State ex rel. Sitton v. Norman

• Decision Date: 01 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC 93020.,SC 93020.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. William J. SITTON, Petitioner, v. Jeff NORMAN, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

406 S.W.3d 915

STATE ex rel. William J. SITTON, Petitioner,
v.
Jeff NORMAN, Warden, Respondent.

No. SC 93020.

Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.

July 30, 2013.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 2013.

Craig A. Johnston, Public Defender's Office, Columbia, for Sitton.

Stephen D. Hawke, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for the State.

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge.

William Sitton was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, section 565.024, and armed criminal action, section 571.015. Sitton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the trial court permitted otherwise qualified jurors to opt out of jury service by agreeing to perform community service. Sitton argues that this opt-out practice entitles him to habeas relief because it constitutes a fundamental and systemic failure to comply with the jury selection requirements sections 494.400–494.505. ¹ Finding no claim

[406 S.W.3d 916]

warranting relief, the petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent.

I. Background

In 2005, a Lincoln County jury convicted Sitton of involuntary manslaughter and armed criminal action. The circuit court sentenced Sitton to consecutive terms of seven and 18 years imprisonment. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Sitton, 214 S.W.3d 404 (Mo.App.2007). The circuit court denied Sitton's motion for post-conviction relief. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment. Sitton v. State, 294 S.W.3d 137 (Mo.App.2009). Sitton did not raise any issue regarding defects in the jury selection process in his direct appeal or during post-conviction proceedings.

At the time of Sitton's trial, the circuit court of Lincoln County allowed jurors to opt out of service by agreeing to perform community service and paying a $50 fee. Sitton alleges he was unaware of this practice until October 18, 2010, after the court of appeals held that Lincoln County's opt-out practice violated Missouri's jury selection statutes. See Preston v. State, 325 S.W.3d 420 (Mo.App.2010). On October 25, 2010, Sitton filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the opt-out practice was a fundamental and systemic violation of the statutory jury selection requirements. The circuit court denied the motion.

Sitton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that the opt-out practice violated the jury selection statutes. Sitton alleged that five prospective jurors elected to opt out of jury duty by agreeing to perform community service. Sitton alleged that the illegality of this practice entitled him to a new trial. The circuit court and the court of appeals denied Sitton's petition. Sitton then filed his writ petition with this Court.

II. Habeas Corpus

“[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government.” State ex rel. Griffin v. Denney, 347 S.W.3d 73, 76–77 (Mo. banc 2011). Habeas proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement. Denney, 347 S.W.3d at 77. Sitton has the burden of proving he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Id.

Sitton's claim that the opt-out practice violated Missouri's jury selection statutes was cognizable on direct appeal and in his Rule 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief. The state asserts that the failure to raise these claims earlier constitutes a procedural default precluding review of Sitton's claim. Sitton argues that his claim is timely pursuant to section 494.465.1 and, alternatively, that he can satisfy the “cause and prejudice” standard for obtaining review of a procedurally defaulted claim. The parties contest the facts pertaining to when Sitton knew or should have known of the Lincoln County opt-out practice. It is unnecessary to resolve this dispute because the undisputed facts demonstrate Sitton has not established prejudice warranting habeas relief.

III. Missouri's jury selection statutes

Sections 494.400–505 provide the framework for jury selection in Missouri. Preston 325 S.W.3d at 423.Section 494.400 provides that “[a]ll persons qualified for grand or petit jury service ... shall be selected at random from a fair cross section

[406 S.W.3d 917]

of the citizens of the county” and that all qualified Missouri citizens have “an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose, unless excused.” There are two grounds on which a citizen may be disqualified from jury duty: (1) ineligible persons and (2) persons entitled to be excused. See sections 494.425 (ineligibility) and section 494.430 (excusal).

The statutes provide that each county in Missouri must have a board of jury commissioners. Section 494.405. The board is required to compile a “master jury list” for the county. Section 494.410. Consistent with the statutory requirement that jurors are selected randomly from a fair cross-section of the population, the master jury list contains a “random selection of names from a minimum of two government records.” Id. The master jury list must contain at least 400 names and must constitute at least 5 percent of the county's total population. Id. From the master list, the board randomly draws the names of as many prospective jurors as a trial court may...