State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis
| Decision Date | 02 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | P--346,Nos. P--347,s. P--347 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida ex rel. Willie L. REYNOLDS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Ben C. WILLIS, Circuit Judge, Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida, Respondent. STATE of Florida ex rel. Ronnie Otis UTLEY, Petitioner, v. Honorable Ben C. WILLIS, Circuit Judge, Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard W. Ervin, III, Public Defender, and Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioners.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING GRANTED
In these two original proceedings in prohibition the respondent has filed petitions for rehearing and clarification addressed to our recent decisions in which we issued absolute rules prohibiting the respondent from further proceeding in these causes. We grant the petitions for rehearing and clarification, and, upon such rehearing and reconsideration, we have decided to adhere to our decisions to issue the said rules absolute, upon the following ratio decidendi:
These two proceedings before us are identical in every substantial respect, so in the discussion below we will write as though only one proceeding is involved, with the understanding that what is said about one proceeding is equally applicable to the other.
The suggestion in prohibition alleges--and the respondent admits in his return to the rule nisi in prohibition which we have hitherto issued--the occurrence of the following events pertinent to our present consideration.
The suggester Reynolds was charged by information in the Circuit Court for Leon County on February 16, 1971, with the crime of receiving stolen property, and the suggester Utley with the crime of breaking and entering a building with intent to commit a felony.
On April 1, 1971, the suggester, pursuant to Rule 3.191 (formerly Rule 1.191), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A., reported in Fla., 245 So.2d 33, filed a demand for speedy trial.
On April 29, 1971, the date set for the trial, the State was unable to bring the suggester's case to trial because (alleges the suggester) 'of other cases being tried.'
No further proceedings were had with respect to the suggester's case until June 7, 1971, the opening day of the new term of court, when a new trial date was set for July 14, 1971, by which date more than 60 days had elapsed since the filing of the demand for speedy trial. On June 12, 1971, this court issued its constitutional stay writ staying all proceedings in the trial court 'pending further order of this court.'
On June 8, 1971, the suggester filed a motion for discharge on the ground that over 60 days had elapsed since the filing of his demand for speedy trial, alleging that no order of continuance had intervened.
On June 11, 1971, the said motion for discharge was heard by the respondent and denied.
The suggestion alleges therefore, that the respondent lacks the authority to have suggester brought to trial, and that prohibition is, therefore, an appropriate remedy to restrain the conducting of the scheduled trial, and to order the discharge of the suggester from custody. We agree that prohibition, for that reason, is an appropriate remedy.
In addition to agreeing to the above timetable of events, the respondent alleges in his return to the rule nisi that other circumstances existed, such as the fact that on April 1, 1971, the case was brought up for trial but that the court granted the State's motion for a continuance because a material witness was hospitalized. The court also noted the fact that on April 29 the case was continued because of another case already docketed for trial. This later circumstance does not, in our opinion, qualify as 'exceptional circumstances' as defined in Rule 3.191, quoted below, as authorizing continuances--in fact the alleged circumstances come close to fitting the description in the rule of circumstances not constituting 'exceptional circumstances', such as 'general congestion of a court's docket.'
By issuing our rule nisi we held in effect that the suggestion stated a prima facie case for the issuance of the writ of prohibition. We adhere to our said holding.
The procedural rule basically involved in these proceedings is Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which rule was promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida on February 24, 1971, and provides in pertinent part as follows:
'(a) (2). Speedy Trial Upon Demand.--
Except as otherwise provided, and subject to the limitations imposed under section (c) hereof, every person charged with a crime, by indictment or information or trial affidavit, shall upon demand filed with the court having jurisdiction and upon service of a copy of such demand upon the prosecuting attorney be brought to trial within 60 days, unless the State is granted a continuance because of exceptional circumstances as defined in this Rule, and if not brought to trial within such period of time following such demand shall upon motion timely filed with the court and served on the prosecuting attorney be forever discharged from the crime; provided, the court before granting such motion shall ascertain that such person has been continuously available for trial during said period of time. The time period established by this section shall commence when such demand has been properly filed and served. If such person is serving in Florida or elsewhere a sentence of imprisonment for an unrelated crime, the operation of this section shall not be effective until such person is no longer imprisoned and becomes available for trial, nor until such person has abandoned or waived further proceedings under § (b)(2) of this Rule if such have been initiated.
'(f). Exceptional Circumstances.--
As permitted by this Rule, the court may order an extension of time or continuance where exceptional circumstances are shown to exist; exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court's docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays.
'Exceptional circumstances are those which as a matter of substantial justice to the accused or the State or both require an order by the court. Such circumstances include (i) unexpected illness or unexpected incapacity...
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V.C. v. Ferguson, 82-323
...right, see Dickoff v. Dewell, supra. See also Turner v. Olliff, 281 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), and State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis, 255 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (both noting that speedy trial rule represents enlightened effort to implement constitutionally guaranteed right to a sp......
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Sherrod v. Franza, 60683
...Florida as well as the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. This rule was deemed by the court in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis, 255 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), as the implementing tool of the constitutional guaranteed right of the accused to a speedy trial, for which a w......
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Turner v. Olliff
...Amendment. See Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). As we said in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis, 255 So.2d 287 (Fla.App.1971): 'The only way we could uphold the respondent's rulings herein would be for us to amend Rule 3.191, but this court......