another inmate approached Bausley. Like Curtis, Mozee testified that Griffin stabbed Bausley in the chest with a homemade knife.

Griffin contested Mozee's credibility with the testimony of inmates David Steele and Eddie Johnson. Steele testified that Mozee said he had a deal with prison officials to testify against Griffin to secure an early release. Steele also testified that Mozee said he was going to say “whatever they wanted just as part of the deal.” Johnson testified that Mozee told him that he did not witness the stabbing.

In addition to the testimony of Curtis and Mozee, the State also introduced evidence showing that during the investigation of Bausley's murder, prison investigators found a homemade knife near the gym. The knife was 13 inches long, three-quarters of an inch wide and had a yellow cloth wrapped around the handle. The medical examiner concluded that the knife could have caused Bausley's wounds. Preliminary tests detected human blood and proteins on the blade. Subsequent testing was negative for the presence of blood. There was no physical evidence demonstrating that Griffin ever possessed the knife or that he had participated in Bausley's murder.

A jury found Griffin guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. The case was remanded for a new penalty phase because the State introduced into evidence the record of conviction of another person by same name. State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Mo. banc 1993). Griffin was re-sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

II. Habeas petition

In 2005, Griffin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the State failed to disclose evidence that that prison guards had seized the sharpened screwdriver from inmate Smith. Griffin asserted that the State's failure to disclose the Smith evidence violated Brady because the evidence implicates Smith as an alternate perpetrator.

The circuit court denied the habeas petition. Griffin petitions this Court for habeas relief. As established below, the State's failure to disclose this evidence, considered with reference to the totality of the circumstances in this case, demonstrates substantial doubt as to the factual validity of Griffin's convictions.

III. Standard for Habeas Relief

“[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution

[347 S.W.3d 77]

or laws of the state or federal government.” State ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003)). Habeas proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement. Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 125. Griffin has the burden of proving he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Id.

Griffin's Brady claim was cognizable on direct appeal and in his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. To overcome the procedural bar to review of his claims, Griffin must demonstrate cause and prejudice, manifest injustice, or a jurisdictional defect. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546. As established below, the evidence in this case satisfies the cause and prejudice standard for habeas relief.1

To obtain relief under the “cause and prejudice” standard, Griffin first must establish “cause” for the procedural default by proving that the claim was not raised timely because of some objective factor external to the defense. Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n. 24, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). Griffin established cause. The State was obviously aware that inmate Smith possessed a weapon while in the prison yard where Bausley was murdered. The State did not disclose this evidence to Griffin. The State's failure to disclose this evidence is an objective factor external to Griffin's defense that constitutes “cause” to overcome the objection that Griffin did not raise this issue at trial.

To establish “prejudice,” Griffin must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence resulted in a verdict not “worthy of confidence.” Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 129 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). The analysis of prejudice under the “cause and prejudice” standard for habeas review is “identical to this Court's assessment of prejudice undertaken in assessing Griffin's Brady claims.” Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126. “Consequently, so long as Griffin establishes the prejudice necessary to support his Brady claims, he will have shown the required prejudice to overcome the procedural bar for habeas relief.” Id. To establish prejudice, Griffin does not have to prove definitively that he would have received a different verdict if the Smith evidence had been disclosed. The question is “whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. at 129. When reviewing a habeas petition premised on an alleged Brady violation, this Court considers all available evidence uncovered following the trial. Engel, 304 S.W.3d at 126; see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436–37, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (courts must consider the cumulative effect of excluded evidence in determining if a Brady violation occurred).

IV. Brady violation

Griffin's Brady argument is premised on the assertion that the State failed to disclose to him material evidence pertaining...

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6 cases
  • Ferguson v. Dormire
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • November 5, 2013
    ...545). “Habeas proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement.” State ex rel. Griffin v. Denney, 347 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Mo. banc 2011). Habeas proceedings are not intended to “ ‘correct procedural defaults as to post-conviction remedies.’ ” McElwain, 340......
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  • State ex rel. Sitton v. Norman
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    ...of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.” State ex rel. Griffin v. Denney, 347 S.W.3d 73, 76–77 (Mo. banc 2011). Habeas proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement. Denney, 347 S.W.3d at 7......
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