State ex rel. Reyna v. Natalucci-Persichetti
Decision Date | 23 September 1998 |
Docket Number | NATALUCCI-PERSICHETT,No. 98-45,D,98-45 |
Citation | 699 N.E.2d 76,83 Ohio St.3d 194 |
Parties | The STATE ex rel. REYNA, Appellant, v.irector, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Blaugrund, Herbert & Martin, Inc., and John W. Herbert, Dublin, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Winston M. Ford, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Reyna asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in failing to grant him longevity pay, a monetary sum in lieu of accrued, unused vacation credit, and costs. For the reasons that follow, we hold Reyna's contentions to be meritless and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Reyna contends in his first proposition of law that the court of appeals erred in denying longevity pay to which he is entitled pursuant to former R.C. 124.181.
Former R.C. 124.181, in effect at the time DYS hired Reyna, provided:
Former Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-37-03, effective at the time Reyna was hired by DYS, provided:
(Emphasis added.)
As the court of appeals correctly held, the foregoing provisions required DAS to administer the longevity pay supplements provided by former R.C. 124.181(E). Reyna argues that the "except as provided in division (E) of this section" clause in former R.C. 124.181(A) obviated the necessity of a formal application and approval of the Director of Administrative Services before receipt of longevity pay. But former R.C. 124.181(D) specifically authorized the Director of Administrative Services to promulgate rules establishing standards regarding administration of the R.C. 124.181 pay supplements, including the longevity pay provisions of former R.C. 124.181(E). Pursuant to this authority, the director issued Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-37-03, which vests DAS with the duty to administer longevity pay supplements.
Our conclusion comports with the plain language of former R.C. 124.181, which did not, as Reyna asserts, specify that the appointing authority administer the automatic longevity pay supplement. The paramount consideration in construing statutes is legislative intent, which is determined by reviewing the statutory language. State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 224, 227, 685 N.E.2d 754, 758. The language of former R.C. 124.181 indicates the intent of the General Assembly to bestow the authority to administer pay supplements on DAS.
In addition, former Ohio Adm.Code 123:1-37-03 does not conflict with former R.C. 124.181. Instead, the rule was promulgated pursuant to the statute and was reasonable and consistent with the statute's provisions. State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 377, 382, 627 N.E.2d 538, 542 ().
Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in denying Reyna's claim for longevity pay because he failed to join DAS as a respondent in his mandamus action.
Reyna asserts in his second proposition of law that the court of appeals erred by awarding him vacation credit instead of a monetary sum for his accrued, unused vacation leave because of his right under R.C. 124.134(C) to liquidate this leave when he transferred to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction from DYS in March 1996. R.C. 124.134(C) provides that "[i]n case of transfer of an employee from one state agency to another, the employee may elect to be compensated at the employee's current rate of pay for accrued and unused vacation leave at the time of transfer by the releasing agency or to retain the accrued and unused vacation leave."
For the reasons that follow, however, Reyna's second proposition of law lacks merit.
First, Reyna waived this issue by not claiming entitlement to the monetary amount in lieu of vacation credit by virtue of the R.C. 124.134(C) election provision in the court of appeals. See State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 679 N.E.2d 706, 709, quoting Goldberg v. Indus. Comm. (1936), 131 Ohio St. 399, 404, 6 O.O. 108, 110, 3 N.E.2d 364, 367. By not raising this issue...
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